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Abstract
Ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) are characterised by a myriad of heterogeneous 
devices fitted with computing and communication capabilities -  many of them embedded in 
physical objects and usually imperceptible -  whose main goal is to cooperate in a coordinated 
manner to supply users with a pool of services that facilitate their tasks. Communication among 
the participating devices is predominantly performed through the wireless medium. UCEs can 
also be partially or completely reliant on infrastructureless wireless multihop communication, 
which provides them with full network connectivity, great flexibility and a versatile dynamic 
network topology that can be desirable in many situations.
However, UCEs’ wireless (often multihop) nature also makes them inherently susceptible to 
having their communication operation disrupted due to their dependence on the cooperative 
packet forwarding behaviour of each individual node. For example, misbehaving nodes can cause 
general network disruption by not forwarding any or only forwarding some packets on behalf of 
other nodes in the network. Consequently, protection of the data forwarding functionality against 
malicious or otherwise defective nodes is an important characteristic that UCEs must support.
This thesis proposes an adaptable protection scheme that can detect, accuse and penalise 
misbehaving nodes that disrupt the communication capabilities of a UCE by dropping data 
packets that they are expected to forward on behalf of their peer network nodes. This thesis 
presents different aspects of the design and implementation of the protection scheme. Among the 
most important aspects are: i) collection of information for behaviour evaluation, ii) accurate 
detection of misbehaving nodes, iii) accurate and effective accusation of nodes persistently 
misbehaving, iv) adaptability through network management policies, v) network clustering and a 
role-based organisational model, vi) resilience to nodes that report false metrics, and vii) 
resilience to colluding nodes. Concepts developed in this work are illustrated in the context of 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) since they have emerged as an appropriate paradigm to 
enable the deployment of UCE technologies. The efficiency and effectiveness of each aspect of 
the protection scheme are evaluated and demonstrated through extensive simulations.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1
1 Introduction
Wireless communications have become a worldwide spread technology that has extended 
computing networks to environments that were previously unreachable or impractical to reach 
(e.g. satellite networks) through wired technologies. Wireless communications’ ubiquity has its 
roots in the advantages offered by the wireless medium. Mobility, spontaneity, flexibility, 
simplicity, cable-free environments and cost-effective deployment are a few of its desirable 
characteristics. Currently the average person makes use on a daily basis of many technologies that 
take advantage of wireless communications: mobile phone networks, the Wi-Fi networks of 
universities and coffee shops, television and radio media, satellite TV and telephony, GPS-based 
positioning systems, and Bluetooth peripherals that connect automatically to computers and 
mobile handsets are just a few examples. On the other hand, wireless communications have also 
facilitated the emergence of many other paradigms which capitalise on the strengths of the 
wireless medium, some examples are: wireless mesh networks (WMN) [1], vehicular ad hoc 
networks (VANETs) [2], mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [3] and ubiquitous computing 
environments [4]. These last two areas represent the research fields where the work described in 
this thesis finds its application.
Ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) are networks consisting of a myriad of 
heterogeneous devices -  often subtly camouflaged in their surroundings -  fitted with computing 
and communication capabilities which cooperate in a coordinated fashion to deliver a suite of 
services to their users in an effort to facilitate the accomplishment of their tasks. Although 
communication between the participants of a UCE is predominantly performed through the 
wireless medium, which contributes towards its devices’ subtlety, UCEs make no presumptions 
regarding the communication technologies that can be employed for their deployment. Thus, 
wireless and wired technologies can both coexist in a UCE and can be employed to provide 
communication among participating nodes. However, in spite of the fact that a UCE can make use 
of existing infrastructure (e.g. base stations and wired backbones), an important characteristic of 
UCEs is that they can be partially or completely independent of such network infrastructure, and 
instead they can rely on wireless multihop communication such as MANETs for their 
communication process.
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One significant drawback of UCEs is that their predominantly wireless nature renders them 
vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks by misbehaving nodes, especially in those areas where the 
network does not have any infrastructure on which to rely. Such attacks range from passive 
eavesdropping, where nodes try to obtain unauthorised access to information destined for another 
node, to active interference where malicious nodes attempt to hinder network performance by not 
obeying globally acceptable rules. For instance, UCEs whose communication process relies on 
intermediate nodes for packet forwarding are susceptible of having their performance disrupted by 
misbehaving nodes that fail to forward data packets on behalf of other participating nodes. 
Nevertheless, when a node exhibits such malicious behaviour is not always because it intends to 
do so. A node may also misbehave because it is broken, overloaded, compromised or congested, 
in addition to intentionally being selfish or malicious, as explained in Section 2.5.1.
1.1 Research Motivation
The motivation for the research presented in this thesis emanates from the increasing need to 
make ubiquitous computing environments reliable and safe as they gradually become a reality that 
permeates every aspect of our daily lives. In fact mobile phones and the countless services that 
they offer are a manifestation of the pervasiveness that UCEs can achieve. As more sensors, 
devices and services are made available in our surroundings the need for reliable communication 
grows evident. Users are generally impatient and do not like it when they have to resend a 
document to a wireless printer because their previous attempt failed due to communication or 
other problems (potentially due to misbehaving nodes). Similarly, when a super-service is 
composed out of a set of smaller services, it often assumes that communication between its parts 
is readily available, reliable and safe. An attack that compromises the communication capabilities 
of an environment could render its service(s) useless, especially if the network does not have in 
place the necessary security measures to mitigate the effects of the attack and prevent the attacker 
from disrupting the communication performance again. Protecting the communication process is 
especially important in UCEs where nodes can leave and enter the network in an ad hoc manner. 
Although the ad hoc characteristic of a network endows it with a great degree of flexibility, it also 
allows for the inclusion of untrustworthy nodes which seek to be part of the environment with the 
unique goal of disrupting its overall functionality.
It is the view of this thesis that previous work addressing the problem posed by misbehaving 
nodes that disrupt the functionality of routing protocols has failed to propose an approach that can 
effectively and efficiently protect a network’s data packet forwarding capabilities. Many of the 
existing solutions offer protection strategies for the route discovery phase of routing protocols and 
ignore the importance of the data forwarding phase. Some other work has focused on identifying
2
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link misbehaviour and proposes tactics to avoid sending packets over the anomalous links, or 
alternatively they propose sending redundant information over different and independent paths to 
improve the chances of a packet reaching its destination. An important drawback of this type of 
approaches is that they make no attempt to pinpoint and remove the source of the problem, which 
leaves other network participants open to its attacks. Finally, there are also approaches that aim at 
locating the source of misbehaviour and removing it from the network. However, their strategies 
to collect behaviour metrics rely on promiscuous listening, which affects their accuracy since 
nodes collecting the metrics are not the actual nodes sending and receiving the data packets and 
therefore can not establish with certainty what is happening in the transmission process.
In our opinion, all these existing shortcomings in previous approaches suggest that there is room 
for research and improvement in the field of multihop wireless communications and their 
protection against nodes capable of launching active attacks on their data transmission 
capabilities. In this context, the general objective of this thesis is to propose a novel and adaptable 
protection scheme that can detect, accuse and penalise misbehaving nodes aiming at disrupting 
the communication capabilities of a ubiquitous computing environment by dropping data packets 
that they are expected to forward on behalf of their peer nodes.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The contribution of this thesis focuses on the proposal of an adaptable protection scheme that 
makes use of the principle of flow conservation (Chapter 3) to evaluate the behaviour of network 
nodes by comparing the number of packets they must forward with the number of packets they 
actually forward. This thesis contributes to different aspects of the design and implementation of 
the proposed protection scheme as outlined below:
a. Collection of packet forwarding metrics for misbehaviour detection
The basic algorithm to collect packet forwarding metrics evolves through the chapters of this 
thesis. It is first based on a limited broadcast strategy that identifies nodes that have been in direct 
contact with the node whose behaviour is under evaluation. This strategy allows a local 
neighbourhood to detect and eventually accuse a node of misbehaviour. However, it also gives 
nodes a small chance to evade the security measures in place if they constantly change 
neighbourhoods in a clever manner (this is not easy to do). This limited broadcast strategy is later 
replaced by a hierarchical organisational model where nodes at the top tier are in charge of 
detecting and accusing misbehaving nodes. This strategy generates lower overhead and solves the 
problem posed by clever nodes that constantly change neighbourhoods.
3
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b. Accurate detection of misbehaving nodes
In the proposed approach the metrics employed to evaluate a node’s behaviour are collected from 
nodes which have actually sent and received packets from the evaluated node. This technique 
eliminates inaccuracies exhibited by previous approaches and allows the protection scheme to 
discriminate adequately misbehaving nodes from well-behaved nodes, as shown in our simulation 
results.
c. Effective accusation and penalisation of nodes that persistently misbehave
Accusing a node of misbehaviour based on a single misbehaviour detection can result in the 
probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved nodes to be very high. For this reason, the proposed 
protection scheme only accuses and penalises nodes that are persistently detected as misbehaving. 
This method provides a high probability of accusing misbehaving nodes while maintaining a low 
probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved ones.
d. Adaptability
Adaptability is brought to the protection scheme by means of a policy based management (PBM) 
framework which is implemented in the UCE through a hierarchical organisational model 
consisting of three tiers. Nodes at the top layer, i.e. Manager Nodes (MNs), offer an interface to 
network administrators to allow them to define the high-level policies that drive our protection 
scheme. Nodes in the middle layer, i.e. Cluster Heads (CHs), distribute and enforce the 
management policies on other network nodes and themselves. Finally, nodes at the bottom layer, 
i.e. Cluster Nodes (CNs), are typical network users who must respect the network policies in order 
to gain access to the services offered by the UCE.
e. Clustering
Selecting the role that a node should play in the network is an important part for the correct 
functioning of the protection scheme. Manager nodes and cluster heads should be nodes having 
certain properties, such as good processing power, good memory capacity and low mobility. 
Cluster nodes, on the other hand, can be devices of limited resources only capable of executing 
simple tasks. In this thesis we present and evaluate two different clustering techniques. The first 
method is a well-known clustering algorithm that allows us to verify the correctness of our 
developed concepts. The second method is an efficient clustering approach based on the 
geographical location of the network nodes that endows the proposed protection scheme with the 
ability to perform well in large-scale environments.
4
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f. Tackling lying nodes
In the proposed approach there is the possibility that nodes may misbehave by reporting false 
metrics about other network nodes. We address this problem by allowing the evaluated nodes to 
tell “their own side of the story”, i.e. to report metrics about their own behaviour. Comparisons 
between the metrics reported by different network nodes allow for the detection and accusation of 
nodes that report false metrics in an attempt to incriminate other nodes or hide their own 
misbehaviour (i.e. how many packets they have failed to forward).
g. Tackling colluding nodes
A common problem in misbehaviour detection systems is how to tackle two or more colluding 
nodes that work in a cooperative manner to frame a well-behaved node for misbehaviour. In this 
thesis we develop the concept of discrepancies which allows two nodes to report metrics that 
contradict each other. Successive discrepancies between the same pair of nodes do not count 
towards their accusation. Thus, by varying the number of different discrepancies required to 
accuse a node of misbehaviour our system actually changes the number of colluding nodes that it 
can accommodate.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a general introduction and literature review for various areas that have 
contributed ideas to develop this thesis work. In particular, the Chapter starts by offering an 
introduction to ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) and guidelines for their deployment. 
It then focuses on Autonomic Computing Systems (ACSs) as a means to address the complexity 
of UCEs and discusses how adaptability can be achieved through its self-management features. 
Next, MANETs are introduced as a paradigm that can enable the development of UCEs and 
provides an insight into the benefits of designing and testing approaches in MANET-like 
environments. The Chapter ends with a general introduction to security systems and their 
characteristics, followed by an analysis of previous approaches addressing misbehaviour in 
wireless multihop environments.
Chapter 3 introduces our packet forwarding detection and accusation algorithm. It first presents 
the network model, assumptions and terminology used, and the specific issues addressed by our 
protection scheme. It continues with a formal definition of the principle of flow conservation and 
how it can be adapted to MANET-like environments in order to track down and detect 
misbehaving nodes. This Section finishes with the evaluation results and analysis for the 
misbehaviour detection scheme. The second half of this Chapter describes how nodes in a
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neighbourhood cooperate to keep track of misbehaviour detections on a node and how they accuse 
in collaborative fashion nodes that persistently misbehave. This Section concludes with the 
evaluation results and analysis for the accusation phase of the protection scheme.
Chapter 4 presents a policy-based adaptable misbehaviour detection and node accusation 
approach. The Chapter starts by providing an introduction to policy-based management (PBM) 
and the policy core information model (PCIM). It then describes how the clustering phase of the 
proposed scheme works and explains its importance in the selection of “good enough” nodes 
which are assigned the role of cluster heads (CHs). Next, this Chapter presents the hierarchical 
organisational model used to distribute policies to nodes in the network and collect behaviour 
metrics for and from nodes actively communicating in the network. This Section also explains 
how the protection scheme parameters can be manipulated through high-level policies to achieve 
the goals set by network administrators. This Chapter is concluded by its respective evaluation 
results and analysis section.
Chapter 5 presents a collusion resistant misbehaviour detection and accusation approach. This 
Chapter begins with an introduction to service discovery strategies since the clustering approach 
introduced in this Chapter was originally designed to address service discovery in large MANETs. 
Then the role of the clustering strategy is presented within the context of service discovery in 
order to highlight its capabilities. This Section ends with its evaluation results and analysis. In the 
second half of this Chapter, a discrepancies concept is presented along with some of its desirable 
characteristics which make it resilient against lying and colluding nodes. This Section is 
concluded with a brief discussion on how data integrity and node authenticity can help address 
some weaknesses of the presented approach. Finally, a section on evaluation results and analysis 
completes this Chapter.
Chapter 6 provides a summary, some final conclusions and identifies open research issues for 
future work.
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2 Background and Related Work
It has been a little over 60 years since the first general-purpose electronic computer made its 
appearance in the world. Every since then the world has been undergoing a rapid transformation 
fuelled mainly by the capabilities of computer systems and information technology. Although it is 
difficult to predict with certainty how technology will alter our lives in a few years’ time, it is 
expected that the trend of a more computerised world will continue. These new computerised 
environments bring along new challenges and implications that are important to study and address 
in order to guarantee that they will effectively improve our quality of life and serve our needs 
hopefully in a seamlessly manner. In this Chapter we first review in Section 2.1 work that 
addresses the challenges posed by environments exhibiting a high degree of computer technology 
penetration, known to the scientific and engineering community as ubiquitous computer 
environments. We then move in Section 2.2 to consider autonomic computing systems and 
explain their usefulness in taming the complexity of managing environments with hundreds or 
thousands of heterogeneous computing devices that interact by making use of all sorts of 
communication technologies. Section 2.3 then reviews work on mobile ad hoc networks and gives 
some insights on how this technology can enable the deployment of ubiquitous computing 
environments. Finally, Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively introduce the subject of security and the 
difficulties faced by designers of security solutions tackling misbehaviour in multihop wireless 
networks.
2.1 Ubiquitous Computing Environments (UCEs)
Ubiquitous Computing Environments (UCEs) are characterised by a myriad of heterogeneous 
devices -  often subtly camouflaged in their surroundings -  with computing and communication 
capabilities that are embedded in almost every physical object surrounding their users. This 
fundamental idea of ubiquitous computing is considered to have been introduced first by Mark 
Weiser almost two decades ago in his paper “The Computer for the 21st Century” [4]. Weiser 
states in [4] and [5] that UCE users must be unaware of the existence of the computing devices 
embedded in their surroundings while those devices cooperate in a coordinated manner towards 
the fulfilment of the users’ goals. Thus, users can focus on their final goals rather than on how to
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use the technologies that will enable them to achieve their objectives. Currently there is a 
commonly used electronic gadget that seems to be one of the closest devices to “disappear” from 
the users’ perception, i.e. the mobile phone, especially when phone calls are made using a 
wireless headset that connects to the handset by means of the Bluetooth communication protocol 
[6] [7]. By analysing this mobile phone example it is possible to see some of the desired 
characteristics in UCEs: 1) users walking on a street or buying items in a supermarket can talk on 
the phone unaware of the device thanks to the fact that their hands are free, instead 2) users focus 
on their main tasks, i.e. communicating with the person on the other side of the phone line and 
getting on a bus or selecting items in the supermarket. As this happens 3) the handset, the headset 
and the base station silently cooperate in a coordinated transparent manner to help the users to 
achieve their communication objective and to avoid interfering with other tasks performed by the 
users. And 4) the same task, or similar ones, can be performed simultaneously by many users all 
over a city or country without them losing their sense of individuality.
Figure 2-1 presents some typical ubiquitous computing environments that users may encounter on 
their daily routines. The figure depicts a scenario where the degree of computing pervasiveness is 
so high that a UCE is present almost everywhere. UCEs can permeate homes, offices, hospitals, 
libraries, shopping centres, restaurants and even in mobile environments such as automobiles, 
trains, airplanes and ships. Each UCE must be tailored to the needs of its particular set of users 
and the environments where they are. For instance, the needs of a doctor vary depending on 
whether they are at home, at the hospital or driving in between, and the devices present in each 
environment must act accordingly. Figure 2-1 also shows that all UCEs are connected through a 
ubiquitous network. This network is the result of the communication capabilities of the devices 
that constitute the different UCEs, which allow them to cooperate in a coordinated manner. Thus, 
UCEs can use the ubiquitous network to interact with each other and form a larger UCE, e.g. a 
countiy-wide UCE. However, current systems still have a long way to go before we can witness 
UCEs, as envisioned by Weiser, with hundreds of devices interacting in a dynamic environment 
in order to aid each user to perform several tasks. Advancing towards such UCEs requires that the 
scientific and engineering community continues its research efforts to create new ideas that 
complement and enhance the approaches proposed in the past two decades, some of which are 
presented in this Section.
Ubiquitous computing is a vast topic and it has received a lot of attention from the scientific and 
engineering community since its introduction by Weiser in 1991. Therefore, the amount of 
literature available can be overwhelming making it difficult to identify and analyse the main 
research themes [8]. Thus, work presented in this Section is by no means exhaustive or 
representative of all possible subareas of ubiquitous computing, but it offers instead an overview
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o f ubiquitous com puting and some o f its related subareas o f study. For a detailed list o f the main 
subjects o f  study within ubiquitous com puting we refer the reader to [8].
Figure 2-1 U biquitous com puting environm ents
2.1.1 UCE Challenges
Several researchers have focused their efforts on the study o f  ubiquitous com puting environm ents 
and the challenges they face in the m odern world. Such challenges have been considered from a 
diverse front o f  perspectives ranging from social and moral issues, passing through the users and 
their interaction with such systems, and going down to low level aspects o f  their im plem entation 
such as a device’s storage and computational capabilities.
In this line, the UK Com puting Research Com m ittee (UKCRC) has set up a Grand Challenge 
M anifesto [9]. Their view requires work on three fronts: 1) the experience perspective, which 
studies the interaction between users and UCEs, 2) the engineering perspective, which focuses on 
the architectural and network challenges posed by UCEs, and 3) the theoretical perspective, which 
focuses on concepts and rigorous models that capture the behaviour o f UCEs. Authors claim that 
UCEs will be the result o f  these three perspectives merging together to create system s that are: 
fluid, purposive, autonomous, reflective, trustworthy, sustainable, efficient and scalable, am ong 
other qualities that may emerge at a later point. W ork presented in [10] reviews and analyses 
previous and current work on UCEs, and sets a series o f challenges that the authors consider need 
to be addressed in the future by the research community. W ork is categorised according to the
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authors’ criteria in one of three possible application-driven interaction themes. The first theme is 
natural interfaces and includes approaches attempting to simplify interaction between users and 
ubiquitous environments with simple interfaces that account for users’ mistakes. Context 
awareness is the second theme and contains work on applications that react depending on the 
“five Ws” rule for context aware designs: who uses the system, what they are doing, and where, 
when and why they are doing it. The last theme is capture and access, and deals with work on how 
to acquire and store information for its later retrieval by users in the UCE. Finally, the authors 
state the challenges that researches face on social issues and evaluation of ubiquitous computing. 
Similarly, the author of [13] lays some foundations for the design of UCEs based on his personal 
experience researching and designing such systems. In his work he presents a series of general 
design guidelines and argues that they are particularly valuable in the ubiquitous computing user 
experience world. The guidelines can be summarised as follows: do not include too many services 
in simple devices, focus on designing services not devices, do not overload users with 
information, do not reinvent the wheel, keep interfaces as consistent as possible between different 
devices offering the same services, provide feedback to users other than just visual (e.g. touch and 
audio), and only include extra information processing capabilities in your product if the cost 
justifies it.
2.1.1.1 UCE Limitations
Some work has focus on identifying the suitability of current technologies to develop UCEs. For 
example, the authors of [11] believe that nowadays, unlike in the past, hardware platforms are 
sufficiently advanced to make ubiquitous computing a reality. However, they also think that the 
software capabilities of systems have not developed at a pace that allows them to take full 
advantage of the new hardware infrastructure. Due to this, they state that new software is required 
to tackle the challenges related to power management, the limitations of wireless discovery and 
the user interface adaptation. In terms of power management, software must be able to control 
hardware in order to extend battery life, for instance selecting the most appropriate transmission 
interface, e.g. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or Ethernet. The limitations of wireless discovery must be 
addressed with appropriate service discovery mechanisms that allow devices to know what other 
devices are in the network and the services they offer. Finally, user interface (UI) adaptation 
refers to the fact that UIs must be able to display properly in all types of devices regardless of 
their size, resolution and colour capabilities. The authors of [12] also consider that the current 
embedded technology is powerful enough to initiate the ubiquitous computing era. However, the 
paper states that networks do not have the fluidity necessary to deal with thousands of networked 
devices. Thus, they identify four challenges in communications networks: i) device 
interoperability in a network that consists of a myriad of heterogeneous devices -  size, processing 
power and communication capabilities vary considerably between devices; ii) the logical network
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topology can be very different from the geographical network topology, thus leading to virtual 
paths that can be very inefficient energy and resource wise; iii) it is currently very complex to 
manage short-lived and intermittent connectivity, typically devices exhibiting this behaviour are 
very unreliable; and iv) managing the evolution of large long-lived systems can be 
overwhelmingly difficult, for instance updating the software and hardware of a system with 
thousands of devices requires state of the art managing techniques.
2.1.1.2 User-Centred UCEs
There is user-centred research that demonstrates the efficiency of employing time-use studies and 
prototypes before implementing a ubiquitous computing system. Although these pieces of work 
do not introduce any specific guidelines, they can be considered guidelines themselves since they 
are an optional and sensible step in the design of UCEs. To start with, work in [16] demonstrates 
that time-use studies conducted by governments and commercial institutions can be used to 
provide data such as classifiers and baseline metrics for activity inference applications in 
ubiquitous environments. These time-use studies are useful for ubiquitous computing design 
because they provide large and detailed amounts of data for long periods of time in unbiased 
environments as opposed to data obtained in laboratories where the results can be biased by the 
artificial setting. Large time-use studies can include tens or hundreds of thousands of participants, 
span from days to years, and cost millions of dollars, yet the collected data by some of these 
studies are open to the public. The authors believe that using this information is an inexpensive 
yet precise approach to the design of ubiquitous computing services, which permits researchers to 
better tailor their work towards the satisfaction of the UCE users’ needs. Another study 
conducting user-centred research is presented in [17]. The techniques proposed in this study focus 
on environments in which common techniques may be too intrusive or might fail to produce 
helpful results, for example in hospital or home environments. The authors use two techniques to 
determine the adequacy of a product for certain users and their common surroundings in the 
prototype phase. The first technique is known as compound prototypes and provides a User 
Interface (UI) that controls a faithful implementation of an application in a computer system 
different to the device where the UI is, e.g. a mobile phone UI that controls an application running 
in a desktop computer. The second technique is referred to in this work as paratypes -  situated 
experience prototypes. Paratypes permit researchers to evaluate users’ experiences by observing a 
technology’s likely use in real-world situations, i.e. not in a laboratory. The authors claim that 
both techniques were successfully tested in the design and implementation of their Personal Audio 
Loop (PAL) project, which aims at providing people with the ability of listening to anything that 
they have said and heard in the last hour by means of non-intrusive technologies.
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User-centred research has also attracted the attention of many institutions around the world which 
have created testing environments capable of adapting themselves to make their users’ experience 
as comfortable as possible. Such environments allow researches not only to see how an 
environment responds to users, but also to analyse how users interact with and perceive their 
“intelligent” surroundings. Among the most popular and well known projects are: The Aware 
Home [18] [19] from the Georgia Institute of Technology, House_n [20] [21] from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the EasyLiving Home Project [22] from Microsoft 
Research.
2.1.1.3 Context-Aware UCEs
Work in [23] proposes an approach to provide context-aware applications with an infrastructure to 
process context information generated in devices of general access such as servers, and devices of 
personal use such as mobile phones. The proposed solution consists of user and ambient side 
agents (i.e. software modules) depending on which device they are installed. Additionally, 
context-based reasoning can be performed locally on each device or cooperatively if  privacy 
issues arise that prevent one of the parts from accessing directly a needed variable value. Finally, 
reasoning on context information, which is described using the Web Ontology Language (OWL)
[24], is achieved by using a set of rules defined in the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)
[25]. Another approach is proposed in [26], which bases its functionality in an architecture 
consisting of three layers. The basic or management layer, which is lightweight and is available in 
all devices, is in charge of managing the services -  loading, starting, stopping and unloading 
them. The second or local services layer is the place where all the local services are. Local 
services are services that only use resources -  and services -  located in the same local device. The 
third layer consists of services that require remote resources to do their job. Local services, remote 
services and their interactions are all supervised and controlled by the management layer.
2.1.1.4 Middleware for UCEs
Proposing a middleware approach but addressing ubiquitous computing environments from an 
infrastructural software point of view is the work presented in [27]. The authors propose a 
middleware layer consisting of six modules each addressing different infrastructural software 
concerns in UCEs: roaming, discovery, ad-hoc networking (routing), limited connectivity, quality 
of service and system context adaptation. The authors then focus on addressing limited 
connectivity, service discovery and system context adaptation, providing examples on how to use 
modularisation to solve these specific problems. The final part of this work suggests an approach 
to evaluate the system’s performance through a set of quantifiable high-level indicators of 
software quality that from the authors’ point of view demonstrate how their proposed six modules 
improve the overall performance and usability of UCEs. Similarly, work in [28] offers a
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software-based solution for UCEs. This work aims at providing a framework that allows any 
common generic application to run in a UCE and take advantage of its features without needing to 
recode the application or implementing a wrapper/proxy for the application to work. Their 
framework, which they have called Plethora, runs on top of the Gaia Operating System [29], a 
distributed meta-operating system that runs on top of existing operating systems. The Gaia OS 
offers “Active Spaces,” each of which can be thought of as the software abstraction of a 
ubiquitous computing environment, thus providing access to all sorts of devices and services 
available in the UCE. On the other hand, the Plethora framework has the task of adequately 
translating common requests made by generic applications so that they are properly adapted to the 
Active Space, i.e. the UCE. Thus, if a user is doing a presentation, Plethora can automatically 
show the presentation in the available projectors and displays available in the current active space 
-  for example a conference room -  according to the user’s preferences. However, one issue that 
the Plethora framework does not deal with is how to allow users to switch from one device to 
another without having to close and open again the application in use, i.e. allowing for 
hot-switching or hot-swapping.
In [30] the author argues that truly ubiquitous computing environments must let processes migrate 
with users. The author then identifies a set of challenges to migrate a program that is in execution 
from one device to another. The first of these challenges is environment mobility, which is 
concerned with bindings between threads and the external environment (e.g. a program using a 
printer). The second challenge deals with channel mobility, which has to do with the re-routing of 
any communications to the new device. Then follows code migration, the main issue here is to 
ensure that the application runs properly regardless of the operating system it migrates to. State 
migration is next in the list; it deals with issues on how to migrate an application’s dynamic state 
which can include hundreds of variables. Finally, the paper analyses how to migrate views with 
minimal loss of consistency due to differences between the display capabilities of those devices 
involved in the application migration.
2.1.1.5 Currently Developed UCEs
In addition to research proposing solutions to the challenges posed by ubiquitous computing, it is 
possible to find in the literature research work that analyses computing environments currently 
available in search of possible solutions that have silently emerged. Such an approach to UCEs 
represents an alternative option to the mainstream ideas based on the futuristic vision stated by 
Weiser. For instance, authors of [31] challenge Weiser’s view of ubiquitous computing by 
claiming that it is invalid because it was conceived almost 20 years ago, and since then the 
technological panorama has changed significantly. In fact the authors do not propose a solution 
but instead they claim that somewhat the ubiquitous computing era has already arrived to some
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countries. They analyse and present the technological advances of Singapore and Korea which 
they consider are already living the ubiquitous computing era. They also explain how the new 
ubiquitous technologies have benefited both people and governments in these countries. Finally, 
they conclude the paper stating that the ubiquitous computing era has arrived, but it is not as we 
had envisioned it 20 years ago. The ubiquitous technology is there but it is not evenly distributed, 
on the contrary it is very messy, heterogeneous and it has not “disappeared” completely from the 
users’ perception, perhaps because it is not meant to.
On the other hand, work presented in [14] examines two case studies of fully operational Radio 
Frequency Identification-based (RFID-based) systems. The two case studies analysed are the 
Oyster Card ticketing system used in public transport in London, UK, and the retail applications 
deployed at the Mitsukoshi department stores in Tokyo, Japan. The authors assert that the analysis 
of both projects demonstrates that current research is not dealing with real-world issues such as: 
the lengthy and costly preparation to upgrade existing infrastructures, the training of employees 
and users in the new ways of working, and the gradual and controlled introduction of new 
functionality with minimum disruption for the users, among others. Finally, this work concludes 
that the challenge for researchers is not only to address the technical issues of ubiquitous 
computing, but also how to translate the principles, guidelines and models created through 
research to large-scale real world environments. Work presented in [15] also examines real world 
case studies. However, in this case the authors themselves were part of the team that implemented 
the systems, which allowed them to come up with some concepts based on their own experience. 
The systems deployed consisted mainly of visual aids provided by public displays and projectors, 
which were installed in two different venues and an underground bus station. In spite of the 
systems being significantly smaller than those evaluated in [14] some guidelines are similar as it 
can be inferred from of their main conclusions: deployments are costly, environmental challenges 
can be significant, after deployment comes maintenance, following government regulations is 
important, system monitoring should be done from a user’s perspective, providing feedback on 
the state of the system to the user is good practice, creating content is expensive, and managing 
content is complex.
2.2 Autonomic Computing Systems (ACSs)
The term “autonomic computing systems (ACSs)” refers to systems composed of heterogeneous 
devices capable of individual and collective self-management which can achieve their goals with 
minimum human intervention. Due to their characteristics autonomic computing systems are 
considered to be one of the building blocks of ubiquitous computing environments. Although the 
protection scheme proposed in this thesis, which we introduce from Chapter 3 onwards, does not
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attempt to offer a complete autonomic solution or self-management property for UCEs, it has 
been endowed with adaptability (as presented in Chapter 4), which is one of the first and essential 
steps towards a fully autonomic approach. This Section provides a short introduction to ACSs and 
the self-management properties that typify them.
From the appearance of the first computer systems, complexity has been an issue that scientists, 
engineers, designers, programmers and even users have had to deal with [32]. What is more, as 
new sophisticated technologies and techniques are developed, complexity tends to increase and it 
can be argued that in many cases it hinders the advancements achieved by such technologies 
owing to the fact that they cannot be easily adopted, require a long time to be implemented or 
necessitate experts to manage them. An example of an emerging paradigm that has brought an 
enormous amount of complexity along with it is ubiquitous computing environments, and some of 
the issues that researches have identified in these environments have been illustrated in Section 
2.1. The intricacy of these systems lies mainly on the large number of heterogeneous devices that 
can be present at one time in an environment, thus making management-related tasks very 
convoluted. This argument is easily demonstrated with a simple question that illustrates an 
example scenario: how can a network administrator maintain up to date hundreds or even 
thousands of devices that exhibit heterogeneity in size, memory, computational power and 
software among many other features? Such a task can be overwhelmingly difficult even for a team 
of network experts. Unfortunately, things can only get worse as other issues such as security and 
users’ privileges are taken into account. From this it becomes clear that as the complexity of 
systems continues to increase there will be a point at which no team of experts will be able to 
handle the problem [33]. Therefore, it is imperative to find a solution that eases the task of 
managing systems by making it less complex for system administrators. Autonomic Computing 
Systems (ACSs), which are inspired in self-regulated biological systems, are a very attractive 
solution that takes away the management burden from the system administrators and places it on 
the system itself, as explained in the following paragraphs.
The idea of using autonomic computing systems to cope with the systems’ own complexity was 
first introduced by Paul Horn from IBM on 8 March 2001 in a presentation to the National 
Academy of Engineering at Harvard University [34]. Such an idea -  IBM’s vision -  is also 
presented and explained in detail in IBM’s Autonomic Computing Manifesto [33]. In this 
document Horn states that they found inspiration in the nervous autonomic system of the human 
body. This system controls the heart beat, body temperature, blood sugar levels and pupils to 
regulate the amount of light reaching the eyes, among many other body functions. But what is 
really important is that we -  the nervous system users -  are completely unaware of all these 
processes while we run, eat, read, etc. In other words, we focus on what we want to do (i.e. our
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goal) and let our nervous system to take care of everything else. Likewise ACSs should allow us 
to concentrate on our tasks while they take care of their tedious own management.
As can be appreciated ACSs share some common goals with UCEs, the most important of them is 
perhaps that they aim at allowing users to focus on their foreground tasks whilst the system takes 
care of supporting background activities. The difference is that UCEs are a more abstract 
paradigm that implies, but does not specify how, devices and their tasks are to disappear from the 
users’ perception, i.e. different technologies and solutions can be employed to achieve this goal. 
ACSs on the other hand are a specific solution that proposes self-management as a means of 
taking certain tasks off the system users and placing them on the system itself, which results in 
user unawareness of the background activities carried out by the system. This is the reason why 
ACSs are considered a solution that can enable the deployment of UCEs.
In [33] Horn also proposes a minimum set of “eight key elements or characteristics” that are 
essential for a system to be autonomic and that have been widely accepted by the scientific 
community, as it can be observed from existing literature on autonomic computing. These key 
elements are as follows:
o An ACS needs to “know itself’. It requires detailed knowledge of its individual components, 
current status, capacity and connections to other systems. It must also know the resources 
available directly to it, and those that can borrow, lend, share or reserve.
o An ACS must be able to automatically find an appropriate configuration and dynamically 
adjust it to best tackle changes in its surroundings.
o An ACS always seeks to optimise its performance. It must constantly fine-tune its constituent 
parts in order to achieve predetermined, yet bound to change, system goals.
o An ACS must execute a process similar to healing. It must do both detection of potential 
problems and recovery from component failures. In either case the system needs to find an 
appropriate way to use the untroubled resources and reconfigure its components to continue 
working as smoothly as possible.
o An ACS must be capable of protecting itself. It must remain alert, anticipate threats, resist 
attacks and take the necessary actions to maintain the overall system security and integrity.
o An ACS must know its environment and the implicit context of its activity in order to take 
actions that satisfy its overall goal within its current circumstances.
o An ACS must work in a heterogeneous world and therefore it must adhere to open standards. 
Proprietary solutions do not offer the versatility required for an ACS to communicate and 
collaborate with other systems of its kind.
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o An ACS must anticipate the optimised resources required by any user, while maintaining its 
complexity hidden from them. This point is of crucial importance for the users as they usually 
want a system ready to act and simple to understand.
2.2.1 Self-Management Properties of an Autonomic Computing System
As research on autonomic computing systems advances it has become clear that such systems are 
required to implement a very distinctive set of attributes which in spite of being incredibly 
common to biological systems are rare and difficult to accomplish in computing systems. These 
attributes are known as the self-management or self-* attributes or properties of ACSs and some 
of the most popular are: self-configuration, self-optimisation, self-healing, self-protection, 
self-awareness, self-maintenance and self-adaptation. It is important to realise that this list is by 
no means exhaustive and that the attributes are not mutually exclusive, i.e. they can overlap or 
embrace one or more of the other listed self-management properties. In the following paragraphs 
five of these properties are concisely analysed due to the vital role they play in ACSs.
The final goal of autonomic computing systems is self-management as a means to free 
administrators from the burden of handling complex systems and to provide users with an 
always-available system that offers its best possible performance at all times [35]. Achieving 
self-management requires the incorporation of the eight key characteristics suggested by Horn 
[33], and IBM has once more taken the lead in this area by proposing that ACSs should be 
endowed with four fundamental features or self-properties [34][35]: self-configuration, 
self-optimisation, self-healing and self protection.
o Self-configuration addresses the need for new components to incorporate themselves 
seamlessly to a new system, while the system adapts itself to the presence of the new 
components. Thus, components and systems must react to changes in their surroundings 
according to high level policies that specify the desired objectives for the overall system (or 
enterprise) rather than for individual components.
o Self-optimisation tackles the very common problem of fine-tuning a system to obtain the most 
efficient and cost effective configuration. The problem is that large systems can have hundreds 
and even thousands of parameters that can be tuned to modify their performance. To make 
matters worse, these systems are usually connected to equally large systems and modifying a 
parameter in one of them may have unexpected repercussions on the entire system. ACSs will 
never set for the status quo; they will always strive for new configurations leading the system 
to more efficient and cost effective states.
o Self-healing addresses the common and costly problem of system failures and service 
disruption. ACSs must be able to isolate failing components and either replace them with
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backup modules of similar capabilities or redistribute the computational load among other 
components while keeping service disruption to a minimum. Then if  the failed component 
cannot be brought back online a notification should be passed to the human counterpart for 
them to take care of it.
o Self-protection is the feature that enables ACSs to anticipate, detect, identify and protect the 
system against all type of threats including intentional attacks, malicious behaviour, intrusion 
and random component failure. If self-protection fails to anticipate and prevent a problem from 
happening -  whether unintentional or not -  then self-healing is required.
2.2.2 Towards Fully Autonomic Computing Systems
Similarly to many other disciplines ACSs have attracted the scientific community’s interest in 
developing guidelines, techniques and frameworks that can be followed and employed to reach 
the ACSs’ ultimate goal, i.e. self-management. Much of this effort is based -  sometimes 
implicitly -  on the original idea proposed by IBM described in Section 2.2. In this Section we 
have a look at some of this work, especially efforts aiming at providing a set of guidelines or 
designing a holistic approach to build ACSs. For a more general and broader review of work on 
ACSs we refer the reader to [36] where several industry and academia oriented projects are 
described.
To start with, IBM researchers argue in [34] that autonomic computing systems will arrive as the 
result of an evolutionary process as opposed to a revolutionary one. The authors envision five 
levels, each of which indicates how autonomic a system is. A system that is currently at level 1 
(basic) has the possibility of gradually work its way up to level 5 (fully autonomic). At the basic 
level each element of an IT system requires an administrator to configure it, monitor it, optimise 
it, update it, fix it when damaged, and eventually to replace it. At the managed level (level 2) the 
system gathers information from disparate elements and collects it into fewer system points 
making it easier for the administrator to analyse and synthesise such information. At this level 
system administrators can cope with an increased degree of complexity in the system. At the 
predictive level (level 3) there are technologies capable of working out the existent correlation 
between different elements of the system. At this point the system is able to recognise patterns, 
calculate the most advantageous configuration, and suggest the best course of action for the 
system administrators. The adaptive level (level 4) is the result of an improvement in the 
predictive technologies and an increased administrators’ confidence in them. Systems can make 
decisions and take actions based on the information available to them and the knowledge o f the 
state of each of their components. Finally, at the fully autonomic level the system’s operation is 
managed by business policies and objectives; system administrators monitor the system at
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business level and intervene only to change the business goals. The steps that a system undergoes 
to evolve from a basic level to a fully autonomic level are illustrated in Figure 2-2.
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Figure 2-2 A utonom ic system s’ evolution |34]
In [35] the authors (also from IBM) present some architectural considerations along with 
engineering and scientific challenges to build ACSs. They propose that an autonomic elem ent 
consists o f  one or more managed elements controlled by an autonomic manager. The autonom ic 
m anager monitors the managed element, analyses the collected information by com paring it 
against its stored knowledge database, plans the necessaty actions to m aintain the managed 
element working as expected, and then it executes the plan by m odifying the managed elem ent as 
required. This approach also assumes that autonomic elem ents constantly interact am ong them 
and can modify the goals o f  elements under their authority depending on the internally set goals 
o f  each element. This architecture is depicted in Figure 2-3. Typically managed elem ents can be 
hardware devices such as a raid o f hard drives, a  printer or a CPU, while autonomic elem ents are 
the representation o f  managed elements at the highest level, for exam ple a safe-backup 
application, a  prepaid photo printer, or an e-utility. After introducing their structure the authors 
analyse engineering challenges from four different points o f  view: life cycle o f  an autonom ic 
element, relationships am ong autonomic elements, system wide issues, and goal specification. On 
the other hand, in the scientific challenges five main points are identified: behavioural 
abstractions and models, robustness, learning and optim isation, negotiation, and autom ated 
statistical modelling. Finally, IBM ’s contributions to autonomic com puting include a w hite paper 
specifying an architectural blueprint for autonomic com puting [37] that develops in-depth the 
areas covered by papers [34] and [35], The latest version o f  IBM ’s white paper, i.e. their fourth 
edition, has been modified to reflect the up-to-date trends and current IT solutions developed by
IBM and can be found in [38].
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Figure 2-3 Structure o f an autonom ic elem ent [35]
The authors o f  [39] propose a simple architecture which incorporates many o f  the ideas available 
in the year 2003. The authors claim that their idea can be used as a general tem plate for the design 
o f ACSs. Their architecture has a main module called the Self M onitor which has direct 
communication with every module o f their approach. An Internal M onitor m odule observes the 
current state o f  the managed element and passes it to the Self M onitor for its analysis. The state is 
then compared against an expected state m aintained in a System Knowledge module. Unwanted 
deviations are then reported by the Self M onitor to the Self Adjuster m odule for it to take action 
changing the managed element if  necessary. Similarly, there is an External M onitor m odule which 
reports changes in the environment which can also lead to alterations to the state o f  the m anaged 
element depending on the system ’s objectives. The final m odule is a Heartbeat M onitor which 
periodically reports the current state o f the autonomic elem ent to other autonomic elem ents for 
them to keep track o f  their environment. A different approach is taken by the authors o f  [40] who 
have developed a three level theory o f  human behaviour which they claim can help w ith the 
design and implementation o f ACSs. The three suggested levels o f  behaviour are: reaction, 
routine and reflection. The reaction level is the lowest level; it constantly m onitors the 
organism/system and the environment and reacts immediately when it detects problem atic or 
dangerous situations by interrupting ongoing higher level activities. In humans, for instance, this 
level automatically makes us drop a cigarette from our hands and stop our ongoing reading 
activity to analyse what just happened. In autonomic systems it may detect a very high electric 
current and shut down an appliance to prevent any damage even if  it was being used at that
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instant. The routine level is home to skilled and well-learnt behaviours. In humans this level 
corresponds to motor skills such as language generation, walking or chewing food. In autonomic 
systems this system can be very complex since it requires learning from past experiences and 
accepting inputs from the reaction level below and the reflection level above in the form of 
control signals. For example an autonomic storage system that has a two disk RAID may learn 
from past experiences that once a disk fails there is an increased probability of an overall system 
failure, thus it can decide to put in place a process that creates a remote backup every time a disk 
fails. At the reflection level the mind performs operations based on its own experiences, current 
behaviour, and the current environment, yielding as output planning, reasoning and problem 
solving. This level in ACSs could lead to cautionary behaviour when executing a task or even 
avoidance and termination of the task if it detects potential harm, excess of resource utilisation or 
a deadlock state.
ACSs are tackled from an engineering point of view in [41]. In the first part of this work the 
authors suggest a set of seven engineering principles to guide the planning of ACSs. These 
principles can be summarised as follows: i) provide needed features only, unnecessary features 
add to the complexity of the system, ii) regardless of how clever the system is users must always 
have the option of switching off the autonomic functionality of any element, iii) many users do 
not use available features in many applications because they do not know they exist, so autonomic 
features should be enabled by default so that user can take advantage of them, iv) if the 
developers are not able to make a decision at the design or implementation phases such 
responsibility should not be passed to the user since the most likely thing to happen is that they 
will be confused, v) assessing autonomic solutions in benchmarking systems is inappropriate 
because these systems do not represent the real world effectively, vi) autonomic functionality 
should never contradict instructions given by the human counterpart since, generally speaking, 
humans have a better understanding of the big picture and are better at judging it, and vii) at the 
highest level policy definition should be minimal and as close as possible to natural human 
language. In the second part of this work the authors present eight existent mathematical 
approaches which they consider suitable for the construction of ACSs. These eight foundational 
techniques are: dependency management, expert systems, trade-off elimination, static 
optimisation, online optimisation, feedback control loop, correlation modelling and security; a 
brief description of each of them is offered in [41]. Also following an engineering approach is 
work presented in [42] which introduces an autonomic computing environment framework called 
AUTONOMIA. The main goal of AUTONOMIA is to provide application developers with the 
tools required for them to implement networked autonomic applications and services. This work 
uses mobile agents to carry out the core self-management tasks: self-configuration, self­
optimisation, self-healing and self-protection. The framework consists of a set of modules with
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two main purposes: managing the mobile agents and providing an application programming 
interface so that the application developers can interact with the autonomic framework. The first 
module is the Mobile Agent System (MAS), which provides the mobile agents with a uniform 
execution environment independent of the underlying architecture and operating system (OS) of 
the platform where the agent is. It also provides functions to receive agents, start the execution of 
new agents, monitor their execution and transfer agents from host to host. Platform independency 
is achieved using Sun Microsystems tools such as java [43] [44], java remote method invocation 
[44] and Jini [45]. The second module is the Application Manager Editor (AME) and allows a 
user to develop applications using existing autonomic components through well-defined libraries. 
Additionally, it enables developers to specify the management requirements for each deployed 
component. The last module, the Autonomic Middleware Service (AMS) module, consists o f the 
mobile agents themselves and it endows the system with the services required to achieve 
autonomic management.
2.3 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
A mobile ad hoc network consists of a group of devices that relies solely on the wireless 
communication medium and themselves for data transmission. Thus, MANETs unlike other 
wireless networks -  e.g. Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) [46] or Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) [46] -  do not require the existence of any 
centralised administration or pre-deployed network infrastructure, e.g. base stations; instead the 
management responsibilities are distributed among the network nodes, which also cooperate by 
forwarding packets on behalf of each other when destinations are out of their direct wireless 
transmission range. These characteristics make MANETs’ deployment quick and inexpensive, 
and the nodes’ ability to move freely endows them with a flexible and versatile dynamic network 
topology that can be desirable in many situations. Mobile ad hoc networks are ideal in 
environments where installing an infrastructure is not appropriate for reasons such as cost, quality, 
or vulnerability, or where the network is too transient, or the infrastructure has been destroyed. 
Examples of MANET applications vary from emergency disaster relief (destroyed infrastructure), 
military operations over a battlefield (vulnerable infrastructure), and wilderness expeditions 
(transient networks), to community networking and interaction between students during a lecture. 
However, one of the most promising applications for mobile ad hoc network technologies is their 
deployment in ubiquitous computing environments. Although UCEs can be supported by a 
network infrastructure, it is not likely that all mobile devices (or sensors) can always be within a 
base station’s area of coverage, thus reliance on intermediate nodes for packet forwarding 
becomes necessary. Furthermore, due to the great number of devices present in UCEs it is
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unfeasible to have them permanently connected to the network (this could lead to bandwidth 
exhaustion), it is a better approach to have them join and leave the network (ad hoc behaviour) as 
required. This point is further enhanced in MANETs thanks to reactive routing protocols, which 
make use only of those nodes essential for the route discovery and data forwarding processes 
while allowing the other network nodes to save their battery power by remaining inactive, as is 
explained later in this Section.
2.3.1 MANETs and the Proposed Protection Scheme
As mentioned above node mobility combined with a lack of network infrastructure make a mobile 
ad hoc network’s topology extremely dynamic. Consequently, conceiving solutions capable of 
managing the dynamicity of MANETs can be very challenging since they must cope, among 
others, with constant link breakages, node unavailability, variable paths between source and 
destination, and the unreliable wireless channel. However, MANET solutions have a welcome 
benefit that springs from the complexity they deal with, when they are migrated to other 
technologies or paradigms migration can be done with relatively ease. Since MANET solutions 
address so many and difficult issues (close to the worst case scenario) once they work well in a 
MANET environment they normally require minimum or no modifications to perform well in 
other environments. For instance, if a MANET approach is migrated to a ubiquitous computing 
environment the available infrastructure and static devices most certainly will only make things 
easier and better. Another advantage of designing solutions for MANETs is that they can be tested 
over a choice of well known network simulators before deploying them for evaluation in the real 
world, which can be costly, time consuming or even unachievable as in the case of MANETs with 
hundreds of nodes. Some well known networks simulators with support for MANETs are: NS-2 
[47] and GloMoSim [48] [49] which are intended for academic and research use, and OPNET 
[50] and QualNet [51] (a GloMoSim based product) which are commercial options. For these 
reasons we have decided to test and evaluate the suitability of the proposed misbehaviour 
detection and node accusation approach using mobile ad hoc networks, even though it is easily 
seen that some of our assumptions described in Section 4.2 would fit better in a ubiquitous 
computing environment.
2.3.2 Route Discovery and Packet Forwarding
Routing protocols in MANETs have two important tasks to perform: route acquisition and data 
packet forwarding. The main task in the route acquisition phase is to find an available path from a 
source node to a given destination node. The task of the data forwarding phase is to forward any 
data packets sent from the source towards the destination (and vice versa) using the path that was
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found in the route acquisition phase. Both these tasks are essential for a MANET to fulfil its 
purpose and all nodes in the network should abide by the rules of the routing protocol in place. In 
this respect the work described in this thesis aims firstly at ensuring the detection of any nodes 
that misbehave during the data forwarding phase and secondly to punish nodes that persistently 
misbehave, as explained in Chapter 3.
Depending on the methodology employed by routing protocols to acquire an available path to a 
destination they can be classified as either proactive or reactive [52] [53]. Proactive protocols, 
also known as table-driven protocols, periodically exchange routing information so that all 
network nodes can keep an up-to-date view of the network topology. A common characteristic of 
these protocols is that routes to any network destination are available even before any packet 
transmission commences [54]. On the other hand, the various proactive protocols differ in the 
number of tables maintained by each node and the strategy used to preserve a consistent network 
view in all network nodes [52]. Examples of proactive routing protocols include the 
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) routing protocol [55], the Wireless Routing 
Protocol (WRP) [56], and the Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [57] [58]. By 
contrast, reactive routing protocols, also known as on-demand protocols, do not exchange any 
packets until a source node desires to send a packet to a destination node and a route discovery 
procedure is initiated [54]. In this scheme, source nodes are required to keep the packet(s) in their 
buffer until a route to the destination is found. Although reactive protocols incur a delay before 
sending the first packet(s), they are very popular because they do not produce any network 
overhead when the network is idle -  also saving battery power -  and they adapt very well to 
highly dynamic environments [52]. Examples of reactive routing protocols include the Ad Hoc 
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [59] [60], the Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) protocol [61] [62], the Lightweight Mobile Routing (LMR) protocol [63], and the 
Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [64].
Finally, once a source node knows of an available path to its desired destination the data packet 
forwarding phase is initiated. In this phase the packets are trusted to intermediate nodes which 
forward them along the route towards the intended destination. Depending on the routing strategy 
adopted the path followed by each packet can be determined at intermediate nodes by choosing 
the next hop from their routing tables, as in AODV, or at the source node and then appended to 
each forwarded packet so that nodes in the path are able to read what the next hop towards the 
destination is, as in DSR. Our approach to enforce behaviour has been design to protect the data 
forwarding phase of routing protocols and one of its main advantages is that it can be used 
regardless of the routing strategy adopted; it can even be used in environments that dynamically 
change routing strategies on the go in order to adapt themselves to an environment’s current
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conditions. The details on how routing independence is achieved in our approach are provided 
from Chapter 3 onwards.
2.4 Network Security
Most people have the notion that security is something good, but very few are capable of defining 
security in an exact manner [65]. This is partly due to the fact that the definition of security is 
subject to the context of each particular situation in which security is considered. For instance, 
security for a person as a citizen could mean to be out and about in their city without risking being 
hurt, but when their role changes to a car owner security could mean that their car is fitted with 
the latest technology to prevent it from being stolen. Likewise in the communications world the 
definition varies depending on the field for which security is required.
Network security or internet security (internet with lowercase, as opposed to the Internet, refers to 
a collection of interconnected networks) is concerned with the measures needed to protect data 
during its transmission between two or more entities, i.e. users, devices or systems [66]. The 
ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union -  Telecommunication Standardisation Sector) 
recommendation X.800 [67] describes a systematic approach to provide security for the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model defined in the ITU-T recommendation X.200
[68]. Due to the fact that this recommendation was designed as an international standard, it has 
been widely adopted by computer and communication vendors all over the word [66]. For this 
reason this approach is now used in most communications systems even if they do not strictly 
follow the OSI reference model.
2.4.1 Basic Security Services
According to recommendation X.800 and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
informational RFC 4949 (Internet Security Glossary -  Version 2) [69] a security service is a 
processing or communications service provided by a protocol layer that ensures adequate 
protection of system resources and data transfers. Generally speaking the following are the 
security services that can be provided in a communications system [67]:
2.4.1.1 Authentication
The authentication service ensures that the parties involved in a communication have genuine 
identifications and remain as such from start to finish. Firstly, at the connection initiation stage it 
ensures that the parties are who they claim to be, and then during the communication stage it 
prevents a third party from masquerading as one of the legitimate parties so as to transmit or 
receive information in an unauthorised manner.
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2.4.1.2 Access Control
Access control specifies through access rights which modules, equipment or functions a remote 
entity is allowed to use. However, before granting access to a system resource the identity of the 
remote entity must be verified through an authentication process.
2.4.1.3 Data Confidentiality
The data confidentiality service aims at protecting the information transmitted over a 
communication link from being released to or read by unauthorised entities, even if those parties 
directly manipulate the transmitted packets, e.g. for forwarding purposes. A second feature of the 
confidentiality service is the protection of traffic flow from analysis. Here the source, destination, 
session length, frequency and other traffic characteristics must be hidden from parties that are not 
directly involved in the communication process.
2.4.1.4 Data Integrity
In its most general form the data integrity service assures that the transmitted information is 
received as sent. The X.800 recommendation differentiates between connectionless and 
connection-oriented integrity service. The connectionless service provides for the integrity of a 
single message by determining whether a received message has been modified. The 
connection-oriented service guarantees received messages have not been modified, duplicated, 
inserted, reordered or replayed. It can also assure that no messages have been destroyed on their 
way towards their destination.
2.4.1.5 Non-repudiation
The non-repudiation service prevents a sender from denying sending a message that it has actually 
sent and a receiver from denying receiving a message that it has actually received. Alternatively, 
this service can be viewed as a way for a sender to prove that an alleged receiver has in fact 
received a message or for a receiver to prove that an alleged sender has in fact sent a message.
2.4.1.6 Availability -  Property/Service
Although both the recommendation X.800 and the RFC 2828 treat availability as a property o f a 
system that is associated with various security services, in [66] Stallings argues that it makes 
sense to explicitly specify an availability service that protects the system, especially against 
security threats raised by denial of service attacks, to ensure its services and resources are 
available when required.
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2.4.2 Security Attacks
A security attack is any deliberate attempt to evade security services that compromises the 
security of information, system resources or services [66] [69]. Security attacks are commonly 
classified as passive attacks and active attacks.
2.4.2.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks try to gain unauthorised access to information from a system or from in-transit 
messages over a communication link, but it does not compromise system resources or services
[69]. Regarding communications systems, passive attacks can be of two types [66]:
o Eavesdropping aims at gaining access to confidential information by secretly tapping into a 
communication link (wiretapping), i.e. without the knowledge of the data packets’ source and 
destination.
o Traffic analysis aims at obtaining useful information, such as the nature of a communication 
taking place, by means of determining the location and identity of the communication parties 
along with the length and frequency of the exchanged messages. This type of attack can still be 
used when eavesdropping is not possible.
Due to the nature of passive attacks they are very difficult to detect. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
deal with them by preventing their success usually making use of encryption techniques.
2.4.2.2 Active Attacks
Active attacks try to modify system resources or hinder their operation [69]. In communication 
systems they attempt to modify or destroy packets in transit, or create false packets that can 
diminish the efficiency of the system in any possible way. There are four common categories of 
active attacks [66]:
o A masquerade attack is launched by an entity that pretends to be another entity. It usually 
involves the creation of packets and the use of other active attacks to break the security 
measures in place.
o A replay attack involves the passive capture of a message and its later retransmission to 
accomplish an unauthorised and usually harmful effect.
o Modification o f  messages implies that a message is captured, altered and retransmitted without 
the consent of its source and destination. This type of attack also includes capturing packets 
and reordering them to manage an unauthorised effect.
o Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks hinder or stop completely the normal use or management of a 
communication system. DoS attacks can affect individual entities (e.g. impeding messages
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from reaching a destination), various entities (e.g. by dropping messages directed to more than 
one destination, or bringing down a network service such as an e-mail server), or the entire 
network (e.g. flooding packets all over the network to overload it and degrade its overall 
performance) -  Section 2.5 offers a review of work addressing DoS attacks targeted at the 
network layer of MANETs and aimed at disrupting its route discovery and packet forwarding 
functionality.
Contrary to passive attacks, active attacks are easier to detect than prevent. Thus the course of 
action is to detect them, tackle them and recover from any disruption that they may have caused.
2.5 Misbehaviour in MANETs
As was stated in Section 2.3 the intrinsic characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks, such as node 
mobility and the lack of infrastructure, endow them with a flexible and versatile dynamic network 
topology that can be desirable in many situations. Unfortunately, those same characteristics in 
addition to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel and the fact that nodes rely on other nodes 
for packet transmission and service accessibility make MANETs vulnerable to a wide variety of 
attacks by misbehaving nodes. Such attacks range from passive eavesdropping, where a node tries 
to obtain unauthorised access to data destined for another node, to active interference where 
malicious nodes hinder network performance by not obeying globally acceptable rules (passive 
and active attacks were introduced in Section 2.4.2). The rest of this Section is organised as 
follows: in Section 2.5.1 we clarify the differences between the terms misbehaviour, intrusion and 
trust. Then in Section 2.5.2 we introduce schemes for the protection of the routing discovery and 
packet forwarding services of the network layer. Section 2.5.3 reviews work by other authors on 
anomalous link behaviour detection and Section 2.5.4 reviews work on intrusion and node 
misbehaviour detection.
2.5.1 Misbehaviour, Intrusion and Trust
In the network security literature the terms misbehaviour, intrusion and trust are commonly used 
with vague and sometimes interchangeable meanings. Although the literature review offered in 
this Section is likely to have the same shortcomings as we prefer to use the same terms employed 
by the authors of each work, we believe that it is important to clarify to the reader the difference 
between these terms as it helps to understand why we have favoured the use of the word 
misbehaviour in our work instead of intrusion or trust.
Trust can generally be thought of as the level of confidence that an entity can have on a system 
that it relies on. The higher the level of confidence an entity has on a system the higher the
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probability that the system meets the specifications, i.e. that the system does what it claims to do 
and it does not carry out any harmful or unwanted functions [69], Typically the level of 
confidence of an entity on a system increases every time it uses the system with a successful 
outcome and decreases otherwise. Additionally, trust on a system can be affected by the opinion 
that an already “trusted” third party has on it. For instance, the X.509 ITU-T recommendation
[70] specifies how a trusted Certification Authority (CA) can create certificates for trustworthy 
systems and revoke them for untrustworthy systems. Thus, when an entity wants to use a system it 
first checks with the CA that the system’s certificate is valid, in which case it assumes that the 
system can be trusted, i.e. confidence in the system starts at a high level.
According to RFC 4949 [69] an intrusion occurs when an entity, i.e. the intruder, gains or tries to 
gain access to a system or system resource without having been granted authorisation to do so. 
However, such definition is somewhat narrow in the context of mobile ad hoc networks since it 
does not account for attacks that degrade the communication performance of a MANET by using 
solely the intruder’s own resources and without requiring any authorisations or violating any 
access rights. A more general definition is offered by the authors of [71] and [72]. In their work, 
which is tailored to MANETs, an intruder is considered to be any node (i.e. user or device) that 
subverts the functioning of the network by intentionally causing undesirable events known as 
attacks or intrusions.
On the other hand, misbehaviour -  or malicious behaviour -  in MANETs has a more general 
definition than that of intrusion. While in the definition of intrusion the node hindering the 
network performance causes the undesirable events in an intentional manner, in the definition of 
misbehaviour such events can also be caused unintentionally. For instance, if a node behaves 
maliciously by not forwarding packets on behalf of other peer nodes, the node does not always 
exhibits such a malicious behaviour because it intends to do so. The node may also misbehave 
because it is overloaded, broken, compromised or congested as well as intentionally being selfish 
or malicious [73] [74]. An overloaded node lacks the CPU cycles to attend its local and/or 
network tasks, which leads it to not comply with its network duties owing to its inability to 
process them. A broken node has a software or hardware fault that prevents it from performing its 
network tasks properly. A compromised node may be victim of an attack that degrades its network 
capabilities. A congested node receives more packets than the bandwidth available to it allows it 
to send, its buffer fills and eventually it has to drop incoming packets. A selfish node is unwilling 
to use its resources such as battery life, bandwidth or processing power to forward packets on 
behalf of other nodes. A malicious node drops packets or generates additional packets solely to 
disrupt the network performance and prevent other nodes from accessing network services (a 
denial of service attack). Thus, misbehaviour accounts for both intentional and unintentional 
network-harmful events.
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2.5.2 Route Discovery and Packet Forwarding Protection
In MANETs misbehaviour at the network layer can involve the routing protocol and it can be 
divided into two categories [73]: route discovery misbehaviour and packet forwarding 
misbehaviour. Route discovery misbehaviour refers to the failure by a node to correctly execute 
the route discovery procedure acting in accordance to a set of rules defined by a routing protocol. 
Packet forwarding misbehaviour instead refers to the failure by a node to properly forward 
packets towards their destination on behalf of other network nodes. In this Section we review 
work on security measures that protect the route discovery and packet forwarding services from 
the disruption caused by intruders or misbehaving nodes. However, unlike proposals made later in 
this thesis, the work described in this Section makes no attempt to pinpoint the links or nodes 
causing the network service disruption, it rather prevents the disruption from happening or 
mitigates it as much as possible.
Secure routing protocols have been proposed based on existing ad hoc routing protocols. These 
protocols add several security features but also eliminate some of the optimisations introduced in 
the original routing protocols because these optimisations can be exploited to launch different 
types of attacks. Although available work in this area mostly seems to address reactive routing 
approaches, there is also work that addresses proactive routing strategies. For example, the secure 
efficient distance vector (SEAD) routing [75] is based on the destination sequenced distance 
vector (DSDV) [55] but makes use of inexpensive one-way hash chains cryptography to create a 
routing protocol that offers robustness against multiple uncoordinated attackers by authenticating 
hop counts and sequence numbers. The secure ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV) 
routing protocol [76] [77], which is based on AODV [59] [60], also uses one-way hash chains 
cryptography in addition to digital signatures to protect Route Request (RREQ) and Route Reply 
(RREP) messages and prevent malicious nodes from advertising false routing information on 
behalf of other nodes in the network. The secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks 
(Ariadne) [78] is based on the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol [61] [62] and the timed 
efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) broadcast authentication protocol proposed 
in [79] which is used to authenticate routing messages. A common characteristic of SEAD, 
SAODV and Ariadne is their need for a mechanism to set up secret keys, shared secret keys or to 
distribute authentic public keys, but these mechanisms are not always readily available in 
transient MANETs. Moreover, these approaches only secure the path discovery and establishment 
functionality of routing protocols; as we will see in Chapter 3, our approach complements them 
by securing the data forwarding functionality.
Some research effort has also been focused on the development of new routing protocols whose 
objective is to protect the network from security threats that were not addressed by earlier work.
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The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [80] assumes the existence of an a priori security association 
between communicating nodes, i.e. source and destination, and it specifically guarantees that 
false, compromised or replayed route replies do not reach back the querying node or are rejected 
if they do. Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [81] on the other hand assumes 
that network nodes can exchange keys a priori with a trusted network certificate server -  possibly 
using an out of band method. Interaction among nodes is based on their certificates, and erratic 
nodes (i.e. misbehaving nodes) can be removed from the network by revoking their certificates. 
Although ARAN includes a mechanism to remove misbehaving nodes, it does not address how to 
detect them. As with SEAD, SAODV, and Ariadne these protocols can be coupled with our 
approach, which is not routing protocol dependent, to offer an improved security solution.
There is also previous work that has been focused on ensuring that the data forwarding 
functionality of routing protocols can withstand the attacks launch by malicious network nodes 
while maintaining the level of network disruption as low as possible. Nodes dropping packets that 
are expected to be forwarded is an example of a security attack seeking to disrupt packet 
forwarding; this attack and similar ones along with their effects on MANETs are meticulously 
studied in [82]. Offering limited resilience against such attacks the Secure Message Transmission 
(SMT) and Secure Single Path (SSP) protocols are both introduced in [83]. In SMT a message 
that is to be sent towards a destination is first divided in N parts and then sent by N independent 
paths. Each part carries a limited amount of redundancy in such a way that only M parts, where 
M<N, are needed at the destination to recover the whole message. This means that (N-M) paths 
can fail to deliver the packet to the destination and the original message will still be received. If 
fewer than M parts are received at the destination the source resends the missing parts using the 
previously successful paths. SSP is a specific case of SMT where only one path is used at a time 
and the source tries a different path each time an acknowledgment is not received. However, SMT 
is very bandwidth-intensive and these protocols do not attempt to find the source of the packet 
loss. Our proposed approach, on the contrary, identifies any source(s) that appear(s) to be causing 
packet losses, allowing for their penalisation at a later stage through an accusation phase.
2.5.3 Anomalous Link Behaviour Detection
In this Section, work proposing approaches to detect anomalous link behaviour, possibly due to a 
node’s misbehaviour, is reviewed. The common feature of these schemes is that they can pinpoint 
anomalous behaviour occurring in a link between a node u and a node v, but they cannot 
confidently discern which node the offender is since the most likely situation to occur is that node 
u blames node v and vice versa.
31
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
A similar system to that in [83] (introduced in the previous section) is proposed in [84], but 
instead of using a multipath approach all the way between source and destination, it uses a 
Neighbour Watch System (NWS) which only uses multipath if there is evidence of misbehaviour. 
In this approach a node has a list of its neighbours as well as of its neighbours’ neighbours. In this 
manner if a node u forwards a packet to node v there is a group of sub-watch nodes, i.e. 
neighbours common to u and v, which save the packet on their buffers until they overhear node v 
forwarding the packet to the next hop. If a timeout period expires, then each sub-watch node 
forwards the packet to their corresponding next hop gracefully starting a multipath transmission 
based on evidence of a link’s anomalous behaviour. Node u, the primary-watch node, keeps track 
of node v and the sub-watch nodes and if none of them forward the packet it selects a next hop 
different to node v and starts the process again. This procedure is repeated at each node in the path 
towards the destination to guarantee the successful delivery of each packet. Although this scheme 
significantly reduces the network overhead compared to [83], it still fails to identify the source of 
the packet loss.
The authors of [85] propose a secure traceroute protocol for fixed networks enabling end hosts or 
routers to locate a link compromised by packet forwarding misbehaviour. In the secure traceroute 
protocol the traceroute source (i.e. the node performing the behaviour check on routers in the 
path) sends traceroute packets to each router in the path starting by the closest router and orderly 
continuing with next hop. Each router receiving the traceroute packet responds including the next 
hop in its reply so that the traceroute source always knows the expected next hop. To prevent 
intermediate nodes from distinguishing traceroute packets from normal traffic and tampering with 
them, the packets are encrypted with a different pair of secret keys by the traceroute source and 
each router in the path. Routers respond to traceroute packets with some agreed-upon secret 
information so that the traceroute source can confirm the packet has not been forged or tampered 
with. Finally, traceroute responses contain a massage authentication code to guarantee its origin. 
This process is then applied iteratively over a path until a compromised link is found or a 
complete route is cleared of misbehaviour. Although this work has been targeted at fixed 
networks its principle can be adapted to MANETs.
An acknowledgement-based approach to detect anomalous behaviour in links is proposed in [86]. 
The authors propose a scheme called 2ACK where nodes send two-hop acknowledgement packets 
in the opposite direction of the traffic flow. Thus, in a route a-b-c-d-e node c sends 
acknowledgements to a, node d  to b, and node e to c. However, acknowledgements are not sent 
for every packet since it would produce a high network overhead; instead nodes c, d  and e 
perform a selective acknowledgement and include the ID of the acknowledged packet in the 
2ACK packet so that the receiver can identify the arriving packet. The receiver can then maintain 
a ratio of unacknowledged packets while observing the link over a period of time. If during that
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period the ratio goes over a pre-determined threshold then the node can determine that the link 
between the next two hops is behaving anomalously. For instance, node b could determine that the 
link c-d is anomalous either because c is not forwarding the packets to d, or d  is not sending back 
the two-hop acknowledgements to try to incriminate c. A report is then sent to the source for it to 
start a new route discovery process avoiding including the anomalous link in the new path.
The routing protocol proposed in [87] offers resilience to Byzantine failures (any disruption or 
degradation of the data forwarding service) by an algorithm that allows the detection of an 
anomalous link after log n faults have occurred on a path, where n is the hop length of the path. In 
this routing strategy nodes maintain a link weight list in which links exhibiting Byzantine failures 
have larger weights. Then a source intending to transmit data to a destination selects the path 
which has the overall lowest weight in an attempt to ensure that anomalous links do not constitute 
part of its path. In [88] the authors propose an approach to detect anomalous link behaviour in a 
clustered MANET under the control of a central Access Point (AP). In this scheme the destination 
must send an acknowledgement (ACK) back to the source signed using the TESLA broadcast 
authentication protocol [79]. Intermediate nodes check the ACK on its way back to the source and 
keep track of those packets which are not acknowledged. Then in a periodically manner all nodes 
report to the AP the number packets they have forwarded (PF) and the number of packets left 
unacknowledged (PU). If all nodes over a path contain the same PF and the same PU it means that 
the entire path is well behaved. Otherwise, an anomalous link is found between any two adjacent 
nodes differing in the reported PF and/or PU. The AP can then decide not include anomalous links 
in future forwarding paths. The authors of this work state that their approach can benefit by using 
existing reputation systems in order detect misbehaving nodes rather than anomalous links. 
However, they do not specify how this can be achieved.
A different approach is followed by MARS (Multipath Routing Single Path Transmission) [89] 
where misbehaviour is detected over a path, not a link. MARS can only work over routing 
protocols capable of obtaining at least two disjoint paths from source to destination. MARS 
selects a pair of disjoint paths: the shortest one to send the information and the second to send 
control packets at the start and end of a communication. When the communication starts the 
source sends two identical information packets over the two paths with information such as the 
expected data rate for this communication session. If the destination receives both packets with a 
time difference equal to or less than a predefined amount of time then the destination assumes that 
both paths are well behaved. From this point onwards the destination keeps track of the current 
packet data rate and periodically compares it against the expected packet data rate. If there is a 
substantial fall in the packet rate, the destination uses the second route to send a control packet to 
the source notifying about the possible misbehaviour detected over the first path. On receipt the 
source selects another pair of disjoint paths, or initiates a new route discovery if  there are none
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available, and starts the whole process again. A negative aspect of this scheme is that in MANETs 
it is not always possible to guarantee the existence of two disjoint paths from a source to a 
destination.
The main drawback of the above approaches is that routing survivability is guaranteed by finding 
problematic links rather than pinpointing problematic nodes, i.e. these strategies do not aim at 
detecting or penalising misbehaving nodes and consequently fail to tackle the root of the problem. 
This drawback is addressed in our proposed solution since it detects and effectively penalises 
misbehaving nodes.
2.5.4 Intrusion and Node Misbehaviour Detection
Work presented in this Section also aims at protecting mobile ad hoc networks against the 
disruption caused by intentionally or unintentionally misbehaving nodes. However, unlike work in 
the previous section, the main goal here is to detect, and in some cases penalise, any nodes 
generating the security breach.
In [90] when a node has broken the security mechanisms of a network it is regarded as an 
intruder. In this scheme an intrusion is detected when a node’s behaviour presents a substantial 
deviation from the normal behaviour profile displayed by all network nodes. Each node is 
equipped with an intrusion detection system (IDS) module allowing them to detect intrusion 
locally or cooperate with neighbouring nodes to further investigate ambiguous intrusion cases. In 
this approach a node may use its own data to identify another node as an intruder. By contrast, in 
our approach a node detects anomalies in packet forwarding based on data acquired by other 
nodes in the network as well as on its own data. IDS modules have also been the object of 
research in order to detect attack patterns and identify known attacks through abnormal packets. 
In [71] and [72] the authors propose a framework for misuse detection which divides the nodes in 
a network into two categories: insiders and outsiders. Insiders are always well-behaved nodes that 
belong to trusted users and run the intrusion detection system (IDS) module to detect attacks 
launched by outsiders through packets with abnormal contents. Outsiders on the other hand can be 
thought of as users of the network since they are not trusted to carry out route discovery or packet 
forwarding tasks, thus limiting the number of possible attacks that they can perform. 
Unfortunately, this framework fails to make use of well-behaved outsiders that could contribute to 
relevant tasks and rewards misbehaving outsiders by allowing them to use the network. In this 
regard, our protocol punishes misbehaving nodes by denying them access to the network and its 
services.
In [91] the authors propose a grammatical evolution approach -  an artificial intelligence based 
learning technique inspired by natural evolution -  to detect intruders. In this work an intrusion is
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defined as one of a flooding attack, a route discovery disruption attack or a packet dropping 
attack. The grammatical evolution algorithm receives as an input a sample of network data 
marked as malicious or non-malicious. Then during the training process the original sample is 
mutated to produce new samples and the resulting samples go through a crossover procedure to 
produce yet more samples. After each mutation and crossover iteration the fitness of the resulting 
samples to address the intrusion detection problem is measured and those that exhibit better 
results -  i.e. samples with greater fitness -  are selected to continue the evolution process. 
Ultimately, the solution with the best fitness to solve the intrusion detection problem is distributed 
to the network nodes and used to detect any possible intruders. Although this approach always 
tends towards an optimal solution, its accuracy strongly depends on the initial data set and how 
well it maps malicious and non-malicious behaviour and the environment where the MANET is 
deployed. This information is not easy to obtain for unplanned transient networks created on the 
fly.
There has been some work that aims specifically at protecting data packet forwarding against 
malicious attacks in order to provide reliable network connectivity. The final part of this Section 
describes some approaches that detect malicious behaviour in the data forwarding phase. 
CONFIDANT (Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks) [92] is a routing 
protocol that, like Ariadne [78], is based on DSR [61] [62]. In CONFIDANT neighbouring nodes 
monitor the behaviour of each other, i.e. neighbourhood watch, as they forward packets towards 
the destination. Any deviation from normal behaviour, e.g. packets not being forwarded, is 
registered in their reputation system by modifying the rating of the observed node. If the deviation 
is considered to be persistent then an ALARM is raised and sent to the neighbourhood to be aware 
of the misbehaving node and to the source for it to start a fresh route discovery process. 
Reputation knowledge is then used to take action against misbehaving nodes in the route 
discovery phase either by not including them in the paths created in the network or by not 
accepting to be in the path of a communication where the source or destination have a very “low” 
reputation rate. In [93] the authors look at traffic transmission patterns between any two 
communicating nodes in order to facilitate verification by a receiver. Such traffic patterns can be 
analysed if they are used in concert with suboptimal techniques at the medium access control 
(MAC) layer that preserve the statistical regularity from hop to hop. In this scheme nodes can 
distinguish between a misbehaving node and a congested node, knowing the traffic transmission 
rates from other nodes to the target node. This work, however, has a very narrow scope of 
application due to its MAC layer assumptions to preserve statistical regularity, and thus it is very 
unlikely for it to be useful in scenarios other than military applications.
WATCHERS (Watching for Anomalies in Transit Conservation: a Heuristic for Ensuring Router 
Security) [94] is a protocol designed to detect disruptive routers in fixed networks through the
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analysis of the number of packets entering and exiting a router -  i.e. the principle of flow 
conservation. In this approach each router executes the WATCHERS protocol at regular intervals 
in order to identify neighbouring routers that misroute traffic and avoid them. To work well the 
WATCHERS protocol requires the existence of at least one path not affected by disruptive routers 
between any two well-behaved routers in the network. Although WATCHERS is based on the 
principle of flow conservation in the same way as will be seen in Section 3.2.1 for our proposed 
algorithm, its design focuses only on fixed networks and is not applicable to mobile ad hoc 
networks. Additionally, in our approach the broadcasting nature of the wireless medium allows 
for multiple possible paths between any two well-behaved nodes.
SCAN (self-organised network layer security in mobile ad hoc networks) [73] focuses on securing 
packet delivery. It uses AODV [59] [60], but argues that the same ideas are applicable to other 
routing protocols. SCAN assumes a network with sufficient node density that nodes can overhear 
packets being received by a neighbour, in addition to packets being sent by the neighbour. SCAN 
nodes monitor their neighbours by listening to packets that are forwarded to them. The SCAN 
node maintains a copy of the neighbour’s routing table and determines the next-hop node to which 
the neighbour should forward the packet; if the packet is not overheard as being forwarded, it is 
considered to have been dropped. In contrast, in our algorithm nodes do not need to overhear 
transmissions to and from any neighbour in order to detect misbehaviour. In SCAN each node 
must possess a valid token to be able to interact with the network and though nodes monitor their 
neighbours independently, all nodes in a local neighbourhood collaborate with each other to 
eventually convict a suspicious node by revoking its token. The tokens’ lifetime is determined by 
a credit strategy that helps reducing the total network overhead. Token renewal and revocation is 
done through threshold secret sharing and secret share updates. SCAN develops these ideas from 
[95] where they are used to give a valid key to a new node entering the network and from then 
onwards to renew its key periodically. Similar techniques have also been studied in various papers 
such as [96], where they are used to achieve distribution of trust throughout a network. SCAN is 
similar to our approach in the sense that it does not only detect the source of misbehaviour, but it 
also punishes any misbehaving nodes. However, SCAN makes use of cryptographic techniques 
that may prove too resource demanding for devices with limited capabilities.
In [97] a system that can mitigate the effects of packet dropping is proposed. This is composed of 
two mechanisms that are kept in all network nodes: a watchdog and a pathrater. The watchdog 
mechanism identifies any misbehaving nodes by promiscuously listening to the next node in the 
packet’s path. If such a node drops more than a predefined threshold of packets the source of the 
communication is notified. The pathrater mechanism keeps a rate for every other node in the 
network it knows about. A node’s rate is decreased each time a notification of its misbehaviour is 
received. Then, nodes’ rates are used to determine the most reliable path towards a destination,
36
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
thus reducing the chance of finding a misbehaving node along the selected path. This work uses 
DSR but its authors claim that it can be easily adapted to other source routing protocols. However, 
its applicability has not yet been addressed for distance-vector based routing protocols. Moreover, 
the watchdog might not detect a misbehaving node in the presence of ambiguous collisions, 
receiver collisions or nodes capable of controlling their transmission power (how these problems 
affect the detection of packet forwarding misbehaviour is explained in Section 3.1.3). Such 
weaknesses are the result of using promiscuous listening to determine whether a node has 
forwarded a packet or not. Also, using pathrater can be considered a reward for selfish nodes 
since the flow is diverted towards other nodes in the network while selfish nodes preserve their 
resources. In order to address these weaknesses the authors of [98] propose a solution that further 
develops watchdog and pathrater. The main difference is the way in which a node’s rate is 
calculated. While in watchdog there is a unique rate that is modified based on a node’s 
misbehaviour, in [98] there are two rate tables: a local rate table and a global rate table. In the 
local rate table a node calculates the rate for its neighbours based not only on their misbehaviour, 
but also on their good behaviour -  i.e. the rate is in fact a reputation value. The global rate table 
requires that neighbouring nodes exchange their local rate tables; it maintains an average for each 
node’s reputation as reported by neighbouring nodes. Later during the routing process an action 
module, which is the counterpart of pathrater, avoids routing packets through nodes whose 
reputation indicates that they are misbehaving. Furthermore, the action module avoids forwarding 
packets on behalf of misbehaving nodes to prevent the system from rewarding them for their 
misbehaviour. This approach does not suffer from the same limitations of the original watchdog 
module, such as ambiguous and receiver collisions, since it evaluates nodes over a period of time 
and only penalise them if their reputation rate crosses a specified threshold. In this respect our 
approach is also immune to these limitations since it is based on metrics obtained from nodes that 
are actually sending and receiving packets to and from the node whose behaviour is under 
evaluation. Additionally, the authors of [98] claim that due to the fact that a node’s reputation is 
also affected by its good behaviour there is an opportunity for penalised misbehaving nodes to 
redeem themselves. While our approach denies access to the network to any node that has been 
accused of misbehaviour -  thus discouraging them from dropping packets, whether they are or not 
admitted back in a network depends solely on the network policies defined by the network 
administrator (as described in Chapter 4).
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Chapter 3 
3 Packet Forwarding Misbehaviour Detection 
and Node Accusation
Ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) rely on the ability of their nodes (users, devices, 
sensors or systems) to communicate with each other and cooperate in a coordinated manner to 
create a pool of services geared towards satisfying their users’ needs. In these environments 
communication plays an essential role and any malicious behaviour compromising its efficiency 
or reliability can also jeopardise partially or entirely the overall UCE’s functionality. As stated in 
Chapter 2, UCEs are especially vulnerable to malicious attacks in areas where their 
communication is partially or completely based on the mobile ad hoc network (MANET) 
paradigm. This statement is in line with existing literature which regards mobile ad hoc 
networking as a paradigm rather than as a specific technology [99] [100]. In MANET-supported 
areas -  which can potentially be the entire network -  network nodes rely on each other to forward 
packets to nodes out of their transmission range, i.e. to perform multihop communication. 
Forwarding nodes are not necessarily trusted entities and therefore it is important for the network 
as a whole to possess a means to check that they do not represent a threat capable of hindering its 
performance or blocking essential network services.
In this Chapter we present our proposed approach which consists of an algorithm that performs 
two tasks: i) it enables packet forwarding misbehaviour detection through the principle o f  flow  
conservation [94], and ii) it enables the accusation of nodes that are consistently detected 
exhibiting packet forwarding misbehaviour. A node that is accused of misbehaviour is denied 
access to the network by its peers, which ignore any of its transmission attempts. Thus, 
misbehaving nodes are isolated from the rest of the network (i.e. isolation is the penalisation for 
misbehaving nodes). Our scheme is not coupled to any specific routing protocol and, therefore, it 
can operate regardless of the routing strategy adopted. Our criterion for judging detections on a 
node is the estimated percentage of packets dropped, which is compared against a pre-established 
misbehaviour threshold. Any node that drops packets in excess of this threshold is deemed a 
misbehaving node while those below the threshold are considered to be correctly behaving.
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The proposed scheme allows for the detection and accusation of misbehaving nodes capable of 
launching two known attacks: the black-hole attack and the grey-hole attack, both of which are 
described in Section 3.1.3. In this Chapter we present our proposed framework, algorithm and 
protocol to deal with these attacks. We also demonstrate through simulations that an appropriate 
selection of the misbehaviour threshold allows for a good discrimination between misbehaving 
and well-behaved nodes. Consequently our approach correctly isolates misbehaving nodes and 
helps to improve the average network throughput. Finally we show that the proposed solution 
provides robustness against different degrees of node mobility in a network that is affected by 
black-hole and/or grey-hole attacks.
This Chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 introduces the network model, some 
terminology used throughout this thesis, and the problems that we seek to address with the 
proposed approach. Then Section 3.2 presents the packet forwarding misbehaviour detection 
approach. It starts by formally defining the principle of flow conservation and afterwards it 
explains how it can be adapted to mobile ad hoc networks by means of some reasonable 
assumptions. This Section ends with our simulation results and their corresponding analysis. The 
proposed node accusation strategy is described in Section 3.3 along with a brief explanation of 
how this strategy can benefit from security techniques such as encryption and digital signatures. 
Simulation results and their analysis are offered at the end of this Section. Finally, Section 3.4 
summarises this Chapter. The misbehaviour detection algorithm (Section 3.2) and the node 
accusation algorithm (Section 3.3) were originally published in [101] and [102] respectively.
3.1 Model Assumptions, Terminology & Addressed Problems
3.1.1 Model Assumptions
The physical layer of a wireless network is often vulnerable to attacks such as frequency 
interference. Spread spectrum and frequency hopping are examples of techniques that have been 
studied as means of preventing this type of attacks [103] [104]. The link layer is also subject to 
attacks where nodes gain unfair access to the medium by ignoring the back-off time, or where 
they disrupt communications by dropping packets related to typical handshake processes. 
Approaches have been proposed that tackle link layer misbehaviour in wireless networks [105] 
[106]. Attacks aimed at the physical and link layers are out of the scope of this work.
We assume bidirectional communication symmetry in every direct link between a pair of nodes. 
This means that if  a node v2 receives a packet from node V], v} can also receive a packet from v2. 
This is a sensible assumption since our approach needs MAC (Medium Access Control) protocols 
with collision avoidance mechanisms to work properly, such as the extensively deployed IEEE
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802.11 [107], MACA (Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance) [108] and MACAW (MACA 
for Wireless LANs) [109], which require bidirectional communication for packet transmission.
We assume that the MAC layer protocol makes use of handshake techniques similar to those 
available in the IEEE 802.11 standard, where successfully transmitted packets are acknowledged. 
This is required to provide confidence that a data packet has been successfully transmitted to the 
next-hop node, and enables us to apply the principle of flow conservation (Section 3.2.1).
We also assume that all nodes in the network are adapted with wireless interfaces that support 
promiscuous mode operation. This operational mode allows a node to process all transmissions 
from nodes within hearing range. This is required in order to determine active nodes in a node’s 
neighbourhood and schedule events to check their behaviour at a later stage. However, the data 
used to determine a node’s behaviour are not collected by this means.
At the network layer we assume that nodes misbehave by dropping packets despite having agreed 
to forward them during route discovery. Other types of misbehaviour are not taken into account in 
this Chapter, including attacks by colluding nodes which are considered in Chapter 5.
This thesis does not address security measures for the proposed approach since it focuses on the 
basic mechanisms to detect and accuse misbehaving nodes. However, cryptographic techniques 
such as threshold secret sharing and secret share updates used in SCAN [73] could be used as 
viable ways of protecting the detection and accusation protocols (Section 3.2 and Section 3.3).
3.1.2 Terminology
We use the term neighbour to refer to a node that is within the direct wireless transmission range 
of another node. From this, it follows that both nodes are able to establish a bidirectional 
communication. Likewise, the term neighbourhood refers to all nodes that are neighbours of a 
particular node. A node is not a neighbour of itself and, therefore, a node does not belong to its 
own neighbourhood.
We use the term detection to mean that our algorithm has identified that a node appears to be 
misbehaving. A detection is based on a single check of a node’s behaviour. An accusation, on the 
other hand, occurs when a node reports another node as misbehaving. It is our view that an 
accusation should be based on more than a single detection to increase confidence in the 
assessment, as we discuss in Section 3.3. Additionally, in Section 3.3.3 it is shown how the 
number of detections needed to raise an accusation affects the percentage of nodes correctly 
accused of misbehaviour.
A misbehaving node is a network node -  regardless of whether they are overloaded, broken, 
compromised, congested, selfish or malicious, as explained in Section 2.5.1 -  that agrees to
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forward packets on behalf o f  other network nodes in the route discovery stage but that instead 
launches a black-hole or gray-hole attack as described in Section 3.1.3
A m isbehaving node is represented by a given drop characteristic. In our simulations, 
m isbehaving nodes drop packets in a statistical manner with a predefined dropping probability, 
e.g. dropping packets with 30% probability.
3.1.3 Addressed Problems
A lthough the main goal o f  our approach is to detect black-hole and grey-hole attacks aimed at 
disrupting the packet forwarding functionality o f a routing protocol, we also seek to address 
various weaknesses exhibited by some previously proposed misbehaviour detection strategies. In 
this Section we describe the attacks and weaknesses that the proposed protection scheme 
addresses.
To start with, Figure 3-1 depicts a typical black-hole attack. In this attack a m isbehaving node 
drops all the packets that it receives instead o f normally forwarding them. In the figure the nodes 
v/, V2, Vi, v4 and v5 are part o f a path through which UDP and TCP packets are being forwarded. 
For simplicity the figure depicts a path that forwards packets in only one direction, from vy to v5. 
In this path the malicious node v3 fails to forward any packets to node v4, thus bringing the path 
throughput to zero. M oreover, despite the fact that link v3-to-v4 behaves as a broken link, node V/ 
is left unaware o f the situation since no route errors are generated. Thus, this attack can continue 
indefinitely if  a misbehaviour detection strategy is not in place.
ioo udp 
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Figure 3-2 shows two types o f grey-hole attacks. A grey-hole attack is a “clever” variation on the 
black-hole attack; it can essentially be o f two types: selective dropping o f  packets or probabilistic 
dropping o f packets (or a combination o f  both). In the selective dropping o f  packets attack a 
malicious node targets a specific protocol and drops all its packages while it continues forw arding 
packets for other protocols, e.g. dropping all UDP packets while forw arding TCP packets as 
malicious node v3 does in Figure 3-2-a, perhaps because it knows that U D P transm issions do not 
have flow control. In the probabilistic dropping o f packets attack a m isbehaving node drops 
packets in a statistical manner, e.g. dropping packets with 50% probability or dropping them 
according to a probabilistic distribution. Figure 3-2-b depicts an attack that com bines selective 
and probabilistic dropping, in this attack the malicious node v3 is more likely to drop UDP packets
100 UDP 0 UDP 0 UDP
Figure 3-1 B lack-hole attack
100 TCP ^ - O T C P - - - ^  .T C P  ^
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than TCP packets. The main goal o f  both types o f  grey-hole attacks is to disrupt the network 
without being detected by the security measures in place.
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Figure 3-2 G rey-hole attacks, a) selective packet dropping, b) probabilistic packet dropping
The proposed packet forwarding m isbehaviour detection and node accusation approach also 
addresses several problems that have been identified in previously proposed schemes due to their 
reliance on overhearing to collect an evaluated node’s essential behaviour data. For instance the 
work proposed in [97] suffers from ambiguous collisions and receiver collisions problems, and is 
vulnerable to nodes capable o f controlling their transm ission power. W ork presented in [98] also 
suffers from the same problems but the authors claim that their improved strategy accom m odates 
for such occurrences by evaluating a node’s behaviour over a long enough period o f  time. An 
ambiguous collision (Figure 3-3, also known in the literature as the hidden terminal problem) 
occurs when a node v2 is trying to determine if  another node is properly forw arding a packet. It 
may happen that node v3 forwards the packet to a further node v4, which is out o f  the transm ission 
range o f  v2, while a second transm ission initiated by node vy prevents v2 from overhearing the 
forwarded packet, thus v2 will not know if  the packet was forwarded.
Figure 3-3 A m biguous collision problem  (hidden term inal problem )
On the other hand, in the receiver collision problem a node v2 forwards the packet to v3 at which 
point a collision occurs with v4, as in Figure 3-4. Node v y ,  w hich is trying to determ ine if  v2 is 
properly forwarding packets, is unaware o f  such a collision and assumes that the packet was 
forwarded even if  v2 does not attempt a retransmission.
A nother common problem is caused by nodes capable o f controlling their transm ission power 
(Figure 3-5). Thus, if  a node vy is trying to determine whether a node v2 is correctly forw arding 
packets, node v2 can transmit with enough power for vy to overhear but not enough pow er for v3 to 
receive the packets, leaving v y  unaware o f  the situation.
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Figure 3-4 R eceiver collision problem
0 0 0
Figure 3-5 A node capable o f controlling its transm ission pow er
The SCAN strategy [73] described in Section 2.5.4 can also suffer from the same problems 
described above. However, in highly dense networks SCAN has a better chance o f  w ithstanding 
some o f the attacks since more than one neighbour can monitor an under-evaluation node, but this 
is not always possible to guarantee. Figure 3-6 depicts a scenario in which m onitoring neighbours 
Vj- and v6 are left unaware o f a receiver collision occurring at node v3 (because v5 and v6 are out o f 
range o f v^), thus assum ing that node v2 has forwarded the packet on behalf o f  node V/ even if  v2 
does not try retransmitting the packet.
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Figure 3-6 R eceiver collision in SCAN
The above misbehaviour detection weaknesses, which can be used by m alicious nodes to disrupt 
the network, are due to the fact that overhearing is used by nodes to determ ine m isbehaviour in 
other nodes. In Section 3.2 we present our strategy to detect nodes exhibiting m isbehaviour and 
we demonstrate how by coupling the proposed scheme with a MAC layer that acknow ledges 
successfully transmitted packets immunity against the above problems is provided.
Another common problem in approaches such as watchdog and pathrater [97] or the schem es 
reviewed in Section 2.5.3 (Anomalous Link Behaviour Detection) is that they reward 
m isbehaving nodes by diverting the network flow towards other nodes and fail to punish their
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m isbehaviour. Continuing to forward packets on behalf o f m isbehaving nodes can encourage them 
to m isbehave since it results in less forwarding work and no penalties at all. Figure 3-7 illustrates 
this situation in a network where w ell-behaved nodes reward m isbehaving node v4 first by 
diverting network traffic through nodes v7, v$ and v<?, which permits v4 to save its resources (e.g. 
battery life); and secondly by allowing nodes v2 and v3 to continue forw arding packets on behalf 
o f  v4 in spite o f  its already detected misbehaviour.
© — 0  ©—0 © ©
Figure 3-7 R ew arding o f a m isbehaving node
The proposed approach penalises m isbehaving nodes by isolating them  from the rest o f  the 
network. In this way nodes are discouraged from misbehaving since they may lose access to the 
network services as explained in Section 3.3.
3.2 Packet Forwarding Misbehaviour Detection
Our work provides a novel methodology to secure the data forwarding functionality in multihop 
wireless UCEs. We propose an approach that takes advantage o f  the principle o f  flow 
conservation in a network. This states that all bytes/packets sent to a node, and not destined for 
that node, are expected to exit the node. In this Section we first present, from a theoretical point o f 
view, how this principle works assum ing it is implemented in an ideal network, and then we 
demonstrate that by m aking some reasonable assumptions and adaptations, our algorithm can 
cope with the practical problems that are encountered in real M ANET-like environments.
3.2.1 The Principle of Flow Conservation
We now formally introduce the principle o f flow conservation over an ideal static netw ork model:
o  Let Vj be a node such that vy e  V, where V = {vj, v2, v3 ... vN} is the set o f  all nodes in the 
network, N  is the total num ber o f  nodes in the network, and j  = 1, 2, 3 ... N.
o Let Uj be the subset o f nodes in the network which are neighbours o f  vy, i.e. Uj is the 
neighbourhood o f vy. It follows that vy & Uj and also Uj a  V.
o Let At be the period o f time elapsed between two points in time t0 and // such that At = t j -  to.
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o Let Ty be the number of packets that node v, has successfully sent to node v, for y, to forward to 
a further node; v; e  Uj, Vj e  Uh i and T^to) = 0. TtJ can be read as “packets transmitted from 
v, to Vj for vj to forward”.
o Let Fjj be the number of packets not originated at node v, that node y, has successfully 
forwarded to node v,; v, s  Uj, v e  Uh i and F},(V = 0. Fjj can be read as “packets forwarded 
from Vy to V /” .
If all nodes y, e  V remain static for a period of time At during which no collisions occur in any of 
the transmissions over an ideal (noiseless) wireless channel, and provided that all packet 
transmissions are executed within At, then for a given intermediate node v,:
A 0 =  2 X ( a 0  (3-1)
Vz'l^et/y Vz|v,e£/y
Equation 3-1 states the fundamental premise of the principle of flow conservation in an ideal 
static network applied to packets rather than raw bytes. It states that if  all neighbours of a node y, 
are queried for i) the amount of packets sent to y, to forward and ii) the amount of packets 
forwarded by Vj to them, the total amount of packets sent to and received from v, must be equal.
In practice networks exhibit conditions that are far from ideal. First of all, the wireless channel is 
error prone and packets get lost while in transit. Secondly, collisions happen when the network 
uses protocols where nodes have to compete for the medium, such as when the link layer protocol 
is based on the distributed coordination function (contention period) of the IEEE 802.11 a/b 
standard. In order to allow Equation 3-1 to hold we assume a MAC protocol such as IEEE 802.11, 
MACA or MACAW as described in Section 3.1.1.
If the MAC protocol at the link layer acknowledges each successfully transmitted packet, then the 
transmitter and receiver can maintain synchronised values of their metrics Ty and Fjh For instance, 
when node V ;  needs to forward a packet to v2, vj sends an RTS frame and v2 replies with a CTS 
frame. Following the reception of the CTS, V ;  sends the data which may collide at the receiver 
with the transmission of some other node vj that heard neither the RTS nor the CTS frame for 
example because vj has just moved into range. In this case v2 does not increase its F j2 (forwarded 
from V] to v2) metric because it did not receive the data, and v/ does not increase its Ti2 
(transmitted from vj to v2) because the packet was never acknowledged. Even in the eventuality 
that an ACK frame gets lost the nodes would realise the error when v; retransmits the data. In this 
case, v2 increases its Fn  metric the first time it receives the data packet and sends back the 
respective ACK frame. Node V ;  does not increase its TI2 metric since it does not receive the ACK 
frame and instead it retransmits the packet, sending an RTS frame and waiting for a CTS frame. 
The second time that v2 receives the packet it will notice that the packet has been already received
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by checking the sequence control field in the MAC header, so it does not increase its F]2 metric 
and it acknowledges again the packet as stipulated in the 802.11 standard. When V] receives the 
ACK it will increase its T12 metric and Equation 3-1 holds again.
The use of a MAC protocol that acknowledges successfully transmitted packets in conjunction 
with the conservation of flow principle means that we are not susceptible to problems that arise 
when overhearing other nodes’ transmissions. Thus, problems such as ambiguous collisions, 
receiver collisions, and the ability of a node to control its transmission power do not exist in our 
approach. In our algorithm the nodes keeping the data used to determine whether the forwarding 
was properly made are the nodes actively involved in the transmission process, i.e. the transmitter 
and the receiver of each transmission.
However, a node may exhibit malicious behaviour even if it is not purposefully doing so. For 
example, an overloaded node may temporarily lack the CPU cycles, buffer space or bandwidth to 
forward packets. In addition, some reactive routing protocols, e.g. AODV, cause buffered packets 
to be dropped if they go through a path that is even just temporarily unavailable. For these reasons 
Equation 3-1 cannot be applied in a rigorous manner and a threshold needs to be established to 
account for packets dropped by a node through no fault of its own. Equation 3-2 reflects this 
change:
^ th r e s h o ld ) £ r ,(A 0  0-2)
\fl]VjEUj \/ i\VjEUj
Equation 3-2 implies that well-behaved nodes are required to forward at least some fraction of the 
total packets transmitted to them to forward. Any nodes unable to fulfil the criteria are deemed to 
be misbehaving. The factor (1 -athreshoid) sets the minimum fraction of packets that a node must 
forward in order to avoid detection. However, we prefer to analyse a node’s behaviour in terms of 
the athreshoid factor since it represent a more tangible concept, i.e. athreshoid represents the network 
misbehaviour threshold which is the maximum fraction of packets that a node can drop without 
misbehaving. The misbehaviour threshold can take values between 0 and 1 and as we shall see 
plays an important role in the detection power of our proposed algorithm, i.e. the capability of the 
algorithm to detect misbehaving nodes. The lower athreshoid is the more likely it is that our 
algorithm detects any malicious behaviour. However, it also means that the probability of a wrong 
detection increases, as will be observed in our simulations (Section 3.2.3). A wrong detection 
occurs when the result of a single evaluation of a node mistakenly determines that the node 
appears to be misbehaving. Therefore, fine tuning is required to reach a fair point in this trade-off.
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3.2.2 Adapting the Principle of Flow Conservation to Multihop Wireless 
UCEs
In MANET-like UCEs the neighbourhood Uj of a node Vj changes dynamically over time, making 
it difficult to determine those nodes that have transmitted or received packets to or from a node y,. 
The proposed scheme overcomes this problem by means of a limited broadcast that tracks down 
nodes that have been in contact with node Vj as explained later in this Section. Every node in the 
network is required to keep a table -  the overheard nodes table -  with the IDs of those nodes that 
have been overheard recently through promiscuous listening. Entries are removed once they go 
stale (e.g. if a node in the table has not been overheard in the last t seconds). This process helps a 
node Vj to keep track of nodes that have become part of its neighbourhood Uj while they were 
actively intervening in the network.
The core parts of our algorithm are detailed in the pseudocode shown in Figure 3-8. A node v, 
maintains a table with two metrics Ttj and Fjh which contains an entry for each node Vj to which v, 
has respectively transmitted packets to or received packets from. Node v, increments Tfj on 
successful transmission of a packet to v, for v; to forward to another node, and increments F}; on 
successful receipt of a packet forwarded by v, that did not originate at y, (Figure 3-8-a).
All nodes in the network continuously monitor their neighbours and update the list of those they 
have heard recently (Figure 3-8-b). If the ID of an overheard node is not included in the table of 
overheard nodes a new entry is created. Otherwise, the existing entry is updated with a timestamp 
corresponding to the time the node was last overheard. Upon the creation of a new entry, a node 
schedules a task (or event) to check the behaviour of the node whose address or ID has been saved 
in the new entry. Nodes randomly select a period of time between Tmin and Tmax to schedule a 
behaviour check task. This random selection seeks to reduce the possibility of two or more nodes 
starting a behaviour check on the same node at the same time, wasting network bandwidth, battery 
energy and other network resources.
When a scheduled task is triggered in node v* to check v/s behaviour (Figure 3-8-c), node v* 
broadcasts a metrics request packet (MREQ) with TTL = 1 in the IP header. An MREQ includes 
the ID of the node originating the request (SRC_ID), the ID of the node whose behaviour is to be 
checked (CHK_ID), an MREQ_ID and a timestamp indicating the time at which the task was 
triggered. The MREQ_ID is used in the same way as in some routing protocols which base their 
route discovery phase on broadcasting. If a node sees an MREQ that has the same MREQ_ID and 
SRC_ID of a packet seen before, the MREQ is dropped. This technique prevents flooding packets 
from traversing a zone of the network more than once.
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a. MONITORING
if  node v* successfully transmits a packet to node Vjfor Vj to forward 
increase Ty by one
endif
if  node v, receives a packet successfully forwarded by node v, 
increase Fjj by one
endif
b. OVERHEARING
if  node v* overhears a node v, e  t/*
if  node Vj is not in v* ’s table o f overheard nodes
add node Vj to v* ’s table of overheard nodes 
schedule an event to check Vj’s behaviour
else
update last time node Vj was heard
endif
endif
c. INITIATE BEHAVIOR CHECK
if  in node v* an event to check node Vj’s behaviour is triggered
send a metrics request packet (MREQ) with node Vj’s ID 
schedule another event to check Vj’s behaviour again at (t + Tmay)
endif
d. REQUEST HANDLING
if  node v* receives a metrics request for node Vj
if  node v* has node Vj in its table o f overheard nodes 
rebroadcast metrics request packet (MREQ) 
reschedule any event to check Vj’s behaviour 
if  node v* has metrics for node Vj
send a metrics reply (MREP) back to the requesting node
endif
else
ignore request
endif
endif
e. REPLY HANDLING
if  a request was sent out
while there are more replies to be receivedfor node Vj 
receive reply
acknowledge reply reception (sendMACK) 
add received metrics to totals
endwhile
if ^  Fji — (1 a threshold) T‘j  
\/t]v ,eU j V/'|v( e t/y
node Vj is not misbehaving (non-detection)
else
node Vj is misbehaving (detection)
endif
endif
Figure 3-8 Pseudocode of our proposed detection algorithm
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The timestamp o f an M REQ packet, on the other hand, is used to resolve conflicts when two 
nodes start a behaviour check on the same node at almost the same time. In such cases, nodes can 
see which packet corresponds to the earliest triggered task and disregard the other. This does not 
require accurate synchronisation o f  the nodes’ clocks; approximate synchronisation is all that 
need be assumed. Finally, after the MREQ packet is broadcast, a task is scheduled to be triggered 
a period o f time Tmax (maxim um  elapsed period o f time without checking an active node’s 
behaviour) later. This means it is highly unlikely that the same node will originate two successive 
behaviour checks for another node, and gives other nodes a chance to perform the behaviour 
check.
The handling o f requests (Figure 3-8-d) is the heart o f the limited broadcast algorithm. W hen a 
node receives an MREQ it first checks if  the CHK ID is in its table o f overheard nodes; if it is not 
the node ignores the M REQ and discards the check. Flowever, if  the CHK_ID appears in its table 
then it rebroadcasts the M REQ with TTL = 1 in the IP header. Setting the TTL to one allows the 
algorithm to control how far the broadcast o f the MREQ is to go, instead o f  leaving this task to 
the IP protocol. Thus, every M REQ travels only one hop at a time, and is then analysed and 
rebroadcast if  the protocol so determines. By following this algorithm, our protocol is capable o f 
tracking down nodes that have been in contact with the checked node, as illustrated in Figures 3-9 
and 3-10.
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Nodes that have overheard*>7 Nodes that have not overheard k, 
Analyzed node v7 ------*■ Node's route
Figure 3-9 O verhearing -  nodes overhear node v7 as it changes position
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( V  )  Node performing behaviour checkNodes thal have overheard v.
Limited M REQ broadcast
Figure 3-10 Lim ited B roadcast - node v8 starts a behaviour check on node v7 
and tracks down nodes that have overheard it
We assume that in Figures 3-9 and 3-10 transm issions can be overheard by vertically, horizontally 
and diagonally adjacent nodes. In Figure 3-9, node v7 is first in position a where it can be 
overheard by nodes vy, \>2, v3, v6, v& vyy, vn  and v]3. Each o f  these nodes makes an entry in their 
table o f overheard nodes when v7 first transmits and each o f  them schedules a task to check its 
behaviour. At some point in time, v 7 decides to move, following the path depicted in Figure 3-9 
and coming in contact with nodes v/4, v y 7, Vy& vy9, V20, V23, v24 and v23. It finally stops in position b. 
In this example the scheduled behaviour check initiation task (Figure 3-8-c) in node v# is the first 
to be triggered and the limited broadcast commences, as shown in Figure 3-10. All nodes that 
have overheard node v7 re-broadcast the M REQ, whereas nodes such as v4, v? and v43 also receive 
the MREQ but ignore it because they have not overheard node v 7.
It may also happen that node v7 stops transm itting and receiving packets before it m oves to a 
different network area. Then, after moving, v7 may become active again form ing a new 
neighbourhood. In this case, the old and new neighbourhoods are not connected by nodes that 
have overheard v7 and, therefore, a limited broadcast triggered in one neighbourhood will not 
reach the other. In spite o f this, our algorithm still works properly because two independent 
behaviour checks will be performed on v7: one at its old neighbourhood and another at its new 
neighbourhood. The outcome o f  each o f these behaviour checks depends on the behaviour 
exhibited by v7 at each neighbourhood.
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Once a node has decided whether to continue or not broadcasting a MREQ, it reschedules any 
pending task to check the behaviour of the checked node specified in the CHK_ID field of the 
MREQ. The new behaviour checking task is scheduled in the same way as when a new entry is 
made in the table of overheard nodes, i.e. a period of time is randomly selected between Tmin and 
Tmax- In this way if the random selection is uniformly distributed, the average frequency with 
which an active node’s behaviour is checked is:
avg freq  = ---------—------ = -----------------------   (3-3)
— (T +T  V 2 (T +T  iv m in  m ax /  \  m in m ax /
The last thing a node does when it receives a MREQ is to check if it has any metrics Fp or Ty 
relating to the node being checked. If  any of the metrics has a value other than zero the node 
returns a metrics reply packet (MREP) (Figure 3-8-d) containing the metrics, but if the value of 
both metrics is zero then the node does not send back any response. A metrics reply packet is 
returned to the node that originated the MREQ following the reverse of the MREQ’s path. This 
requires nodes to set a backward pointer when they receive a previously unseen MREQ. We have 
adopted this approach to return MREP packets since it creates much less network overhead than 
an approach where MREPs are trusted to a reactive network protocol. The same reason does not 
necessarily apply to proactive routing protocols but reactive protocols need to be accounted for 
since the approach aims at being routing protocol independent. Thus, if  every MREP packet were 
to be trusted to a reactive routing protocol, e.g. AODV, this would result in several new 
broadcast-based route discovery processes being executed per each behaviour check. In a network 
with a few active nodes forwarding packets on behalf of various sources these simultaneous route 
requests would increase the network load substantially.
Reply handling is executed in the node that initiated the MREQ. This node, in Figure 3-10, 
waits for a period of time in order to give all nodes with metrics about the checked node the 
opportunity of replying. When the time expires, the node checks the behaviour of the analysed 
node by verifying that Equation 3-2 holds (Figure 3-8-e). If it does not, it flags the checked node 
as a misbehaving one; this is a detection. Using a single detection to accuse a node is not 
sufficient since such an algorithm may lead to wrong accusations against correctly behaving 
nodes. A scheme in which multiple detections by different nodes are necessary to accuse a node is 
fairer to well-behaved nodes, while keeping a high probability of correctly accusing misbehaving 
nodes. The proposed method to accuse misbehaving nodes is presented in Section 3.3.
Due to the nature of the algorithm nodes are not perfectly synchronised with each other. A MREQ 
will reach close nodes faster than nodes placed a few hops away. The last nodes to receive the 
MREQ have enough time to send or receive some extra packets to and from the analysed node, 
thus unbalancing the values of the Ty and Fp metrics. This discrepancy, in which some packets
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may have been sent to the node being analysed but not yet forwarded by it, is accommodated by
&threshold.
A problem that has been detected in our simulations has its roots in the dynamic nature of 
multihop wireless UCEs. Nodes receiving a metrics request (MREQ) send a reply if they have 
non-zero metrics for the checked node. However, such replies sometimes get lost due to 
collisions, noise in the wireless channel or link/path breakages due to the mobility of the nodes. If 
the value of the metrics contained in the lost reply is small compared to the total obtained after 
adding up the replies that do not get lost, athresh0id can accommodate them and Equation 3-2 holds. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case and some of those replies that get lost contain key 
information for the calculations and the checked node is then wrongly detected as misbehaving. 
This is one of the reasons why an accusation should not be made based on a single detection. 
Using a single detection to accuse a node is not sufficient since such an approach may lead to 
wrong accusations against correctly behaving nodes. To circumvent the lost replies problem we 
propose an optional module to our algorithm. A node receiving an MREP as it is forwarded 
towards its destination (i.e. towards the node performing the behaviour checking task) will also 
send back a metrics acknowledgement packet (MACK). Thus, nodes sending/forwarding an 
MREP wait for an MACK from the next hop in the route. If the confirmation does not arrive then 
they retransmit the MREP. The process is repeated up to MAXRetx retransmission retries before 
giving up. The results obtained in our simulations have demonstrated that this technique can 
significantly improve the results in MANETs with a high degree of mobility. Simulations have 
also shown that the most significant improvement can be seen when comparing the results for 
MAXRetx = 0 (without retransmitting any reply) and MAXRetx = 1. Subsequent increases to 
MAXRetx improve the results further but not significantly.
3.2.3 Evaluation Results and Analysis
We perform our simulations using the GloMoSim simulation package [48] [49]. The results 
presented for each value are the average of 10 simulation runs. Tests with a larger number of 
simulations (e.g. 20) give results that vary typically no more than 1% from those presented here. 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise our simulation parameters take the following values: i) nodes 
move according to the random waypoint mobility model with a speed randomly chosen with 
uniform distribution between Om/sec and lOm/sec, this yields a mean node speed of 5m/sec and a 
speed standard deviation of 2.89m/sec, ii) the pause time takes a value that is exponentially 
distributed with mean 30 seconds, iii) the wireless transmission range of every node is 100 metres, 
iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 DCF, vi) the 
underlying routing protocol is AODV, and vii) the total simulation time for each scenario is 1800 
seconds.
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An important param eter to evaluate the effectiveness o f  an approach that detects and accuses 
misbehaving nodes is its detection power. In this Section we present results that dem onstrate that 
our approach has a high probability o f  detecting truly m isbehaving nodes while m aintaining a low 
probability o f  perform ing wrong detections, i.e. wrongly detecting a w ell-behaved node as a 
misbehaving one. For this set o f  results the network was set-up with 40%  o f  its total nodes 
misbehaving by not forwarding all packets. This value corresponds to a reasonable worse case 
scenario. If  more than h a lf the network nodes were to misbehave, then their m isbehaviour would 
be considered the normal network behaviour as they would represent the majority o f  the network 
participants. Nodes check the behaviour o f active nodes within a period chosen uniformly 
between 40 and 60 seconds, and keep any overheard node in their tables for 120 seconds after the 
last time they are heard. The principal metric in our tests is the percentage o f detections and it is 
assessed in terms o f  misbehaviour threshold and node speed.
We initially consider our m isbehaviour detection algorithm in terms o f  the m isbehaviour 
threshold, which is the param eter athreshoid in Equation 3-2, i.e. the maximum percentage o f 
packets that a node is allowed to drop without being detected as a m isbehaving node. In order to 
see the effect o f  the m isbehaviour threshold on nodes, simulations were carried out with networks 
containing 20 and 60 nodes, and areas o f  40 000m2 (200m*200m) and 120 000m 2 
(346.4lm *346.41m ) respectively. These values ensure that node density is the same in both 
scenarios. We varied both the packet drop probability o f misbehaving nodes and the m isbehaviour 
threshold between 0% and 100%.
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Figure 3-11 Percentage o f detections vs. m isbehaviour threshold  
(20 node netw ork)
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Figures 3-11 and 3-12 show the percentage o f detections as a function o f the m isbehaviour 
threshold for nodes exhibiting different probabilities o f m isbehaviour for networks with 20 and 60 
nodes respectively. It can be inferred from both graphs that the criterion to select an adequate 
m isbehaviour threshold a threshoid depends on the level o f  trust required in the network as well as on 
network characteristics such as network size. The lower the threshold is the greater the fraction o f 
packets that nodes need to forward to be considered well behaved. However, since characteristics 
inherent to M ANETs such as mobility and the noisy wireless medium can cause some packets to 
be lost (including packets o f  our own protocol), a lower value o f athreshoid also means that an 
increasing num ber o f  correctly behaving nodes can be wrongly detected as m isbehaving ones. A 
similar problem occurs with misbehaving nodes that drop a small percentage o f  packages, e.g. less 
than 10% o f packets. By com paring the 10% M isbehaviour Drop curve with the No M isbehaviour 
curve we can see how the less m isbehaviour a node exhibits the more its curve resembles that o f  a 
well-behaved node (i.e. d  = 0), making distinguishing between them a com plex task.
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Figure 3-12 Percentage o f detections vs. m isbehaviour threshold  
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Finally, it can also be seen from Figures 3-11 and 3-12 that selecting a m isbehaviour threshold 
equal to a node’s m isbehaving probability prevents our approach from identifying m isbehaving 
nodes with certainty, i.e. the probability o f detection is approximately 50%. These occurrences are 
seen for each curve at points for which the m isbehaviour threshold has a value close to a node’s 
packet drop probability. Selecting an acceptable or tolerable level o f  misbehaviour x in a netw ork 
is a policy decision. This policy then allows a value o f  a threshoid to be set depending on the desired
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detection probability. For example, for a detection probability o f  90%  or greater our results 
suggest that a threshoid should then be set at approximately 10% lower than the nodes’ packet 
dropping probability for the 20 node network and 20%  lower than the nodes’ packet dropping 
probability for the 60 node network. This aspect will be considered further in Section 4.2.2.
Figure 3-13 is a subset o f  the data shown in the above figures and corresponds to the curves for 
well-behaved nodes in 20 and 60 node networks. In spite o f  the fact that the curves belong to 
networks with the same node density, the figure clearly shows that the num ber o f  nodes in a 
network has an effect on the precision o f  our approach. There is a greater likelihood o f wrongly 
detecting well-behaved nodes as m isbehaving in a 60 node network than in a 20 node network. 
This occurs because in larger networks it is more probable that the average distance between 
source and destination is greater, thus requiring more nodes to be involved in the packet 
forwarding process in order to reach the destination. This consequently leads to lower path 
stability, i.e. there are more nodes likely to move out o f  the path at any instance causing link 
breakages and forcing new route discovery processes, which in AODV are performed through 
broadcasting methods. Additionally, more active nodes mean more behaviour checks, more 
limited broadcast procedures, and potentially more key metric reply packets (M REP) being lost to 
packet collisions. This problem is exacerbated because at the MAC sub-layer broadcasting 
procedures do not employ handshaking techniques.
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Figure 3-13 Percentage o f Detections for non-m isbehaving netw orks with 20 and 60 nodes
Our second set o f results assesses the performance o f our m isbehaviour detection algorithm  in 
terms o f the degree o f mobility o f the nodes in the network. This time the m isbehaving nodes drop
55
Chapter 3. Packet Forwarding Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
packets with 50% probability while the m isbehaviour threshold is kept at 40% ( a,hreshoid ~  40%). 
The mean node speed varies between Om/sec (a static network) and 20m/sec with nodes random ly 
selecting a speed in the range given by mean node speed  ± Im/sec, which results in a speed
standard deviation o f 0.58m/sec for all m easurements. W hereas Figure 3-14 is plotted for
misbehaving and well-behaved nodes in a 20 node network, Figure 3-15 is plotted for
misbehaving and well-behaved nodes in a 60 node network.
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Figure 3-14 Percentage o f detections vs. m ean node speed (20 node netw ork)
It can be seen from Figure 3-14 that the m isbehaviour detection protocol is not significantly 
affected by the speed o f the nodes in small networks. Our approach robustly keeps a gap between 
m isbehaving nodes and well-behaved nodes m aking it easy to spot nodes that are purposefully 
violating the principle o f  flow conservation. The fluctuations seen in both curves are likely to 
have occurred due to the sporadic losses o f metrics reply packets (M REP) rather than the node 
speed. However, what has been said for small networks does not apply for large scale networks, 
as can be appreciated from Figure 3-15. As the mean node speed increases the gap betw een 
m isbehaving and correctly behaving nodes grows smaller. This can be due to a higher netw ork 
overhead introduced during the route discovery (i.e. expanding ring broadcast by A O D V ) and 
metrics request phase (i.e. limited broadcast by our approach), as they have larger areas and 
number o f nodes to cover. As the speed increases, link breakages occur more often and new 
broadcast-based requests are generated. This in turn leads to a higher probability o f  m etrics replies 
(M REP) being lost to packet collisions, thus degrading the accuracy o f  the proposed protection 
scheme. Nevertheless, a good level o f discrimination is maintained. These results support our
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hypothesis that using a single detection to accuse a node is not sufficient since such an algorithm 
may lead to wrong accusations against correctly behaving nodes.
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Figure 3-15 Percentage o f detections vs. m ean node speed (60 node netw ork)
Finally we assess the network overhead generated by our misbehaviour detection algorithm  in a 
20 node network. In this set o f simulations misbehaving nodes drop packets with 50% probability, 
the misbehaviour threshold athreshoid is 40% and the node speed varies between Om/sec (a static 
network) and 20m/sec. Figure 3-16 shows the total network resources used, m easured by the 
number o f packets sent over each link during the entire simulation. Figure 3-17 displays the mean 
number o f packets sent over each link per behaviour check. In both figures, the total netw ork 
resources are calculated by adding one each time a packet crosses a different link: thus a M REQ 
packet broadcast that traverses three hops (links) contributes three packet-links to the total.
The total overhead in Figure 3-16 is the sum o f  the overhead produced by the M REQ, M REP and 
M ACK packets. It is least in a stationary network and increases with the mean node speed. This 
increase is due to the fact that in highly dynamic networks more nodes actively intervene in the 
communication process because new paths are constantly being formed. Subsequently, behaviour 
checks have to be performed on a greater number o f  nodes. This observation is confirm ed by the 
data in Figure 3-17. It shows that the average num ber o f  packets per behaviour check in dynam ic 
networks is about 65 packets and it seems to be approximately independent o f  the m ean node 
speed. Thus, i f  the network overhead increases but the num ber o f packets per behaviour check 
remains the same then the network overhead growth m ust be due to a greater num ber o f  checks 
being performed in the network.
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It can also be seen from Figures 3-16 and 3-17 that the MREQ overhead represents the main 
contribution to the total algorithm overhead. This is expected since the dissem ination o f  M REQ 
packets is based on broadcast, albeit limited to the area in which the node has been heard. Finally, 
the figures show that M REP and M ACK packets produce more or less the same overhead. A gain
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this is expected since each node receiving a MREP packet must acknowledge it to the previous 
nodes. The small difference observed between the curves corresponds to transmitted MREP 
packets which are lost to channel noise, link breakages and packet collisions.
3.3 Accusation of Misbehaving Nodes
In order to enable the accusation of misbehaving nodes every node in the network is required to 
keep two tables in addition to the overheard nodes table introduced in Section 3.2.2: a detection 
table and an accusation table. The detection table contains the IDs of those nodes that have been 
detected as misbehaving and the number of times their misbehaviour has been reported. The 
accusation table keeps the IDs of those nodes that have been accused of misbehaviour. Nodes are 
typically accused of misbehaviour because they have reached within a predefined period of 
evaluation (Tevaiuation) the number of misbehaviour detections imd) required to be accused.
We believe that nodes should not be accused based on a single detection since it can lead to 
mistakenly accuse well-behaved nodes of misbehaving. This idea is strongly supported by the 
evidence provided by the simulation results obtained in Section 3.2.3. In this Section we introduce 
a scheme in which multiple detections by different nodes are necessary to accuse a node. This 
approach is fairer to well-behaved nodes, while keeping a high probability of correctly accusing 
misbehaving nodes as it can be seen from our simulations results in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Node Accusation
Accusing misbehaving nodes requires the detection algorithm, introduced in Section 3.2.2, to be 
further developed to provide it with the features needed to keep track of any misbehaving nodes 
and the number of times they have been detected. Additionally, nodes should be able to 
communicate this information to other network nodes and thus reach a consensus on whether a 
node should or should not be accused of misbehaviour. Figure 3-18 shows the pseudocode to 
accuse misbehaving nodes. Subroutines a, b, c and d are not shown in this figure as they remain 
exactly as they are in Figure 3-8. Subroutine e has a small modification and replaces our previous 
subroutine e (Figure 3-8-e). Finally the new subroutines f, g and h are to be appended at the end of 
the pseudocode of Figure 3-8.
As seen in Figure 3-18-e the only change made to this subroutine instructs a node performing a 
behaviour check to send out a detection alert packet (DAP) if it detects a misbehaving node. 
Detection alert packets contain similar fields to MREQ packets: the detected node ID (DN_ID), 
the ID of the node that realised the detection (SRC_ID), and a packet ID (DAP_ID); the IP 
header’s TTL field is also set to 1. As with MREQ the SRC_ID and DAP_ID fields are used to
59
Chapter 3. Packet Forwarding Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
prevent a DAP packet from being broadcast twice by a same node; the basic idea is that a node 
drops a packet whose SRC_ID and DAP_ID have already been seen.
e. REPLY HANDLING
f a  request was sent out
while there are more replies to be receivedfor node Vj 
receive reply
acknowledge reply reception (sendMACK) 
add received metrics to totals
endwhile
if  Fji -  0 _ a  threshold ) ^  f j
'ii\vieUj \/i\vjeUj
node Vj is not misbehaving (non-detection)
else
node Vj is misbehaving (detection) 
send a detection alert packet (DAP) with node v /s  ID
endif 
endif
f. DETECTION ALERT HANDLING
if  node v, receives a detection alert for node v,
if  node v, has node Vj in its table o f overheard nodes 
rebroadcast detection alert packet (DAP) 
if  node Vj has been reached md misbehaviour detections
broadcast an accusation packet (AP) with node v, ’s ID
endif
else
ignore detection alert
endif 
endif
g. ACCUSATION HANDLING
if  node v, receives an accusation packet for node v, 
i f  node v, has node v,- in its accusation table 
ignore accusation packet
else
add node v, to v, ’s accusation table 
rebroadcast accusation packet (AP)
endif
endif
h. PUNISHING ACCUSED NODES
i f  node v, receives a packet from node Vj
if  node Vj is in node v i’s accusation table 
ignore packet
else
handle and process the packet
endif
endif
Figure 3-18 Pseudocode of our proposed accusation algorithm
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The handling o f  detection alerts (Figure 3-18-f) generates a limited broadcast which is conducted 
in the same fashion as the limited broadcast o f M REQs. This means that the inform ation to accuse 
a node o f  m isbehaviour is collected locally rather than globally. W hen a node receives a detection 
alert packet (DAP) it first checks if  the reported node ID contained in the received packet is 
present in its table o f overheard nodes; if  it is not the node stops broadcasting the DAP. However, 
if  the ID appears in its table then it rebroadcasts the DAP with TTL = 1 in the IP header. Thus, 
nodes can control how far a DAP travels in the same manner that they control a M REQ. For 
instance, assum ing that node v# in Figure 3-10 detects that v7 is misbehaving, it sends out a DAP 
that follows the same path as that depicted in the Figure 3-10 for a M REQ packet, i.e. DAP are 
transmitted using the limited broadcast algorithm, which was introduced in Section 3.2.2.
A lthough using the limited broadcast method prevents nodes from generating excessive network 
overhead, it may also permit malicious nodes constantly changing their geographical position in a 
clever manner (without going back to previously visited areas within a certain period o f  time 
Tevaluation) to avoid being accused; this situation is depicted in Figure 3-19.
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Figure 3-19 A clever m isbehaving node that avoids accusation by constantly  
changing its geographical location
Figure 3-19 shows a 46 node network in which a m isbehaving node vy  is first at position ‘a ’ (Vycl in 
the figure) and agrees to forward packets on behalf o f  some nodes o f its neighbourhood but it 
actually launches a black-hole or grey-hole attack. Node v9 knows that if  it stays for too long a
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time in the same neighbourhood enough number of detections will be collected to accuse it of 
misbehaviour. It therefore stops transmitting packets and quietly moves to position ‘b’ (y% in the 
figure). Once there it agrees to forward packets on behalf of its new neighbourhood and launches 
its attack again. In Figure 3-19 node v9 travels to position ‘c’ and then ‘d’ (v9c and v9ci in the 
figure) in order to avoid accusation, and at each position it strictly follows the same process. By 
the time node v9 returns to position £a’ it knows that it can be detected again without risking being 
accused of misbehaviour because the number of detections required for an accusation will not be 
reached within the predetermined time, i.e. v9 will not reach md misbehaviour detections within 
the period Tevaiuation. However, the attacker has to follow a somewhat complex and cumbersome 
procedure to avoid being accused, and even in such a scenario it can not guarantee that it will not 
be accused. For instance, in Figure 3-19 node v9 cannot impede other nodes from moving around 
the network too. Thus as it travels to different neighbourhoods it may bump into a node that 
happens to know of its previous detections which still are fresh enough. If this old acquaintance 
becomes aware of some new detections made on node v9 it can potentially have enough 
information to accuse v9 of misbehaviour. Alternatively a node may move and become a bridge 
between an old and a new neighbourhood. For example, let us assume that node vjc in Figure 3-19 
moves to where node V22 is. It will form a bridge between the neighbourhood of position ‘a’ and 
that of position ‘b’. As a result detection alert packets (DAPs) regarding node v9 can now travel 
between both neighbourhoods (i.e. the limited broadcast covers both neighbourhoods) since node 
V]6 has overhead v9 and will rebroadcast the DAPs, thus allowing for the accusation of v9. These 
examples demonstrate that a clever misbehaving node that tries to avoid accusation by constantly 
changing its geographical location is unlikely to be successful all the time.
In Figure 3-18-f after a node has decided whether continue broadcasting a DAP or not, it checks if 
an entry for the reported node ID has been already created in its detections table. If it has not, a 
new entry is created with its field number of detections equal to one. If the entry is already present 
its number of detections is increased by one and then compared against the misbehaviour 
detections (md) required to accuse a node of misbehaviour. When the number of detections 
reaches the md value in less than a predefined period of evaluation Tevaiuation there is enough 
evidence to accuse the reported node of misbehaviour, and an accusation packet (AP) is broadcast 
in a network-wide fashion to inform all network nodes about the misbehaving node.
As stated above, whether a node is accused or not of misbehaviour depends on the number of 
times that it has been detected as misbehaving, the period of evaluation T evailiauon and the number 
of misbehaviour detections md required for an accusation. On the other hand, the number of 
behaviour checks (ch) performed on an evaluated node is not taken into account to accuse the 
node of misbehaviour since this could potentially lead to unfairness on some network nodes. The 
reason for this is that the misbehaviour detection approach of Section 3.2.2 cannot guarantee how
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often or when a node’s behaviour will be checked. Instead, neighbouring nodes randomly select a 
period between Tmin and Tmax to check an overheard node’s behaviour, which in addition to the 
possible loss of synchronisation between neighbours could result in the premature accusation of a 
node. By contrast, the misbehaviour detection approach that we introduce in Section 4.2.3 
establishes a regular period of time to check the network nodes’ behaviour, and in this case a 
misbehaving node’s probability of accusation depends on its exhibited number of detections, the 
misbehaviour detections md required for an accusation and the number of misbehaviour checks ch 
performed on the evaluated node.
Nodes that receive an accusation packet (Figure 3-18-g) examine their accusation tables to see 
whether the reported node has been accused previously. When an AP with a newly accused node 
is received a new entry is created in the accusation table and the broadcast of the AP continues. 
Otherwise, the packet is ignored and dropped to prevent unnecessary network traffic. Finally, all 
nodes in the UCE are responsible to ensure that packets coming from an accused node (a node 
present in their accusation table) are immediately dropped (Figure 3-18-h). This approach denies 
misbehaving nodes any chance to have their packets transmitted in the network as well as to 
participate in route discovery, thus preventing them from causing further disruption in the 
communication process at the network layer. Isolating a node by preventing it from using the 
network services is an effective incentive for nodes not to misbehave, and at the same time it 
avoids rewarding nodes by permitting them use the network in spite of their misbehaviour.
3.3.2 Authenticity of Detection Alert and Accusation Packets
A problem of our detection and accusation approach has its roots in the inability of a node to 
verily the authenticity of a detection alert packet (DAP) and an accusation packet (AP). This 
problem can be exploited by malicious nodes to accused well-behaved nodes of misbehaviour and 
persuade other network nodes of isolating them from the network. A workaround to this problem 
is to employ digital signatures and encryption (using either private or public keys) to protect our 
protocol packets. In this way a node receiving a packet can be sure of the packet’s authenticity 
and the originality of its contents, i.e. be sure that the source of the packet is who it claims to be 
and that the packet has not been tampered with along the way.
A possible solution using this strategy is to have nodes that receive a DAP to keep in their 
detection table the fields ID of the detected node and ID of the node that originated the DAP. 
Later when a node has to decide whether to accuse or not another node of misbehaviour not only 
will it check that the number of detections for the evaluated node has reached the required md 
value, but also that the nodes generating each DAP are all different. Thus a node guarantees that 
there are md independent detection alerts in order to accuse a node of misbehaviour. In other
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words, the node guarantees that there is a consensus in the neighbourhood with respect to the 
misbehaviour exhibited by the evaluated node. A similar approach can be followed by nodes 
receiving an AP. Instead of denying access to the network to a node accused by a single AP (i.e. 
accused by a single source), a node can wait to receive a predefined number of accusation packets 
from different sources before starting to drop all packets transmitted by the accused node.
3.3.3 Evaluation Results and Analysis
In this Section, as in Section 3.2.3, we perform our simulations using the GloMoSim simulation 
package [48] [49]. The simulation parameters, which remain as in Section 3.2.3, are repeated here 
for completeness: i) nodes move according to the random waypoint mobility model with a speed 
randomly chosen with uniform distribution between Om/sec and lOm/sec, this yields a mean node 
speed of 5m/sec and a speed standard deviation of 2.89m/sec, ii) the pause time takes a value that 
is exponentially distributed with mean 30 seconds, iii) the wireless transmission range of every 
node is 100 metres, iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 
DCF, vi) the underlying routing protocol is AODV, and vii) the total simulation time for each 
scenario is 1800 seconds. Neighbouring nodes randomly select a period of time between 40 and 
60 seconds to check an overheard node’s behaviour, and a node is accused of misbehaviour if it 
exhibits 3 or more misbehaviour detections (i.e. md = 3) in 300 seconds (i.e. Tevaluation = 300sec).
This Section presents first an evaluation of the average throughput gain offered by our proposed 
algorithm to networks affected by nodes that drop packets in a probabilistic manner. Results are 
shown for networks with 20, 40, 60 and 120 nodes. Then, the final set of results analyses the 
network overhead created by our approach and how it compares against the total traffic produced 
in the network. Networks simulated in this Section were set up with 20% of its total nodes 
misbehaving by dropping packets with 60% probability. The misbehaviour threshold was 40%.
In order to see the improvement that our approach can bring to networks affected by packet 
forwarding misbehaviour we consider the average network throughput in terms of the mean node 
speed. Our graphs present results for networks without misbehaving nodes, networks with 
misbehaving nodes but without mechanisms to defend them against misbehaviour, and networks 
that use our algorithm to deny access to misbehaving nodes. Results are displayed for networks 
containing 20, 40 and 60 nodes, which are distributed over areas of 40 000m2 (200m*200m), 
80 000m2 (282.84m*282.84m), and 120 000m2 (346.41m*346.41m) respectively in order to 
maintain a constant node density.
Figures 3-20, 3-21 and 3-22 show curves for 20, 40 and 60 node networks respectively. Each 
graph displays the average network throughput as a function of the increasing mean node speed 
for i) networks without misbehaving nodes (No Misbehaviour), ii) networks making use of our
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detection and accusation approach (Detection & Accusation), and iii) networks w ith m isbehaving 
nodes but with no means o f  defending them selves from any type o f  attack (M isbehaviour Alone).
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Figure 3-20 A verage netw ork throughput vs. m ean node speed (20 node netw ork)
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Figure 3-21 A verage netw ork throughput vs. m ean node speed (40 node netw ork)
As can be seen from the figures our approach improves the network throughput when it is used in 
networks exhibiting packet forwarding misbehaviour. However, the average throughput cannot
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reach that o f  a network where there is not any m isbehaviour present. This is due to the fact that 
our algorithm requires a certain amount o f  time to collect the necessary data to detect and accuse 
m isbehaving nodes. Thus, during this initial phase (data collection) m isbehaving nodes can drop 
packets before their behaviour is evaluated long enough (TevatuaUon) to accuse them and isolate 
them  from the network. Then the network throughput is expected to improve gradually as the 
simulation time elapses and m isbehaving nodes are effectively accused. Nevertheless, the average 
network throughput shown in the figures is unavoidably affected by the initial bad perform ance o f 
the network. Moreover, the resulting network is a network with a lower node density than the 
original network, which can have some influence on the network connectivity and the num ber o f 
packets lost to reasons other than network misbehaviour.
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Figure 3-22 A verage netw ork throughput vs. m ean node speed (60 node netw ork)
With the purpose o f seeing how our approach reacts to changes in a netw ork’s node density our 
next set o f results has been carried out in a network that preserves the same area as the previous 
60 node network (120.000 m2 = 346.4 lm *346.41m ), but has double its num ber o f  nodes (120 
nodes) so as to double its density. Figure 3-23 presents results for networks w ithout m isbehaving 
nodes, networks with misbehaving nodes but without defence mechanisms in place, and netw orks 
that use the detection and accusation algorithms to deny access to m isbehaving nodes.
From Figure 3-23 it can be seen that our approach still works in networks with relative high node 
density. The network throughput o f networks using the detection and accusation approach 
improves when compared against networks containing misbehaving nodes that are neither avoided
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nor penalised. However, networks that do not present node misbehaviour at all still exhibit the 
best performance in terms o f  network throughput.
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Figure 3-23 A verage netw ork throughput vs. mean node speed (120 node netw ork)
A network that implements our detection and accusation algorithm looks, when it first starts 
operating, like a network without a protection scheme. However, as tim e elapses the algorithm 
starts detecting and accusing those nodes that drop a fraction o f packets above a preset 
m isbehaviour threshold a,hreShoid■ Consequently, in such a network most m isbehaving nodes will 
eventually be detected, accused and denied network access, allowing the netw ork to obtain an 
overall performance close to a network where nodes do not misbehave. This point is studied in 
detail in the evaluation results o f Section 4.3.2, where it is possible to observe how the throughput 
evolves through the simulation time.
The final set o f  results assesses the network overhead generated by our m isbehaviour detection 
and accusation algorithm as a function o f  the increasing mean node speed, and com pares it against 
the network traffic produced by four constant bit rate (CBR) connections present in the network. 
Although CBR traffic is generated at the application layer, it is accounted for at the TCP/IP layer 
in the form o f  UDP packets. In this set o f simulations, misbehaving nodes drop packets w ith 60% 
probability, the misbehaviour threshold a threshoid is 40%, the node speed varies betw een Om/sec (a 
static network) and 20m/sec, and the speed standard deviation is set at 0.58m/sec. The CBR traffic 
and the overhead o f  the proposed approach are evaluated in terms o f  their contribution to the total 
network traffic. Results are displayed for a network containing 40 nodes distributed over an area 
o f 80 000m2 (282.84m*282.84m).
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Figure 3-24 C ontribution to total netw ork traffic vs. mean node speed (40 nodes)
The contribution made to the total network traffic by our protection scheme, w hich is shown in 
Figure 3-24, corresponds to the sum o f  the overhead produced by the M REQ, M REP, M ACK, 
DAP and AP packets. It is least when the nodes are stationary, less than 10% o f the network 
traffic, and though it increases to about 25%  when the nodes move, it is not affected by the mean 
node speed. On the other hand, the CBR traffic represents 90% o f  the network traffic when the 
network is stationary and decreases to about 75%  when the network is dynamic. This does not 
necessarily mean that the actual CBR traffic has decreased; it means that its contribution to the 
total traffic in the network represents a sm aller fraction. In Figure 3-24 this is due to a real 
increase in the overhead o f our approach, which raises its contribution to the total network traffic 
and reduces the contribution made by the CBR traffic.
3.4 Summary
In this Chapter we have presented an approach that uses the principle o f flow conservation to 
effectively detect and accuse nodes that exhibit packet forwarding m isbehaviour. It has been 
shown that by using data gathered by nodes actively intervening in the com m unication process, as 
opposed to data gathered by nodes overhearing a communication, our approach is immune to 
problems such as ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions and nodes capable o f  controlling their 
transm ission power.
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Although the principle of flow conservation was originally envisaged to detect misbehaviour in 
fixed networks, we have demonstrated that by making some reasonable assumptions this principle 
can be adapted to detect misbehaviour in mobile ad hoc networks. We have also shown that by 
pairing our algorithm with a MAC layer protocol such as the IEEE 802.11 standard, our approach 
can effectively detect malicious nodes launching black-hole and grey-hole attacks regardless of 
the routing protocol employed by the network.
Finally, through simulations we have established that our limited broadcast solution effectively 
tracks nodes that have behaviour metrics about an evaluated node. Additionally, our results verify 
that our approach efficiently isolates nodes that persistently exhibit packet forwarded 
misbehaviour. As a result our scheme significantly improves the average network throughput of 
multihop wireless networks affected by nodes that maliciously fail to forward packets on behalf of 
other network nodes.
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Chapter 4 
4 Policy-Based Adaptable Misbehaviour 
Detection and Node Accusation
In this Chapter we extend the work of Chapter 3. First of all, we introduce a new approach to 
collect the metrics for behaviour evaluation and node accusation, which creates some new 
parameters in addition to those used in the algorithm of Chapter 3. Secondly, we aim at making 
automatic adjustments -  by using polices -  to the various parameters that control the proposed 
protection scheme in an attempt to optimise the network performance.
The protection scheme that we propose in this Chapter consists of two modules in each node: one 
that works in the security plane and another that works in the management plane. The security 
plane module consists of an algorithm that performs three tasks: i) collects and aggregates metrics 
for behaviour evaluation and node accusation, ii) detects misbehaving nodes that maliciously drop 
packets above a predefined limit, and iii) accuses and punishes nodes that are persistently detected 
as misbehaving. The management plane module uses high-level policies to control and adjust the 
security plane module by varying the algorithm’s parameters. The interworking of both modules 
drives network adaptation based on current conditions and the objectives of high-level entities, 
such as a network administrator.
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 offers an introduction to polices for 
network management. This introduction provides an overview of the policy core information 
model (PCIM), it then examines the types of policies that can be used within the network 
management context, and it ends with a brief literature review of policies in the context of mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANETs). Section 4.2 presents our adaptable misbehaviour detection and 
accusation scheme. This has three parts: the first is a selected clustering approach which is the 
driving mechanism for assigning roles to network nodes based on their connectivity and their 
computational capabilities. The second part is an improved version of the detection and 
accusation scheme presented in Chapter 3. The final part of Section 4.2 demonstrates how 
adaptability can be achieved with the use of network management policies. Next, Section 4.3 
presents a case study scenario to evaluate our proposed protection scheme followed by an 
extensive set of simulation results and their corresponding analysis. Finally, Section 4.4
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summarises this Chapter by highlighting its main achievements. The work presented in this 
Chapter was originally published in [110].
4.1 Introduction to Policies for Network Management
As stated in Chapter 2 ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) consist of a myriad of 
heterogeneous devices that communicate with each other through a hybrid set of network 
protocols and technologies. For example, a UCE can be composed of areas where the network is 
wired, or wireless with infrastructure support, or pure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) based. 
Chapter 2 also discussed how the complexity associated with the management of these systems 
can outweigh their benefits due to the fact that their administration can be extremely costly and 
sometimes technically close to impossible. Additionally, we presented autonomic computing 
systems and showed how this plausible solution to the complexity of system management places 
the burden of administration on the system itself and allows network managers to concentrate on 
the design of high level goals or objectives. In this Section we now introduce policies for network 
management, which are considered a key tool to enable the deployment of truly autonomous 
systems, and we discuss how they can help network administrators to automate a system’s 
response to a series of network or external events.
As is common in the computing world the term policy has received different definitions according 
to the field and context where it is used and sometimes depending on how experts interpret the 
word in order to make it fit their goals. For example, the IETF gives two perspectives for the 
definition of policy within the network management context; both these perspectives are provided 
in complementary Request for Comments (RFC) documents produced by the Policy Framework 
Working Group. RFC 3060 [111] defines policies as a set of rules to administer, manage, and 
control access to network resources; alternatively RFC3198[112] defines them as a definite goal, 
course or method of action to guide and determine present and future decisions. Also, many 
members of the scientific community have proposed their own definitions, for instance the 
authors of [113] define a policy as a mechanism to configure the behaviour of a system in ways 
that are not predictable at system initialisation time because the configuration depends on the 
dynamic state of the system and its surroundings. Fortunately, in spite of the variety of policy 
definitions in the area of network management, the policy information model presented next has 
been generally accepted as a core template and most new proposals are based on it or extend it.
4.1.1 Policy Core Information Model (PCIM)
Policy-based management (PBM) has been studied for over two decades but it gained relevance 
thanks to the joint efforts of the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) and the Internet
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Engineering Task Force (IETF) on producing a standard architecture and object-oriented 
information model for policy-based m anagem ent in the late 1990s [113]. The results o f  this jo in t 
effort are available in the RFC 3060 (Policy Core Information M odel (PCIM ) -  Version 1 
Specification) [111], update RFC 3460 [114], and some com plem entary RFCs that propose 
concrete implementations for specific parts o f this policy information model. The core PBM 
architecture described in [111] and [114] is shown in Figure 4-1.
Policy Management Tool 
(PMT)
PMT-PR Interface
Policy Decision Point 
(PDP)
£
PDP-PR Interface Policy Repository (PR) 
(LDAP Directory)
PDP-PEP Interface
Policy 
Enforcement 
Point (PEP)
1
Policy 
Enforcement 
Point (PEP)
PEP-PR Interface
PEP-PR Interface
Figure 4-1 Policy core inform ation m odel (PC IM ) architecture
The components depicted in Figure 4-1 and its corresponding functions are [113]:
o  Policy Management Tool (PTM): The policy management tool is a user interface that allows 
for the reading, creation, deletion and modification o f  policies. It can be as sim ple as a 
graphical user interface (GUI) that facilitates access to policies stored in a policy repository, or 
it can be a complex application that takes a high-level input by a netw ork adm inistrator or 
operator, translates it into polices o f  the adequate format, checks for possible policy conflicts, 
and stores the output in a policy repository.
o  Policy Repository (PR): A policy repository can be a physical data store (such as a database or 
directory) or a logical container (such as a “Quality o f  Service” domain) that holds policy 
rules, their conditions and actions, and any related policy data [112]. RFC 3703 [115] defines a 
mapping for the PCIM shown in Figure 4-1 that can be implemented in a service repository 
that uses Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [116] as its access protocol.
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However, the IETF standard does not make compulsory the use of an LDAP directory, and 
other repository solutions are also accepted, e.g. a relational database.
o Policy Decision Point (PDP): A policy decision point is a logical entity where the intelligence 
of a policy system is contained. It is in charge of evaluating a policy rule’s conditions and if 
they are true it triggers the necessary actions to ensure the appropriate policy enforcement.
o Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): A policy enforcement point is a logical entity -  often 
contained in the physical element where the policy is enforced -  that executes the actions 
indicated by policy decisions made by a PDP.
The above components communicate by means of the interfaces shown in Figure 4-1 as follows
[113]:
o PTM-PR Interface: The policy management tool interacts with the policy repository using an 
adequate access protocol to retrieve and store policies. The access protocol used depends 
directly on the implementation of the policy repository. For instance, if the repository is an 
LDAP directory then the PMT uses LDAP to access the PR, but if the repository is a relational 
database then the PMT uses SQL (Structured Query Language) queries.
o PDP-PR Interface: The policy decision point accesses the policy repository in the same way 
that a PMT does, i.e. it depends on the specific implementation of the PR.
o PDP-PEP Interface: This interface allows a PDP to control the behaviour of one or more PEPs 
based on the policies specified by a PMT that have been stored on a PR. The IETF standard 
does not command the use of any particular protocol over this interface. COPS (Common 
Open Policy Service) [117], SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) [118], and even 
proprietary solutions are suitable to be used.
o PEP-PR Interface: It is not common for PEPs to access directly a PR since they receive their 
instructions directly from a PDP. However, there are circumstances in which it may be 
appropriate for a PEP to retrieve directly its instructions from a PR, e.g. when a network 
administrator in order to bypass a PDP defines some policies in a low enough level for a PEP 
to be able to interpret them directly. In this case the PEP accesses directly the PR using an 
adequate protocol so as to retrieve the necessary policies.
4.1.2 Policy Types
In this Section we review the types of policies that can be used within the network management
context, which are three: Event-Condition-Action policies, Access Control Policies and
Configuration Policies.
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4.1.2.1 Obligation or Event-Condition-Action Policies
Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policies describe network management actions that must be taken 
when certain network or external event occurs, provided that certain given conditions are satisfied 
at the moment the event is triggered. Typically these policies have the following format: 
on <Event(s)> i f  <Condition(s)> then <Action(s)>. A brief description of the elements of an 
ECA policy is provided below [113]:
o Events: Events represent network activities of special interest in a relevant context. These 
activities are used to trigger polices, such that the policies react to the activities happening. For 
example, an activity of special interest in the context of security is an intrusion or 
misbehaviour detection. Events are an optional component of an obligation policy.
o Conditions: Conditions check that certain network states are satisfied, i.e. evaluate to true, 
when an event occurs and before executing an action. They are very useful preventing harmful, 
unfair, unnecessary or insensible actions when a service or network element is in inadequate 
states. For example, when a misbehaviour detection event happens a condition may check that 
it has been detected at least three times before executing an action on the offender.
o Actions: Actions are a type of management network operations that are useful to monitor and 
configure a service or network element. Actions can also act as triggers to other network 
components or services. For example, if a node reaches three or more misbehaviour detections 
an action can bring up an accusation module which has embedded the intelligence necessary to 
deal best with the offender.
4.1.2.2 Access Control Policies
Access control policies are rules that determine whether grant or not permission to an entity to 
perform certain actions provided that certain conditions are satisfied. They specify what actions 
are permitted by which users on which network resources. Typically the general form of an access 
control policy has the following components [113]:
o Subject: The entity on which a decision is to be made (e.g. a user with username 
“Oscar-Gonzalez”, or a computer called Poseidon).
o Request: Parameters that define the activity to be performed by the subject (e.g. authorisation 
to configure a router called Zeus).
o Target: Network resource that the subject is to access (e.g. router Zeus).
o Conditions (optional): Conditions that restrict the circumstances under which access is granted 
or denied (e.g. Zeus CPU load is lower than 75% and Zeus is not in standby mode).
o Permit/Deny: Indicates whether a request is allowed or rejected (e.g. accept).
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4.1.2.3 Configuration Policies
Configuration policies specify the parameters for network elements, services, protocols and 
software components. They can be categorised in two groups [113]:
o Administration Policy: Administrative policies represent high level goals or objectives to be 
achieved. These policies can express optimisation rules for the overall system. As these 
policies are refined to low level configuration they impose constrains to the components 
enforcing them. An example of such a policy is: keep as many web servers in standby mode as 
possible such that the users’ queue mean time is never more than 2 seconds.
o Configuration Policies fo r  network elements, services and protocols: These policies contain 
configuration information, typically low level instructions, for network hardware or software. 
For example, a policy indicating a firewall the types of network traffic that it must or must not 
let traverse it.
4.1.3 Mobile Ad Hoc Network Management -  Related Work
Related literature in mobile ad hoc network (MANET) management is relatively limited and 
existing approaches do not address all available problems. A first effort to address this field of 
research is presented in [119]. The proposed Ad Hoc Network Management Protocol (ANMP) is 
based on a hierarchical clustering approach with three tiers and a unique manager. ANMP uses 
two methods to cluster a network: graph-based clustering, which is performed by the network 
nodes, and geographical clustering, which is performed by the network manager. Additionally, the 
authors claim that ANMP is designed to be SNMPv3 [118] compatible because SNMP is already 
widely used for network management in today’s networks and MANETs are just extensions to 
cover areas lacking network infrastructure, thus there is no reason for MANETs to use a different 
management protocol. A different approach is adopted by authors of [120] who propose an 
architecture called Guerrilla which makes use of mobile code techniques to provide nodes with 
capabilities to manage or be managed. In this scheme the network is clustered in two tiers 
according to what code is deployed on what node: nomadic managers, which are deployed in 
managing nodes (i.e. cluster heads), correspond to the higher tier, while active probes, which are 
installed in managed nodes, belong to the lower tier.
The authors of [121] proposed a policy-based network management (PBNM) system that uses 
intelligent agents responsible for managing and enforcing the policies of a policy domain. This 
approach organises the network in three tiers, each with different type of agents: global policy 
agents (GPA), domain policy agents (DPA), and local policy agents (LPA). Although the agents 
have the same management capabilities their scope is not the same, as suggested by their names. 
Also, the policy definitions of this work follow the principles of the IETF, but the implementation
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uses several proprietary protocols, which restricts its wider adoption. Another PBNM approach 
was proposed in [122]. The authors propose a solution suite composed of four schemes: a k-hop 
clustering algorithm, dynamic service redundancy, policy negotiation, and automated service 
discovery. This approach also makes some extensions to the standard Common Open Policy 
Service (COPS) [117] to add policy server delegation and redirection capabilities. The main 
drawback of this solution is that it is relatively heavyweight, which may limit its applicability to 
MANETs. Finally, the policy based paradigm introduced in [123] and [124] offers a promising 
solution the management of MANETs since it allows dynamic alteration and controlled 
programmability of the behaviour of automated managers without having to re-implement them, 
thus allowing for the reuse of managers in different environments.
4.2 Adaptable Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
Our proposed mechanism introduces a novel adaptable method, which builds on the approach and 
techniques introduced in Chapter 3, to detect packet forwarding misbehaviour based on the use of 
policy-based management (PBM) [125] in addition to the principle of flow conservation [94]. 
Such adaptability allows the system to better judge the behaviour of nodes and decide whether 
they should, or not, be accused of misbehaviour and penalised according to current network 
management policies. The approach is deployed over a role-based wireless network, organised in 
a tiered manner [126] [128]. Nodes are assigned a role that defines the tasks they are responsible 
for as well as the policies that apply to them. For example, depending on their role, nodes may 
hold behaviour information only about their neighbours, or a localised network area or the entire 
network.
As in Chapter 3, the approach presented in this Chapter is distinguished from existing schemes 
because it does not use promiscuous listening to detect nodes that fail to forward packets in the 
network. However, whereas the work presented in Chapter 3 uses promiscuous listening to 
determine the active neighbourhood of a node (i.e. neighbours that are actively transmitting and 
receiving packets), the work proposed here does not use promiscuous listening at any stage of the 
packet forwarding misbehaviour detection and node accusation scheme. All relevant calculations 
and subsequent decisions are based on metrics directly acquired by nodes actively sending and 
receiving packets. Likewise, the problem posed by nodes that constantly change their 
geographical position in a clever manner to avoid the security measures in place, as explained in 
Section 3.3.1 and depicted in Figure 3-19, is solved in this new scheme due to the fact that nodes 
making the accusation decision have a holistic instant network misbehaviour view. Also, to the 
best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first attempting to connect misbehaviour detection and 
accusation with the use of policies at the management plane. By allowing policies to manipulate
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key features of our algorithm, such as the misbehaviour detection threshold and the maximum 
expected percentage of wrong accusations, the network manager or administrator can fulfil the 
requirements stipulated by high level management goals, e.g. the desired security level.
This Section is divided in 4 subsections: Section 4.2.1 presents a clustering algorithm and 
demonstrates how by making use of a capability function it selects a suitable connected 
dominating set (CDS) of nodes to carry out essential management tasks and metrics collection for 
the behaviour evaluation of nodes in the network. Section 4.2.2 introduces an improved and more 
efficient version of the detection algorithm of Section 3.2.2 and investigates in detail how the 
selection of the misbehaviour threshold athreshoid affects the probability of wrongly detecting a 
well-behaved node as misbehaving. Section 4.2.3 describes an also improved version of the 
accusation strategy of Section 3.3.1. It also provides an important analysis on how the desired 
probability of accusation for misbehaving and well-behaved nodes affects the selection of an 
adequate misbehaviour threshold athreshoid• Finally, Section 4.2.4 explains how adaptability can be 
achieved by using management policies and proposes a method so that the management plane can 
gain control over our protection scheme and adjust it as required to accomplish the overall system 
objectives.
4.2.1 Clustering Phase
Later in this Chapter we propose a metrics collection procedure (Section 4.2.2) and a management 
policies distribution process (Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.4) which are based on the clustered 
organisation of the underlying multihop wireless UCE. We assume that in our network model 
nodes are in one of three possible roles: Manager Node (MN), Cluster Head (CH) or Cluster Node 
(CN). We also assume, as explained in Section 4.2.2, that MNs are statically pre-assigned while 
CHs are selected through a dynamic algorithmic selection driven by a clustering strategy. 
Clustering is an effective method to reduce traffic overhead in wireless networks, both for routing 
(e.g. the selection of multipoint relay nodes in OLSR [57] [58]) and management purposes [126]. 
By selecting cluster heads and forming clusters, scalability can be increased and locality can be 
preserved.
4.2.1.1 Cluster Heads Selection Algorithm
In this Chapter, we employ a clustering algorithm originally developed by Wu [127] and modified 
by the authors of [126] and [128] to make it suitable for network management. In this context, 
they propose the use of a capability function to select the most suitable nodes as CHs, as 
explained later in this Section. By exploiting the fully distributed algorithm proposed in [127] to 
achieve cluster creation and maintenance, the framework dynamically decides what nodes become 
cluster heads (CHs), taking into consideration their capabilities and mobility attributes, as
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proposed in [126] and [128]. To aid the reader, below we provide a brief description of the 
clustering algorithm and its cluster head selection process. For a detailed description of the 
algorithm we refer the reader to [127]. The main reason behind the selection of this particular 
clustering approach is that, in spite of its inefficiency, it is a simple and effective method to obtain 
a Connected Dominating Set (CDS) of nodes in a network in a fully distributed and decentralised 
manner. A CDS is a subset of network nodes such that they fulfil two conditions: i) a network 
node that does not belong to the subset has a direct link with at least one member of the subset, 
and ii) a node that is part of the CDS also has a direct link with a least another member of the 
subset (i.e. nodes in the subset are connected). Wu’s algorithm generates a CDS that is scattered 
throughout the network, which facilitates the collection of metrics for behaviour evaluation and 
the distribution of network management policies to the network nodes. In Chapter 5 we propose 
the use of a more efficient clustering approach designed specifically to deal with large-scale 
networked environments.
The algorithm is executed in two stages: the marking round and the optimisation round. The 
marking round generates a redundant CDS and the optimisation round reduces the set to make it 
closer to a Minimum Connected Dominating Set (MCDS). Since the problem of calculating a 
MCDS is known to be NP-complete [127], heuristics are used to achieve a suboptimal solution. 
We now formally define the graph model [127]:
o Let G = (V, E) be a connected, undirected and non-weighted MANET (or MANET-like UCE).
o Let V = {vj, v2, V3 ... vNj  be the set of all MANET nodes. N  is the total number of nodes in the 
network.
o Let E  be the set of links between the MANET nodes. Thus if v, e  V, vj e  V, i = 1, 2, 3 ... N, 
j  = 1, 2, 3 ... N, i j ,  and there is a direct link between nodes v; and v7, then the link
fa, vj) = {vj, v j  e  E.
o A node y, is part of the open neighbour set N(Vj) of a node v, if and only if there is a direct link 
between nodes v, and Vj, i.e. vy £ N(Vj) if and only if {vit v j  = {vj, v} e  E  and i ^  j .
o Let the closed neighbour set N[vJ of node v; be the set N[vJ = {N(Vj), v}, i.e. the set formed by 
the open neighbour set of v, and node v; itself.
o Each node v, has a marker m(vt)  to indicate whether it belongs to the CDS, m(v} = T  (true) if  
v; e  CDS, and m(vj) = F  (false) if v; 0  CDS.
o Each node has an arithmetic identifier id(v}.
The marking process is as follows [127]:
1. Initially all nodes v; e  V assign their marker m(v} = F.
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2. Every node v, exchanges its open neighbour set N (v) w ith all its neighbours.
3. Every node v, assigns its m arker m(Vj) = T  i f  there exists two unconnected neighbours, i.e. 
m(Vj) = T  if  node v, can directly reach a neighbour that is not directly reachable by at least one 
o f its neighbours.
Figure 4-2 shows an example o f a M ANET and Figure 4-3 shows the same network after the 
marking process. In Figure 4-3 node v2 is marked (m(v2)  = T) because vy and v6 can not reach 
directly node v3 and vice versa, but v2 can. Node v3 is marked because v2 can not reach directly v8 
and vice versa, but v3 can. Similar reasoning can be applied to explain the m arking round for the 
rest o f  the marked nodes v4, v7, v8 and v9.
Figure 4-2 C lustering process -  M A N E T  before m arking round
Figure 4-3 C lustering process -  M A N E T  after m arking round
The resulting reduced set composed o f the nodes v, with m arker m(v,) = T  is denoted G \  In Figure 
4-3 G ’ = {v2, v3, v4, v7, v& vgj. Optimisation rules (heuristics) are applied to G ’ in order to 
eliminate unnecessary redundant vertices in the connected set. The optimisation rules are [127]:
1. Consider two nodes v, and v, in G
if  N fvJ  cc N fvJ  in G and id(v,) < id(vj), then m(v,) = F
2. Assume v, and v* are two marked neighbours o f  marked node v, in G
if  N fvJ  cr (N fvJ  U N [v/j) in G and id(v) = minfidfvf), id(vj, id fv jf,  then m(v) = F.
Figure 4-4 shows the result o f applying optimisation rule 1 to the set G ’ in Figure 4-3. From  the 
figure N fv J  = fv4, v3, v8, v9, v\o} and N fv J  = fv4, vj, v8, v9, vl0}, that is N fv J  c: N fv J .  If  we 
assume that id(v,) = i, then id(v4)  = 4 and id(v9)  = 9, which means that id(v4)  < id(v9)  and 
therefore m(v4)  = F, i.e. node v4 is unmarked. Node v9 can not be unmarked in spite o f  the fact that 
N fv J  c iN fv J  because id(v9)  > id(v4).
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Figure 4-4 C lustering process -  M ANET after optim isation rule 1 is applied to G ’
The result o f  applying optimisation rule 2 is depicted in Figure 4-5. From the figure it can be seen
that N[v2]  ci ( N[v3J  U N [v7] )  because N[v2]  = {v}, v2, v3, v6, v7} and N[v3]  U N [v7]  = {v2, v3, v8} U
{vj, v2, Vg, v7, v8} = {v 1, v2, Vj, v& v7, v8} and min{id(v2), id(v3), id(v7)} = id(v2)  = 2 therefore node
v2 is unmarked (m(v2)  = F). The figure also shows that N[v3J  cr (N[v2J U N[v8] )  but min{id(v2),
id(v3), id(vs)} = id(v2)  d  id(v3),  therefore node Vj remains marked (m(v3)  = T). A similar situation 
arises when node v7 is analysed. Thus, Figure 4-5 holds our solution CDS.
Figure 4-5 C lustering process -  M A NET after optim isation rule 2 is applied to G ’
Another attractive feature o f this clustering algorithm is its ability to adapt the CDS to topological 
changes in the network. The authors o f  [127] identity and provide solutions for three types o f  
dynamic changes: a node is switched on, a node is switched off, and a node is moving. In order to 
address mobility the authors propose two ideas: i) each individual node updates its marked status, 
and ii) the whole network recalculates the CDS. The form er option is efficient w hen few nodes 
are m oving about; the latter is a better approach when many nodes are in movement. Since cluster 
formation in our approach is very important in those instants when the network behaviour is to be 
evaluated, we periodically recalculate the CDS o f  the whole network just before behaviour 
evaluation is about to take place.
Having adopted the described approach for cluster formation it was necessary to modify it to 
allow its integration with the proposed policy-based and role-based m isbehaviour detection and 
node accusation approach. The first modification has already been described above and concerns 
the periodic CDS recalculation o f the whole network. The second modification is regarding its 
arbitrary arithmetic function id(v,). Instead o f  using such a function we have substituted it w ith a 
scalar Capability Function CF(v)  as originally proposed by authors o f [126] and [128]. The higher 
the capability function o f a node is the higher the probability that it stays marked (i.e. it stays part 
o f  the CDS) after the optimisation rounds. CF(v,) in our approach expresses three different facets
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of a node’s capabilities: its processing power (PP(Vj)), its memory (MEM(v,)) and its mobility 
ratio (MR(Vj)) as seen in Equation 4-1.
c f (v, ) _  ” S P (y l)+ 'f 2MEM(yl) (4. 1}
MR(vt)
With the intention of making them comparable, each variable in Equation 4-1 is normalised to a 
value range of (0, 1] by dividing each one with its maximum value, e.g. we consider the 
maximum processing power to be PPma^v,.) = 3.2 GHz. Weights wj and w2 are assigned 
according to the significance of their respective variables, the only restricting condition being that 
wj + w2 = 1. Finally, it is important that the value of the mobility ratio MR(Vf) effectively reflects 
the topology changes occurring around node v,. In this respect, a node’s speed and movement 
frequency do not necessarily mean that a node is unfit to be part of the final CDS. For example, a 
group of nodes may be moving in the same direction at an equal speed while the network 
topology remains almost static. Conversely, a static node may not be suitable to be part o f the 
CDS if its neighbours are all moving away from it. For this reason the mobility ratio MR(Vj) of 
node v; in our scheme is associated with its average frequency of link breaks with its neighbours.
In the proposed protection scheme, the connected dominating set obtained after applying Wu’s 
clustering algorithm and its respective optimisation rules [127], and its modified capability 
function [126] [128], represents the set of network nodes that are assigned the cluster head (CH) 
role in the network. Nodes that do not belong to the CDS are assigned the cluster node (CN) role.
4.2.1.2 CDS Population Size Evaluation and Analysis
As usual, we perform the simulations in the Glomosim network simulation package [51] [52]. The 
objective of this Section is to evaluate the efficiency of Wu’s clustering algorithm [127]. To this 
end, we analyse how the CDS population size is affected by the number of nodes in the network 
and the nodes’ transmission range. The results presented for each value are the average of 20 
simulation runs. No packets are transmitted in the network except for the essential packets to 
create the CDS; as a result no routing protocols are employed. Nodes move according to the 
random waypoint mobility model with a constant speed chosen uniformly between 0 and lOm/sec, 
this yields an average node speed of 5m/sec and a standard deviation of 2.89m/sec. The link 
capacity is 2 Mbps.
For the first set of results, we simulated networks of 25, 50, 75, 100, 225 and 400 nodes with 
areas of 40 000m2, 80 000m2, 120 000m2, 160 000m2, 360 000m2 and 400 000m2 respectively. 
These values yield a constant node density of 6.25x1 O'4 nodes/m2. Figure 4-6 shows the results for 
the CDS population size (i.e. the number of nodes that are part of the CDS).
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Figure 4-6 C DS population size vs. num ber o f netw ork nodes 
(node density = 6 .2 5 x 1 0 4 nodes/m 2)
Figure 4-6 illustrates how the CDS population size is affected by the total num ber o f  nodes in 
networks with node transm ission ranges o f  100m, 150m, 200m and 250m. It can be appreciated 
from the figure that as the transmission range increases the CDS population decreases. This is due 
to the fact that nodes have more overlapping neighbours within each other’s transm ission range. 
Therefore fewer nodes become part o f the CDS as their neighbours are already covered by other 
network nodes. Additionally, Figure 4-6 also shows that the main factor influencing the num ber 
o f nodes in the CDS is the number o f  nodes in the network. In fact, the CDS population grows 
sharply as the num ber o f nodes in the network rises. These results demonstrate the inefficiency o f 
employing W u’s clustering algorithm in large networks, where the CDS population is typically 
more than half the total number o f  nodes in the network. For example, for a 225 node netw ork 
with a node transm ission range o f  100m the CDS population size is about 155 nodes, and for a 
400 node network with the same transm ission range the CDS population size is about 300 nodes.
These evaluation results are not in agreement with the results obtained by the authors o f  [126]. 
Generally speaking, their simulated networks generate a CDS whose population is about a third o f 
the population shown in Figure 4-6 for the curve “7x Range = 100m”. Regarding this issue, in 
discussions with Dr. Hadjiantonis, who is one o f  the authors o f  [126], we have found a possible 
inadvertent error in their interpretation o f W u’s clustering algorithm [127], which could explain 
the difference in the obtained results. In our opinion, Hadjiantonis et al have calculated a 
minimum connected dominating set (M CDS) in their simulated networks instead o f  a CDS 
corresponding to W u’s optimisation rules. Unfortunately, this Section results and those obtained
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in [126] are not comparable to those presented in [127] since W u et al present evaluated networks 
consisting o f few er than 100 nodes with node transm ission ranges o f less than 100m. However, in 
Section 5.3.1 we demonstrate through an example that it is possible for this clustering algorithm  
to select more than 50% o f the network nodes to be part o f the CDS.
For the second set o f  results, we simulated a set o f  networks deployed over an area o f  360 000m 2 
(600mx600m) with different node densities and node transm ission range o f  100m. The total 
number o f  network nodes was gradually increased from 40 nodes to 800 nodes. Consequently, the 
node density increased from 1.1 lx lO '4 nodes/m 2 to 2.22x10° nodes/m2. Figure 4-7 shows the 
results obtained for the CDS population size.
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Figure 4-7 CDS population size vs. num ber o f  netw ork nodes 
(netw ork area =  600m  x 600m )
Figure 4-7 corroborates that the CDS population size increases linearly but steeply as the total 
num ber o f  nodes in the network grows. It can also be seen from the figure that the CDS 
population size is more than half the total num ber o f  nodes for large networks. For exam ple, for 
the 800 node network the CDS population size is about 640 nodes, i.e. about 80% o f  the nodes are 
part o f  the connected dominating set. Such a large CDS population in a network as dense as the 
800 node network (nodes have about 60 neighbours in average) means that many o f  the CDS 
participants are redundant nodes.
The analysis o f the evaluation results has revealed the inefficiency o f W u’s clustering algorithm  
[127] to select a non-redundant connected dom inating set o f nodes in a network. This m eans that 
it is possible that for CHs in the proposed protection schem e not to have any subordinated nodes
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(i.e. CNs) in their managed cluster -  this point is further investigated in Section 5.3.1, where 
various issues are pointed out and a more efficient clustering approach is presented. However, as 
stated at the beginning of Section 4.2.1.1, Wu’s clustering algorithm is a simple and effective 
method to obtain a CDS in a fully distributed and decentralised manner, which makes it 
appropriate for the distribution of policy management policies and the collection of 
behaviour-related metrics, as discussed in the next Section.
4.2.2 Detection Phase
We now describe how the algorithm of Chapter 3 is modified to take advantage of a clustered 
network (i.e. where the CHs have been selected) during the metrics collection process. Our 
approach can be divided into two main phases: gathering of behaviour information for 
misbehaviour detection, and node misbehaviour accusation with penalty enforcement. The former 
involves collecting and aggregating behaviour information in the low levels of the tiered network 
and presenting it to the top level for analysis in order to detect misbehaving nodes. The latter 
phase on the other hand starts at the top level with the decision making of which nodes to accuse 
of misbehaviour and how to penalise them, and continues with the enforcement of the respective 
penalties from the top to the bottom tiers.
Three roles are defined, namely manager node, cluster head and cluster node. For modularity, a 
MN encapsulates the functionality of a CH and in turn a CH encapsulates that of a CN. In brief, 
by using the clustering approach described in Section 4.2.1 the most suitable nodes are selected as 
cluster heads, while remaining nodes become CNs and register with their nearest CH. A CH uses 
a policy decision point (PDP) to locally manage the policy enforcement point (PEP) of CNs that 
belong to its cluster and communicates with other CHs to exchange management information, 
including policies. Network deployment issues have an impact in the selection of MNs and CHs, 
e.g. in a ubiquitous computing environment (UCE) with infrastructure support they can be 
statically assigned and controlled by an administrator. In MANET-like scenarios, the assignment 
of roles can be fully dynamic. Management policies are defined at MNs and are distributed to 
CHs for enforcement on CNs. Management policies are enforced on MNs and CHs as well. These 
policies can be specific for each role, as described later, and transparently prescribe the 
participation of the network nodes during the metrics collection, misbehaviour detection and node 
accusation phases of the proposed protection scheme. For the rest of this Section, we will assume 
a clustered multihop wireless UCE with a pre-assigned number of MNs and CHs selected as 
described in Section 4.2.1, i.e. the selection of the connected dominating set (CDS) corresponds to 
the selection of the CHs in the network. Nodes that are not selected as part of the CDS are 
assigned the role of CNs.
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Misbehaviour detection continues to be based on the principle of flow conservation in the same 
way it was in Chapter 3. For convenience, Equation 3-2 is repeated below as Equation 4-2 since it 
can help the reader understanding the concepts described in this Chapter. However, the metrics 
collection process is not based on the limited broadcast strategy introduced in Section 3.2.2, 
instead a more efficient and effective process reliant on the role-based clustered UCE is 
employed.
“  ( 1  t^hreshold ) 2 X ( A 0  (4-2)
Vi[vteUj Vi'|v(e£/y
Equation 4-2 needs to be applied to all nodes in the network, which requires the gathering and 
aggregation of the T y  and F j, metrics for each active node in the network. Our scheme achieves 
this by requiring all CNs to report their collected T y  and FJt metrics to their respective CHs in a 
periodic fashion. The period that elapses between two consecutive reports (Treport) depends on the 
current network management policies. CHs aggregate the reported metrics, and any metrics 
proactively collected. This aggregation at CHs provides them, to a certain extent, with a local 
view of the behaviour of nodes in their cluster. This view is more accurate for clusters with 
relatively infrequent changes in nodes participation. To anticipate node movements, aggregated 
cluster information is passed on from CHs to MNs.
Finally, MNs exchange behaviour information between them and perform a new metrics 
aggregation. At this point, MNs have managed to acquire information on the overall network 
behaviour as well as on the individual behaviour of each active node in the network. This allows 
for the detection of misbehaving nodes by applying Equation 4-2 on the collected metrics, as 
described later. Since MNs obtain a holistic view of all active nodes in the network, in this new 
approach the problem posed by nodes that cleverly change their geographical location, as 
explained in Section 3.3.1, does not exist. Regardless of where on the network nodes are, their 
metrics are reported up the role-based hierarchy to MNs.
As we stated in Section 3.2.3 and showed in Figures 3-11 and 3-12, selecting an appropriate 
misbehaviour threshold a threshoid is very important to avoid wrong detections, i.e. a state where a 
well-behaved node is mistaken for a misbehaving one. We now develop this point in detail, 
illustrating it with Figures 4-8 and 4-9. All values shown on our graphs are the result of averaging 
20 simulation runs. More details on the value of the parameters and the tools used for our 
simulations can be found in Section 4.3.2. Figure 4-8 shows three curves depicting the percentage 
of detections as a function of the increasing misbehaviour threshold for three different 60 node 
networks. By comparing this Figure to Figure 3-12, it is possible to see the improvement offered 
by the new strategy to collect behaviour-related metrics. The network can now discriminate better 
between misbehaving and well-behaved nodes. This is represented by curves with greater
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detection probabilities for m isbehaving nodes (i.e. nodes that drop more packets than those 
allowed by a threshoid), and lower detection probabilities for well-behaved nodes (i.e. nodes that 
drop packets below the amount permitted by a  threshold)-
In Figure 4-8 all nodes drop packets with the same probability. This means that in the figure the 
curves correspond to networks with nodes that drop packets with probabilities o f  70% , 30%  and 
0% respectively. For these three particular cases, it is assumed that this average behaviour 
corresponds to the normal behaviour o f a well-behaved node. For the networks dropping 70% and 
30% o f  the packets it is presumed that such node behaviour is perhaps due to increased noise or 
mobility issues and therefore nodes are not expected to be detected as m isbehaving. Consequently 
the m isbehaviour threshold a,hreshoid should at least be set to a value equal to the packet dropping 
average plus an offset which helps preventing the algorithm from wrongly detecting well-behaved 
nodes. For example, it can be observed from the figure that for the network where nodes drop 
about 70% o f  their packets it is required that a threshoid> 70% + 10% (i.e. offset = 10%) in order to 
have less than 20%  chance o f detecting a node as misbehaving.
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Figure 4-8 Probability o f detection PD vs. m isbehaviour threshold a t|ireshoid 
for different average netw ork behaviours
Simulations have also been carried out for 20, 40 and 120 node networks. The curves obtained 
exhibit similar behaviour to the 60 node network o f  Figure 4-8. However, our results show that 
the offset to keep a desired detection probability suffers small changes betw een different 
networks. Figure 4-9 shows a subset o f curves corresponding to networks o f  20, 40, 60 and 120 
nodes that drop packets with 30% probability. The range o f  the m isbehaviour threshold axis has
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been modified so as to offer a better view o f  our area o f interest, i.e. around athreshoid = 30%. We 
can now see the effect that the number o f nodes in a network has on the selection o f  an adequate 
m isbehaviour threshold. For instance, if  we desire to set the m isbehaviour threshold to a value that 
yields less than 10% change o f  wrongly detecting a well-behaved node in the networks o f  Figure 
4-9, then it is required that a threshoid> 30%  + 9% {offset = 9%) for the 20 node network, a,hreshoid> 
30% + 12% {offset = 12%) for the 40 node network, a threshnid> 30% + 14% {offset = 14%) for the 
60 node network, and a ,h resh o id> 30%  + 16% {offset = 16%) for the 120 node network. Thus, it is 
evident that there is a relation between the m isbehaviour threshold and the num ber o f  nodes in a 
network. O ur results also imply that using the same misbehaviour threshold value in networks 
with different nodes can produce different likelihoods o f wrongly detecting well-behaved nodes. 
This is true even if  the average num ber o f  dropped packets is the same between networks. 
Therefore in order to not exceed a desired maximum probability o f  w rong detections, the offset 
value has to be adjusted to account for the higher number o f  nodes in a network. Table 4-1 
introduces a set o f suggested values that can be given to the misbehaviour threshold offset 
depending on the number o f nodes in the network and the maximum probability o f  wrongly 
detecting well-behaved nodes as misbehaving.
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Figure 4-9 Probability o f detection PD vs. m isbehaviour threshold a threshoid 
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The misbehaviour threshold parameter a,hreshoid can be linked to factors or requirem ents which 
influence the way it is calculated. For instance, athreshold can be set to specific values or levels by 
network managem ent policies that seek to guarantee certain security level or quality o f  service
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required by high-level entities such as network administrators or application layer software 
modules. A second option is to set otthreshoid to the average network misbehaviour, considered to be 
the normal behaviour of a well-behaved node, plus an estimated offset. In this case, the average 
network behaviour can be obtained thanks to the overall behaviour view that MNs have for the 
network, after aggregating the behaviour metrics. Then management policies could set the offset 
to a value that satisfies a given maximum probability of wrongly accusing a node as it will be 
seen in the next Section.
Table 4-1 Adequate Values for the Misbehaviour Threshold Offset
Maximum probability of a wrong detection
Number of Network Nodes 10% 20% 30%
20 Offset = 9% Offset = 5% Offset = 3%
40 Offset = 12% Offset = 7% Offset = 4%
60 Offset = 14% Offset = 8% Offset = 5%
120 Offset = 16% Offset = 9%o Offset = 6%
4.2.3 Accusation Phase
As described in the previous section the network behaviour information is collected, aggregated 
and sent to MNs for them to analyse. Thus, MNs have access not only to the overall network 
behaviour but also to each node’s individual behaviour data. This makes them responsible for 
controlling and adjusting the procedures carried out to detect and accuse misbehaving nodes. 
Therefore the accusation concept developed in this Section is implemented by MNs within our 
proposed protection scheme.
A single detection is not sufficient to accuse a node of misbehaviour since this would result in the 
probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved nodes being very high. If the punishment of 
accused nodes is network isolation, then in such a case the overall network performance is likely 
to be worse than that of a network with misbehaving nodes, due to the lack of enough nodes to 
guarantee network connectivity. For this reason, we propose that a node in our scheme be accused 
of misbehaviour only if  in a number of behaviour checks ch the node is detected md 
(misbehaviour detections) times as misbehaving. Since the order of those md detections does not 
matter, combinatorics and probability theory can be used to derive Equation 4-3. We assume that 
detections are independent from each other and that the probability of detection PD remains 
constant during the evaluation period.
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ch
P = PA md,ch I
i= m d \
/ - I  
m d  - \
j ,  md — V -m d )
X Pn X Pn (4-3)
Where,
P A Probability o f  accusation,
Probability o f  md  m isbehaviour detections in ch behaviour checks, 
Probability o f  a single detection,
PD = 1 -  PD —> Probability o f  a single no-detection, and 
ch ^ ch\
P  - »m d ,ch
md md\(ch — md)\
Equation 4-3 states that if, for instance, ch = 4 and md = 2 the probability o f  a node being accused 
o f  m isbehaviour is the probability that the two detections occur in the first tw o behaviour checks, 
plus the probability that the second detection occurs in the third check, plus the probability that 
the second detection occurs in the last behaviour check, i.e. the fourth behaviour check. It follows 
that the probability o f accusation PA depends not only on the detection probability PD but also on 
the num ber o f  behaviour checks ch , which defines our sliding window size (m em ory buffer), and 
on the num ber o f  detections md  required for a node to be accused o f  misbehaviour. Figures 4-10, 
4-11 and 4-12 show how Equation 4-3 varies with different values given to its factors.
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Figure 4-10 presents a set o f curves displaying the probability o f accusation Pa for different 
com binations o f  m isbehaviour detections md  and behaviour checks ch when the probability o f  a 
single detection is PD = 80%. As an example, if  we analyse the curve corresponding to 3 
detections (md = 3) it can be seen that the curve starts at ch = 3, since lower values o f ch are not 
possible for md  = 3. Then for ch = 3 we have that the probability o f  accusation is Pa = 0.8 x 0.8 
x 0.8 = 0.512 = 51.2%, which is the probability that all three behaviour checks yield positive 
m isbehaviour detections. When ch = 4, three misbehaviour detections out o f  the 4 possible 
behaviour checks are required in order to accuse the evaluated node; this gives a higher 
probability o f  accusation (PA ~  81%). To sum up, the fewer m isbehaviour detections md  are 
required and the more behaviour checks ch are taken into account, the higher the probability o f 
accusation PA is.
In Figure 4-10 the probability o f  accusation PA increases to almost 100% for all curves as the 
performed behaviour checks ch get closer to 10. Figure 4-11 shows how the probability o f 
accusation PA reacts when the probability o f  a single detection PD is 60%. In this figure not all 
curves climb quick enough to reach PA ~  100%, which is an indication that the probability o f 
detection PD is not good enough (not high enough). Finally, Figure 4-12 illustrates what happens 
when the probability o f detection is too low (PD = 10%). Here the m aximum probability o f 
accusation PA reached is 65% and corresponds to the case when at least 1 detection out o f  10 
behaviour checks is needed to accuse an evaluated node.
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for a 60 node netw ork in two different states
These figures enable us to select adequate values for the number o f behaviour checks ch and the 
minimum num ber o f  detections md  needed to accuse a node. In order to illustrate this notion, let 
us assum e a 60 node network consisting o f  two types o f nodes: well-behaved nodes that do not
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drop packets on purpose, and misbehaving nodes that drop about 70% of the packets they are 
supposed to forward. Figure 4-13 shows separately the probability of detection (PD) as a function 
of the increasing misbehaviour threshold (athreshoid) for well-behaved nodes, misbehaving nodes, 
and the average network behaviour for a network in two different states. In state 1 -  the initial 
state -  the network has 50% of well-behaved nodes and 50% of misbehaving nodes. In state 2 the 
network has detected and isolated half the misbehaving nodes, i.e. 25% of the total number of 
nodes in the network. If the curves for states 1 and 2 are compared, it is simple to notice that the 
state 2 curve resembles more the curve for well-behaved nodes. In general the more misbehaving 
nodes are isolated the more the average network behaviour resembles that of a network with 
well-behaved nodes only.
If in our example network, regardless of its state, we set a threshoid = 5% we see from Figure 4-13 
that PD~ 10% for well-behaved nodes (d = 0). Then if we want to have a probability of wrongly 
accusing well-behaved nodes no greater than 1%, from Figure 4-12 we observe that setting the 
number of behaviour checks ch = 4 and the minimum number of required detections md = 2 
would not satisfy our requirement since in such case the probability of accusation PA is about 5%. 
Instead if ch = 5 and md = 3 we obtain that PA is less than 1% (actually from Equation 4-3 we 
know PA = 0.856%). Furthermore, with athreshoid = 5% the probability of detecting misbehaving 
nodes is Pd ~ 98% (from Figure 4-13, 70% Drop) and by using Equation 4-3 (with ch = 5 and md 
= 3) we obtain that the probability of accusing misbehaving nodes in our example network is 
virtually 100%. This example verifies an important property of the protection scheme proposed in 
this Chapter, i.e. the property of exhibiting a low probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved 
nodes while maintaining a high likelihood of accusing misbehaving ones.
As has been seen, our protection scheme has several configurable parameters. Furthermore, 
knowing the desired value of one or more parameters allows our scheme to calculate and adjust 
the other parameters in order to satisfy the given requirements. We propose therefore that these 
parameters be the interface between the protection scheme and the management plane. The 
algorithm’s parameters can be manipulated through low-level policies in order to adapt the system 
to the current network conditions and at the same time fulfil the goals specified by high-level 
entities. On the other hand, our scheme also provides the management plane with information 
related to the current performance of the network. For example, event-driven policies could be 
triggered when the overall misbehaviour of the network exceeds a pre-established limit. These 
policies would execute a set of procedures and parameter configurations in order to lead the 
overall system to a new desired state.
It was briefly mentioned that the number of behaviour checks (ch) defines our sliding window 
size. In fact, a sliding window is kept at MNs for each active node in the network. Every time a
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node’s behaviour is evaluated, the new result is inserted into the sliding window and the oldest 
value is removed from it. This ensures that MNs keep track of the latest ch behaviour check 
results. If in those behaviour checks, md  misbehaviour detections or more are found, MNs accuse 
the respective node of misbehaviour. Then, MNs inform cluster heads (CHs) of the accusation and 
in turn CHs enforce the respective policies on cluster nodes (CNs). The enforced policies apply to 
MNs and CHs too. However, the punishment that a node receives due to its misbehaviour depends 
on the set of policies implemented by the PBM system, which may distinguish between different 
node types and apply different punishment policies, as explained in the following section.
4.2.4 Adaptability and Management Policies
The adaptability of the detection and accusation processes is achieved in two ways. First, a new 
method is proposed for the calculation of the detection threshold athreshoid• This configurable 
method uses a weighted algorithm of recent metrics and inherently adapts to the dynamic 
forwarding behaviour of participant nodes. The second aspect of adaptability is achieved with the 
use of policies, based on the role-based network organisation of Section 4.2.1. Special policies are 
introduced to manage the proposed protection scheme, taking into account management 
objectives and the changing network conditions.
Policies can express the high-level goals of a managing entity and can be interpreted into 
low-level policies that dynamically control the operation of participating wireless devices. 
Although policy refinement is currently out of the scope of our work, we propose a simplified 
translation of high-level policies (e.g. the level of detection rigidness) and variables (e.g. the 
probability of wrong accusation) to low-level algorithm configuration (e.g. values for ch and md). 
The main benefit from the proposed use of policies with the aforementioned protection scheme is 
the facilitation of dynamic management functionality in a controlled manner. This functionality 
enables a management entity to predefine the expected behaviour and performance of the network 
through policies. The event-driven evaluation of policy conditions and the automated enforcement 
of policy actions are two important properties of PBM systems that have been integrated with the 
proposed adaptive detection and accusation scheme.
We have adopted the established ECA policy notation, where a policy can be expressed as a 
statement in the form of: on <Event(s)> i f  <Condition(s)> then <Action(s)>, in the same fashion 
that is done in [126]. In spite of its simplicity, this notation is very effective because it provides 
the building blocks for complex management logic. This is achieved by creating groups of 
policies that can be assigned to management or organisational roles. For example, different 
policies can apply to devices in the CH and CN role. The use of events and conditional 
expressions in policies provides a dynamic element to the management system, making it able to
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adapt to network conditions. For example, policies can be triggered if  the node density in an area 
has become lower than a dynam ically configurable threshold. A series o f  policy types for 
adaptable detection and accusation o f  packet forwarding m isbehaviour have been defined, as seen 
in Figure 4-14.
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Figure 4-14 Policy types for adaptable detection and accusation o f  
packet forw arding m isbehaviour
We classify management policies in two sets, the protection scheme set and the network 
deployment set. Policies in the protection scheme set are organised in the security requirements 
and penalisation policy groups. The network deployment policy set includes an exceptions policy 
group. Each policy group contains a num ber o f  policy rules that express the low-level policies to 
be enforced on network devices. The m odelling o f policies in sets, groups and rules follows the 
recommended practices o f IETF, as described in RFC 3460 [114]. The aforem entioned policy 
groups are only a sample o f  possible policy extensions and form the basis for the use o f  policies to 
achieve an adaptable protection scheme. The use o f  m ultiple policies and dynam ic conditions to 
affect the values o f the same managed objects, introduces the risk o f  policy conflicts and the need 
to address conflict detection and resolution (CDR) arises. However, policy conflict resolution is 
out o f  the scope o f the work described in this thesis.
The protection scheme policy set aims to facilitate the interaction o f a m anaging entity w ith the 
underlying methods and algorithms that implement the m isbehaviour detection and node 
accusation. In a way, this set provides an abstraction to the manager, hiding the com plex
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implementation details and offering two high-level parameters that can be dynamically 
manipulated: The detection rigidness expresses the level of tolerance the network should exhibit 
to misbehaviour, while the accusation accuracy expresses the expected confidence in accusing 
and punishing nodes in the network. These parameters offer a mechanism to encapsulate the 
high-level management objectives as enforceable policies, by affecting the accusation probability 
PA and determining the detection threshold offset.
The security requirements group can be further divided in packet forwarding misbehaviour 
policies and routing misbehaviour policies. The latter can be used to control an ad hoc routing 
protection scheme like SAODV [76] [77]. The former policies are the ones that manipulate the 
parameters of our protection scheme and provide the desired versatility to change according to 
management objectives. It should be emphasised that the proposed policy set interaction not only 
provides the means to influence the protection scheme, but also provides the increased 
adaptability and parameterisation offered from PBM systems by taking in mind network events 
and other related policy sets (e.g. penalisation or network deployment groups).
The penalisation group includes policies to control the node accusation, punishment, and 
revocation of punishment. Their aim is to refine the actions against those nodes detected as 
misbehaving by deciding when and how to penalise them. The importance of this group lays in 
the fact that it can offer a differentiation in the treatment of misbehaviour, thus allowing a 
manager to introduce different policies for each user class. For example, assuming free vs. paid 
network access, paying customers can be offered a lower probability of being wrongly accused. 
Likewise, in ubiquitous computing environments, where there is the possibility that some 
pre-deployed trusted infrastructure exists, when a trusted cluster head (CH) is accused of 
misbehaviour an action can trigger other policies to check the CH’s current working condition and 
enforce appropriate actions instead of penalising the trusted device, e.g. the CH may be a base 
station that needs to be restarted. Accusation policies can provide additional conditions to 
expedite or delay node accusation while punishment policies control the type of actions against 
accused nodes. Revocation policies define if  and when an accused node can be cleared o f its 
current punishment, e.g. stop node isolation in 30 minutes.
Finally, the network deployment set can be used to express policies that prescribe the usage and 
purpose of the network and are not directly related to the proposed protection scheme. This set 
can encapsulate a priori management knowledge like the characteristics o f the deployment area 
(e.g. city, stadium, rural), the type of network (infrastructure-based, pure MANET, hybrid), the 
expected user mobility (e.g. pedestrian, vehicular, mixed) and the types o f supported applications 
(e.g. data, voice, video). Based on the above parameters, an exceptions group was created that 
includes similar policies to the penalisation group. The purpose of this group is to differentiate the 
penalisation of nodes depending on the deployment conditions that affect their normal behaviour.
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For instance, areas with high mobility are expected to have a reduced packet delivery ratio, 
making mobile nodes more prone to misbehaviour detection.
4.3 Case Study, Evaluation Results and Analysis
In order to evaluate the applicability and implications from the use of the proposed detection and 
accusation scheme, we now outline a case study scenario of a ubiquitous computing environment 
based on the wireless ad hoc paradigm. We then present the evaluation results regarding key 
aspects of our scheme and use the case study network to illustrate its effect regarding performance 
and management objectives.
4.3.1 Case Study Scenario
Ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) (Section 2.1) are a prominent technology that can 
optionally adopt and benefit from the versatility offered by MANETs (Section 2.3). A 
self-organising UCE integrates a number of privileged nodes (base stations or routers) that act as 
gateways for the rest of the participating wireless devices. In order to provide connectivity in 
areas out of the range of any gateway, such networks are reliant on the packet forwarding 
behaviour of individual nodes along the created multihop paths. We assume the deployment of an 
UCE as a case study scenario and consider a number of fixed nodes assigned the MN role, i.e. the 
devices under the direct control of a managing entity. A number of base stations are also deployed 
in the examined area and these nodes are assigned the CH role. For the purpose of this scenario, a 
number of user devices can be dynamically assigned the CH role, based on the adopted role-based 
framework and distributed algorithm (Section 4.2). The rest of network nodes assume the CN 
role. All of the participating devices are expected to forward packets to facilitate the required 
multihop communication. In order to safeguard the operation of the UCE’s wireless 
communication, the managing entity integrates the proposed protection scheme and introduces 
appropriate policies to control and automate the detection and isolation of misbehaving users.
As a proof of concept, some example policies are included in Tables 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4. The effect 
of our scheme on network performance is demonstrated in the simulations of Section 4.3.2. For 
this case study, policies can be used to achieve the following example goals:
1. Control the calculation method of the detection threshold based on management objectives 
(e.g. accusation accuracy, such as security requirement policy 1 -  SRP1) or on network 
conditions (e.g. network congestion, such as SRP2 and SRP3).
2. Control the offsetting of the detection threshold based on the desired maximum probability of 
wrongly accusing a well-behaved node (e.g. policies from SRP1 to SRP5).
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3. Differentiate the accusation and punishment enforcement based on the device role, the 
application type and the business model (e.g. penalisation policies PP1 and PP2, and exception 
policies EP1 and EP2).
T able 4-2 M anagem ent Policies for A daptive M isbehaviour D etection, 
Security  R equirem ents Policy G roup
Policy ID Security Requirements Policy Group
SRP1
on { startup } 
i f  { true } 
then {
{ set_accusation_accuracy(/ow)},
{ set_detection_rigidness(med/wm) },
{ set_threshold_method(/aeJ_vtf/z/e) }
}
SRP2
on { congestion }
if  { accused_nodes_count <= 40% } 
then {
{ set_accusation_accuracy (medium) }, 
{ set_detection_rigidness (medium) }
}
SRP3
on { congestion }
if  { accused_nodes_count >  40% }
then {
{ set_accusation_accuracy (high)}, 
{ set_detection_rigidness(/ow) }
}
SRP4
on { low_real_time_traffic_throughput}
i f  { accused_nodes_count <= 40% } A { congestion =  false }
then {
{ set_accusation_accuracy (high) },
{ set_threshold_method (weighted) },
{ set detection_rigidness(/z(g/z) }
}
SRP5
on { low_real_time_traffic_throughput} 
if  { accused_nodes_count > 40% } 
then {
{ set_accusation_accuracy (high) },
{ set_threshold_method (fixed_value) }, 
{ set_detection_rigidness(/ow) }
}
Table 4-2 contains example policies for the security requirements policy group. These policies are 
somewhat high-level policies in the sense that they specify levels of accuracy and rigidness (low, 
medium and high) rather than exact values for our scheme parameters such as the misbehaviour 
threshold athreshoid, its offset, the number of behaviour checks ch, or the number of misbehaviour 
detections md. Thus, this set of policies needs to go trough a refinement process to map them into
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actual algorithmic parameters before they can be distributed to the policy enforcement points 
(PEPs). It is the task of the UCE administrator to decide the parameter values corresponding to 
low, medium and high levels of accuracy and rigidness. In Table 4-2 SRP1 represents a typical 
policy to set the initial parameters of a system. Notice that the condition is always true and the 
triggering event alone is enough for this policy to be enforced. Every time the system starts up the 
accuracy of our approach is set to low, its rigidness to medium and the threshold is set to a fixed 
value, which is derived from the rigidness level. SRP2 and SRP3 represent examples of how our 
scheme can be adapted on the fly to deal with network congestion. In these policies the accuracy 
and rigidness depend on the percentage of nodes that have already been accused of misbehaviour. 
Similarly, policies SRP4 and SRP5 are triggered when the real time traffic throughput in the 
network is low (this network event is considered to be the consequence of the presence of active 
misbehaving nodes when no congestion exists, see SRP4). Thus if the percentage of accused 
nodes is less than 40%, the threshold is set to be calculated using a weighted average algorithm 
applied to the overall network behaviour plus an offset which depends on the rigidness level 
indicated (high on the example).
Table 4-3 Management Policies for Adaptive Misbehaviour Detection, 
Penalisation Policy Group
Policy ID Penalisation Policy Group
PP1
on { startup } 
iff true } 
then {
{ set_accusation_parameters(c/r=5, md:=3) }
}
PP2
on { startup } 
iff true } 
then f
f set_punishment(/5o/a//o«) }
}
Table 4-4 Management Policies for Adaptive Misbehaviour Detection, 
Exceptions Policy Group
Policy ID Exceptions Policy Group
EP1
on f node_check }
if f Node.role == CN } A f Node.owner == paying_user } 
then f
f set_accusation_parameters (ch:=5, md:=4) }
}
EP2
on f node_check }
if f Node.role ==  CH } A f previous_waming - false } 
then f
{ set_  punishment (warning) }, 
f set_accusation__parameters (ch:=ch+2, md:=md+2) }
}
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Table 4-3 shows example penalisation policies to configure the parameters behaviour checks ch 
and misbehaviour detections md on startup (PP1) in addition to set network isolation as the default 
punishment for nodes accused of misbehaviour (PP2). Table 4-4, on the other hand, shows 
example exception policies that modify the type of punishment to be applied to an accused node 
depending on the role it plays in the network. EP1 changes the number of detections required to 
accuse of misbehaviour a paying network user. EP2 sets the punishment for cluster heads (CHs) 
to an initial warning and allows for other two misbehaviour detections before punishing the node.
4.3.2 Evaluation Results and Analysis
As usual, we perform our simulations using the GloMoSim simulation package [48] [49]. The 
results presented for each value are the average of 20 simulation runs. Widely deployed standard 
protocols are used to provide traffic and communication between nodes. The simulation 
parameters have been selected in order to obtain results that are meaningful when coupled with 
our study case scenario. Unless explicitly stated, our simulation parameters take the following 
values: i) nodes move according to the random waypoint mobility model with a speed randomly 
chosen with uniform distribution between 4m/sec and 6m/sec, yielding a mean node speed of 
5m/sec (which is about the average speed of a car in a city centre), and a standard deviation of 
0.58m/sec, ii) the wireless transmission range of every node is 100 metres, iii) the node density is 
5x1 O'4 nodes/m2 iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 
DCF, vi) the underlying routing protocol is AODV, vii) the total simulation time for each scenario 
is 1800 seconds, and viii) network isolation is the punishment enforced for any nodes accused of 
misbehaviour.
Roles are assigned to each node in the network following the adopted role-based framework 
(Section 4.2). The number of MN is predefined as 3 and remains constant for all simulations, 
while the number of CHs depends on the number of network nodes. Before every behaviour 
metrics collection for misbehaviour detection, the simulated networks are re-clustered using Wu’s 
approach [127] as described in Section 4.2.1. Having in mind our case study, MN nodes can be 
operator-controlled fixed routers, while a number of user devices are selected as CHs to assist 
distributed management. In this Section we first present a set of results showing how our 
protection scheme effectively improves the network performance in the presence of misbehaving 
nodes. Then the reaction time of our approach is shown for different network sizes and number of 
nodes. Finally, we demonstrate that the overhead introduced by our proposed scheme allows it to 
scale well.
An important parameter to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach is the network throughput 
gain that it can offer to networks affected by misbehaving nodes that drop packets in a
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probabilistic manner. In this Section we present results that dem onstrate that our protection 
scheme effectively improves the average network throughput as it detects and accuses 
m isbehaving nodes in the network. For our first set o f  results, sim ulations for networks o f  40, 60 
and 120 nodes were run in areas o f  80 000m 2 (282.8m x 282.8m), 120 000m 2 (346.4m x 346.4m) 
and 240 000m2 (489.9m x 489.9m) respectively. The networks were set-up with 40%  o f their 
nodes misbehaving by dropping 80% packets. The misbehaviour threshold athreshoid, be- the 
maximum amount o f  packets that nodes are allowed to drop without being detected, is 60%. The 
sliding window size or number o f behaviour checks is ch = 5, the minimum num ber o f  detections 
required for an accusation is md  = 3, the reporting period is Treport = 60sec.
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Figure 4-15 A verage netw ork throughput vs. sim ulation tim e (40 nodes)
Figures 4-15 (40 node network), 4-16 (60 node network) and 4-17 (120 node network) depict the 
value o f  the average network throughput as the simulation time progresses from 180 to 1800 
seconds. Each throughput value corresponds to the average network throughput in the previous 
180 seconds. For this reason, all curves start at 180 seconds instead o f 0 seconds. Each graph 
displays a) networks without misbehaving nodes (No M isbehaviour), b) networks with 
m isbehaving nodes using our proposed protection scheme (Detection & Accusation), and c) 
networks with misbehaving nodes but with no means o f  defending them selves from any type o f 
attack (M isbehaviour Alone). As can be seen, our protection scheme effectively m itigates the 
effects o f  packet forwarding m isbehaviour in a network and offers a substantial im provem ent on 
the average network throughput.
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Figure 4-16 A verage netw ork throughput vs. sim ulation tim e (60 nodes)
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Figure 4-17 A verage netw ork throughput vs. sim ulation tim e (120 nodes)
At the start o f  the simulations the throughput in networks im plem enting our protection schem e is 
similar to that o f a network with misbehaviour alone. This is due to the fact that our algorithm  
requires the acquisition o f  behaviour metrics before it can detect and accuse any m isbehaving 
nodes. However, as the simulation time elapses our approach rapidly detects, accuses and isolates 
m isbehaving nodes leading to a steep increase o f  the network throughput until it closely
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approaches that o f a network with well-behaved nodes only. It is interesting to notice that the 120 
node network (Figure 4-17) seems to have a sharper network throughput increase than that o f the 
40 (Figure 4-15) or 60 (Figure 4-16) node networks. This suggests that in larger networks nodes 
exhibiting packet forwarding m isbehaviour are detected quicker than in sm aller networks. The 
reason for this is that in larger networks the mean hop distance between source and destination is 
greater and more nodes are involved in the packet forwarding process. This increases the 
probability o f misbehaving nodes actively intervening on the path between source and destination, 
which in turn leads to an earlier evaluation o f their behaviour. Thus, m isbehaving nodes can be 
detected and accused sooner in large networks than in small networks.
We next consider a 60 node network (Figure 4-18) over a terrain o f  120 000m 2 (346.41m x 
346.41m). Four groups o f  m isbehaving nodes are set that drop 80%, 60%, 40%  and 20%  o f 
packets respectively. Each o f  the groups consists o f  10% o f  the total number o f  nodes in the 
network, i.e. 6 nodes per m isbehaving group. The rem aining network and algorithm param eters 
stay unchanged. For this set o f  results we assume a relaxed security policy with ot,hreShoid fixed at 
70% for the first half o f the simulation. H alf way through the simulation policies change the 
m isbehaviour threshold from a fixed value to be equal to the weighted average network 
m isbehaviour plus a pre-established offset (8%).
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Figure 4-18 A verage netw ork throughput vs. sim ulation tim e (60 nodes)
Figure 4-18 shows how the fixed threshold a threshoid ~ 70% policy is ineffective since the netw ork 
throughput does not improve significantly during the first ha lf o f the simulation. In fact, 
ot,threshold= 70 fails to detect nodes dropping less than 70% o f  the packets (60%, 40%  and 20% ). In
102
Policy-Based Adaptable Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
the middle o f the simulation (900 seconds) the misbehaviour threshold is changed by policies to 
be the weighted average network m isbehaviour plus an offset o f  8%. This yields a value m uch 
lower than 70% which permits the algorithm to detect and accuse previously undetected 
m isbehaving nodes. As these nodes are isolated from the network, the average network 
m isbehaviour is reduced which leads to a reduced m isbehaviour threshold thus allowing for the 
detection o f  nodes dropping lower amounts o f packets. By the end o f  the simulation when all 
m isbehaving nodes are isolated, the network throughput becomes close to that o f a network with 
well-behaved nodes only.
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Figure 4-19 M isbehaviour threshold vs. sim ulation tim e (60 node netw ork)
Figure 4-19 shows the m isbehaviour threshold (cc,hreshoid) corresponding to the “A daptable 
Detection & Accusation” curve o f  Figure 4-18. On this figure it is possible to observe the 
significant drop in the value o f  a,hreshoid as is changed from a fixed value (70%) to the average 
network m isbehaviour plus an offset o f 8% (at 900 seconds). Then a,hreshoid continues to decrease 
gradually as the rem aining m isbehaving nodes are isolated from the network. By the end o f  the 
simulation the m isbehaviour threshold value is close to 10%, which indicates that the average 
network misbehaviour is o f  about 2%. This particular example illustrates the im portance that 
policies can play in ubiquitous computing environments im plementing our proposed protection 
scheme. A single network event can trigger a set o f  policies capable o f driving the netw ork into a 
new state where previously undetected misbehaving nodes are isolated from the network. To 
accomplish such a task, pre-defined policies must interface with our protection schem e through
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the configurable parameters o f  our algorithm (e.g. ch, md  and offset) and the selected m ethod to 
calculate/set the netw ork m isbehaviour threshold a,hreshoid, as seen in Section 4.2.3.
Additionally, polices can help in the identification o f critical nodes whose removal can result in a 
lower network performance, e.g. a lower network throughput. By constantly m onitoring variables 
such as the network throughput and the average network misbehaviour, it is possible to identify 
whether the isolation o f a node causes more harm than good to the network. For instance, if  after a 
node is isolated from the network the average network m isbehaviour and the network throughput 
decrease, then this is an indication that a misbehaving node was effectively isolated but also that 
the node was o f critical importance for the network. Therefore, polices can be triggered that let 
the node back in the network despite is misbehaviour.
A different angle to observe and analyse our simulation results is offered by the reaction tim e o f  
our proposed approach. Figures 4-20 and 4-21 allow us to observe how quick our protection 
scheme responds to the presence o f m isbehaving nodes in networks o f 40, 60 and 120 nodes with 
areas o f 80 000m2, 120 000m2 and 240 000m2 respectively. Additionally, Figure 4-21 
demonstrates that policies can effectively help to improve the detection and accusation o f 
misbehaving nodes in networks with nodes exhibiting different levels o f m isbehaviour.
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Figure 4-20 Percentage o f m isbehaving nodes being isolated vs. sim ulation tim e
Figure 4-20 shows the percentage o f m isbehaving nodes isolated as the simulation tim e elapses. 
This graph corresponds to the same networks shown in Figures 4-15, 4-16 and 4-17. However, 
Figure 4-20, unlike the previous ones, allows us to see the reaction speed o f  our protection
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scheme in accusing and isolating misbehaving nodes. It shows that the 120 node network 
responds the quickest to the presence o f misbehaving nodes and effectively isolates them. It is 
followed by the 60 node network and then by the 40 node network which exhibits the slowest 
reaction time. This confirms that larger networks exhibit sm aller reaction time, i.e. they take less 
time to detect m isbehaving nodes as previously explained in this Section.
Figure 4-21 illustrates the reaction tim es for the networks o f  Figures 4-16 and 4-18. It clearly 
shows the importance o f  selecting an adequate m isbehaviour threshold in order to effectively 
accuse and isolate m isbehaving nodes from the network. The curve corresponding to the network 
o f Figure 4-18 (60 N ode N etwork -  2 Thresholds) shows that initially with a,hreshoid ~  70%  only 
25% o f the misbehaving nodes are isolated from the network, i.e. only nodes dropping 80% o f  the 
packets are isolated. However, at simulation time = 900 seconds the m isbehaviour threshold is set 
to the weighted average network misbehaviour plus an 8% offset, at which point the am ount o f 
misbehaving nodes isolated rapidly increases to reach 100%, i.e. now our approach detects nodes 
dropping 60%, 40% and 20% o f the packets.
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Figure 4-21 Percentage o f m isbehaving nodes isolated vs. sim ulation tim e (60 nodes)
Our final set o f results presents the overhead produced by our protection schem e com pared 
against the overhead produced by the underlying routing protocol (AODV), and the CBR traffic 
load (the application layer traffic), in terms o f  their contribution to the total netw ork traffic. The 
information displayed in Figure 4-22 corresponds to the 120 node netw ork o f  Figure 4-17. The 
mean node speed is increased from 0 to 20m/sec in order to see its effect on our approach.
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Figure 4-22 C ontribution to total netw ork traffic vs. m ean node speed (120 nodes)
Figure 4-22 shows the contribution to the total network traffic o f  three types o f  protocols: CBR 
traffic, AODV overhead and the proposed protection scheme overhead. The total network traffic 
takes into account contributions from generated and forwarded packets. This means that i f  a 
packet travels over a three hop network path, it is accounted three tim es since every tim e it is 
transmitted it consumes network resources. The traffic percentage is calculated with respect to 
packets transmitted instead o f bytes, since in the IEEE 802.11 wireless networks standard each 
packet is associated with the competition to gain access to the wireless m edium regardless o f  its 
size. As can be seen from the figure, our approach contributes with a small overhead fraction to 
the total network traffic, and such a fraction is independent o f  node speed. This is expected since 
the traffic produced by our approach depends on how often behaviour metrics are reported rather 
than on mobility issues. The reporting o f information is controlled by the adopted policy-based 
framework (Section 4.2) and the reporting period Treport, which is 60 seconds for the netw orks o f  
Figure 4-22. Based on our results, we conclude that with the correct tuning o f  reporting 
parameters and its immunity to node speed, our protection scheme can scale well to m edium  
mobile wireless environments. On the other hand, the figure also shows how the contribution o f  
the AODV overhead to the total network traffic increases from about 5% in a static netw ork to 
above 50% when the mean node speed is 20m/sec. This increase is due to more frequent link 
breakages, which leads to more route request (RREQ) broadcasts. Finally, the CBR traffic 
contribution to the network traffic decreases as a result o f  the increase o f  the AODV overhead.
106
Policy-Based Adaptable Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
4.4 Summary
In this Chapter we have presented an adaptable protection scheme that is capable of effectively 
detecting, accusing and punishing nodes that exhibit packet forwarding misbehaviour in 
accordance with the changing network conditions and the management policies set by high-level 
entities. The effectiveness and efficiency of our approach was verified through an extensive set of 
simulations.
We have also identified an interface between the management plane and our protection scheme. 
Such an interface is provided by parameters such as the misbehaviour threshold a threshoid, the offset 
applied to misbehaviour threshold, the number of behaviour checks ch performed on each node, 
the misbehaviour detections md required to accuse a node of misbehaviour, and the method to 
calculate/set the misbehaviour threshold, e.g. a moving weighted average or a fixed value. At the 
same time we have identified the overall network behaviour, which is calculated at manager nodes 
(MNs), and the partial and local behaviour view obtained by cluster heads (CHs) as feedback 
mechanisms that can be used by the management plane to fine tune the level of security desired 
on a ubiquitous computing environment.
Finally, we have shown that by making use of policies at the management plane to control our 
scheme’s detection and accusation parameters, the rigidness and accuracy of our approach can be 
customised in order to punish nodes that exhibit different levels of misbehaviour in the network. 
Furthermore, different types of punishment can be established for nodes that execute different 
tasks or have different roles in the network. Also, we have demonstrated through simulations that 
policies can effectively improve the detection and accusation power of our proposed algorithm 
while maintaining a low probability of accusing well-behaved nodes, i.e. nodes whose behaviour 
does not exhibit significant and consistent variances above the average network behaviour.
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Chapter 5 
5 A Collusion-Resistant Misbehaviour 
Detection and Node Accusation Approach
As discussed in Chapter 2 ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) typically consist of large 
numbers of heterogeneous devices that can be distributed over large physical areas. For this 
reason it is desirable that approaches designed to work in UCEs address any scalability issues. 
Our proposed approach in Chapter 4, for instance, requires a more efficient clustering algorithm 
that allows it to scale better. Additionally, such a clustering algorithm should provide a means to 
keep track of manager nodes (MNs) in the network (even if they are on the move) and select only 
“good enough” nodes to be cluster heads (CHs). In the previous chapter “good enough” nodes 
were identified through the capability function CF(Vj) introduced in Section 4.2.1. However, its 
use is somewhat limited by the prior fulfilment of a set of rules regarding an evaluated node’s 
neighbourhood. One of the objectives of the work in this Chapter is to propose the use of a 
clustering algorithm that allows for better scalability, manager nodes traceability, and appropriate 
cluster heads selection. Our proposed strategy, along with some other ideas, is a modified version 
of a clustering algorithm that we have developed and used in some of our previous work on 
service discovery mechanisms [129]. Therefore, in this Chapter we introduce part of such work in 
order to make the concepts presented easier to understand and offer a logical development of 
ideas.
Chapters 3 and 4 also present approaches in which it is assumed that nodes in the network do not 
collude in order to bypass the security measures in place. Additionally, it is supposed that nodes 
reporting metrics do not lie, i.e. if node v, reports that it sent x packets to node y, for y, to forward 
it is presumed that the transmission of the x packets actually took place, which is not necessarily 
true in a real network. In this Chapter we introduce a new concept based on discrepancies between 
reported metrics that, as we demonstrate, offers a predefined degree of resilience against colluding 
nodes and prevents the accusation of well-behaved nodes due to metrics reported by lying nodes 
(referred to as liars).
This Chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 reviews service discovery strategies with 
emphasis on mainstream service discovery solutions and service discovery strategies for
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MANETs. Section 5.2 introduces an efficient network clustering algorithm within the context of 
service discovery and evaluates it through simulations. This algorithm is a key component for the 
selection of cluster heads in our network model. Then, Section 5.3 describes how our approach 
can achieve resilience against misbehaving, lying and colluding nodes by allowing nodes to report 
metrics on their own behaviour. To this end, a new concept based on discrepancies between nodes 
is also introduced. Evaluation results and analysis for our discrepancy-based protection scheme 
are also presented in this Section. This Chapter is finally concluded in Section 5.4 with a brief 
summary.
5.1 Introduction to Service Discovery Strategies
Service discovery and service composition play a fundamental role in ubiquitous computing 
environments where applications and services are not necessarily deployed onto a pre-existing 
network, but instead the network itself grows out of the applications and services the users want. 
This approach enables users to view the network in the manner most appropriate to them and their 
requirements [129]. An expected result of this approach is the ease with which larger, more 
complex services can be composed from smaller ones. However, in order to interact with each 
other, services and applications need first to know of the existence of other services in the 
environment as well as the tasks that they are capable of performing and the information they 
need to perform them. A solution to this problem is offered by service discovery mechanisms 
which typically are a set of software components with network and storage capabilities that allow 
applications and services in a system to find and make use of other network services that are 
useful to them.
A service can be either software as a web or e-mail server, or hardware as a printer, camera, 
scanner, etc. A client application wishing to use a service needs to know two things: the location 
of the service, i.e. the address of the machine running the service, and how to use the service, i.e. 
the interface. Both problems may be dealt with through a Service Discovery Protocol (SDP). 
However, some approaches prefer to follow the model of a well known interface for every 
service. This approach assumes that a client trying to contact a service knows the way to use it 
beforehand while the service location stills a responsibility of the SDP.
Service discovery strategies can be categorised depending on the methodology they follow to 
advertise services available in an environment. The three main categories are [130]:
o  Centralised Architecture: A group of devices is selected to act as service repositories -  also 
known as service coordinators, directory agents or lookup services. When a device has a 
service to offer it must inform service repositories (at least one of them) about the type of 
service, attributes and location where the service is running. In this approach the device that
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registers the service is not necessarily the device offering the service. Later, when a client 
needs to use a specific service it consults the service repositories and if it finds one or more 
matches for its query it selects the service it wants to use and contacts it.
o Distributed Architecture: A client needing a service multicasts or broadcasts a query 
requesting the service. In the multicast approach the query reaches those devices belonging to 
the multicast group. The multicast group consists of the set of all devices that have a service 
available (self-advertising). In the broadcast approach, on the other hand, flooding is limited 
using techniques such as expanding ring search to prevent queries from circulating indefinitely 
or traversing unnecessarily the whole network. In both approaches each service provider 
having a matching service responds back to the query originator with a unicast reply.
o Hybrid Architecture'. This architecture combines the centralised and distributed architectures 
in an attempt to blend their strengths while filtering out their weaknesses. Different approaches 
are possible each of them resulting in substantial improvements under certain circumstances.
All service discovery strategies can be placed in at least one of the categories above. What 
approach is followed by an SDP depends a lot on the environment that it is targeting. For instance, 
service discovery strategies addressing current computing systems tend to use more centralised 
architectures, whereas those targeting UCEs or MANETs seem to prefer more distributed 
approaches.
5.1.1 Mainstream Service Discovery Strategies
Many of the most well known service discovery strategies currently available have been designed 
as a response to the arising needs of existent computing systems (i.e. computing systems of the 
last decade). Additionally, these protocols have been developed by large companies, consortiums 
and well established standardisation bodies as part of larger comprehensive solutions for 
networked systems. In this subsection we review some of these well known service discovery 
protocols.
To start with, Jini [45] is Sun Microsystems’ solution to the service discovery problem. Jini is 
purely implemented in Java [43] [44], which provides its components with independence from the 
operating system (OS) on which they are running. Jini consists of four essential component types: 
lookup services, Jini services, Jini clients and services’ proxies. Lookup services are service 
repositories where the services available in the network are registered. Lookup services can 
typically be found by polling a well known multicast address. Jini services refer to services that 
are registered with one ore more lookup services. Jini clients are the users, applications and 
services that make use of a Jini service. Finally, a service’s proxy is a software component that a 
Jini service stores in a lookup service to be later retrieved by a Jini client. A service’s proxy
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contains all the intelligence on how to contact and use its Jini service. Jini, however, has not been 
widely adopted and Sun Microsystems has transferred responsibility for this project to The 
Apache Software Foundation under the project name Apache River [131].
The Service Location Protocol (SLP) [132] [133] has been developed by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), and unlike Jini it is a vendor independent standard and has been designed to 
work specifically with TCP/IP networks. SLP consists of three main processes or agents [132]: 
user agents, service agents and directory agents. A user agent is a process working on behalf of a 
user or application to acquire a service’s attributes and configuration. A service agent is a process 
working on behalf of one or more services to advertise their attributes and configuration. A 
directory agent receives information from service agents and stores it in a centralised fashion for 
its later retrieval by user agents in an efficient manner. SLP has been designed to work in a 
distributed or centralised manner. In small networked environments service agents can be 
configured to respond to the queries of each user agent (distributed approach). However, in larger 
networks, where a distributed approach would be inefficient, service agents register services they 
are responsible for with a directory agent which can be later contacted by user agents requiring a 
service (centralised approach).
The Salutation Protocol [134] is a cooperation architecture developed by the Salutation 
Consortium (which has formally disbanded). It follows a centralised architecture only but it 
supports operating system and communication protocol independence. The Salutation 
Architecture defines an entity called the Salutation Manager (SLM) that works as a service broker 
between service providers and service users. SLMs play two important roles in the Salutation 
Architecture: i) it acts as service repository, and ii) it provides for operating system and 
communication protocol independence. To achieve the latter SLMs offer a standard Salutation 
Manager Application Programming Interface (SLM-API) to service providers and service users. 
Thus, a service user and a service provider, which can be in different networks with different 
communication protocols, do not establish direct contact, but instead they contact their 
intermediate SLM through its SLM-API and let it take care of translating information from one 
network to the other if  required.
The Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) protocol [135] is developed by an industry UPnP Forum 
[136] led by Microsoft Corporation. Its initiative is similar to that of the Plug and Play (PnP) 
protocol developed some years ago, which allows for the installation and configuration of a 
computer’s peripherals in a simple manner. PnP’s basic idea is that a user plugs a peripheral to a 
computer and it will automatically be ready to play almost instantly. UPnP is an extension of this 
concept applied to networked environments, i.e. a device can be plug to a network and it should 
be installed and configured without intervention of the human counterpart. To make this possible 
UPnP uses proven techniques and well known standards such as TCP/IP, DHCP [137] and XML
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[138]. These standards can be implemented in any computing language thus generating the 
concept of universality. Additionally, UPnP defines two system components: device points which 
offer services, and control points which use and control the device points. Control points 
broadcast their requests while device points periodically advertise its presence to the network. 
Due to its broadcasting nature UPnP is mainly used in small networked environments such as 
small office home office (SOHO) networks.
Targeting short range wireless transmission environments (typically one hop networks) is the 
Bluetooth protocol [6] [7] [139] designed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group which is a 
privately held, not-for-profit trade association whose member companies are leaders in the 
telecommunications, computing and network industries. The main service discovery element in 
the Bluetooth technology is the service discovery protocol (SDP) component. Each Bluetooth 
network device holds a SDP module. On the server side SDP maintains information about the 
services available for remote use in its service records database. On the client side a local 
application uses the SDP component to discover services available in other machines. Thus, when 
an application requires a service it contacts its local SDP which sends out a request packet to be 
received by the SDPs of one-hop-away devices. Remote SDPs check their service records 
database and send back a response if they find any matches. Local SDPs receiving more than one 
response to their request pass a list of available services to the application or user for them to 
decide what service to employ.
5.1.2 Service Discovery Protocols for MANETs
Service discovery protocols for mobile ad hoc networks and ubiquitous computing environments 
have been extensively studied recently due to the importance that the scientific community and 
the industry have given to user-oriented environments, where the network is principally seen a 
collection of nodes working in a collective and cooperative manner to provide services that make 
users’ tasks and goals simpler to execute and accomplish. However, this subsection reviews only 
three approaches which represent just a small subset of the large amount of service discovery 
schemes available in the literature.
Due to the dynamic nature of the topology of MANETs centralised approaches are generally not 
used in these environments. However, fully distributed approaches tend to generate a lot of 
network overhead, which does not make them ideal to scale to large networks. Thus, a common 
approach in MANETs is to use hybrid service discovery strategies where a subset of the network 
nodes -  generally known as the dominating set -  is selected to act as an array of service 
repositories where service providers can keep information about their offered services. One such 
approach is the fully distributed mediator based service location protocol presented in [140]. The
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idea of the mediator based technique is to form clusters by scattering mediators (i.e. service 
repositories) in those network areas where service providers are present while leaving other 
network areas untouched. In this approach, when a service provider has to transmit information 
for the first time it checks if it has heard of any mediators in its neighbourhood. If it has, it stays 
as service provider and registers its services with any mediators it is aware of. If it has not, it 
becomes itself a mediator and periodically advertises its mediator services to its local 
neighbourhood. Then, when a client needs a service it can query local mediators for the required 
service. However, this approach can lead to an unconnected set of virtual clusters and it is not 
clear how clients can contact services out of their local clusters.
Another distributed architecture based on the selection of a dominating set is that proposed in 
[141]. This solution proposes to tackle the problem in two phases: a backbone management 
(BBM) phase and a distributed service discovery (DSD) phase. The BBM phase aims at creating a 
small size (not necessarily optimum) and relatively stable backbone. After this phase is completed 
network nodes are either virtual access points (VAPs) or routers between VAPs. The selection 
algorithm is such that any two VAPs are separated by two or three hops i.e. one or two routers are 
present between any two VAPs. Additionally, VAP nodes are required to maintain a directory to 
keep a record of registered services. Once the VAPs have been selected the DSD phase starts. In 
this phase service providers register their services with at least one VAP. Then, when a client 
requires a service it sends a request to a VAP (which is never more than a hop away thanks to the 
VAP selection process). If the VAP has a service matching the query it sends back a response 
with the service location, otherwise it passes on the request to other VAPs which repeat the 
process.
Unlike the previous two approaches, Konark [142] is a fully distributed service discovery protocol 
in which every network node behaves as a peer, i.e. it behaves as both a service provider and a 
client. The dual role can be assumed by any of the nodes at any time depending on the demanding 
operations given by the different applications spread throughout the network. Each device has a 
Konark Service Discovery Protocol Manager (SDPM) which performs three essential tasks: i) 
discovers services on behalf of Konark applications, ii) advertises a device’s own services, and iii) 
keeps a service registry with information about remote (in other devices) and local (in the same 
device) services available in the network. The service registry is organised in a tree-like structure 
where higher levels represent generic service categories while the lower levels are closer to 
concrete services. In fact, the lowest level in the tree structure consists of those components that 
represent actual services.
Konark uses two methods to carry out service discovery. The first one is passive push. This model 
is followed by peers that wish to offer services to others. They advertise their services periodically 
to a multicast address that is listened to by all peers having a Konark SDPM. The second method,
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active pull, is performed by peers that are in need of a service. Peers looking for a particular 
service send out a discovery message on a fixed multicast group. Then, nodes with services 
matching the query reply including the necessary service information. When a peer receives a 
reply it updates its own service registry and passes to the application layer the list o f services 
matching the service request. Finally, aiming at reducing network overhead, nodes can overhear 
each other’s replies. Thus, a node avoids responding with redundant service information that has 
been included in other nodes’ replies to the same service request [142].
5.2 Home-Zone Based Service Discovery Mechanism
We now introduce a location-based clustering approach (virtual clusters) and a home-zone based 
service discovery mechanism, which were originally published in [129]. We then show in this 
Section how the virtual cluster and home-zone concepts can also be applied to node location 
discovery for routing purposes, as originally proposed in [143]. In Section 5.3 we will show how 
these concepts, in turn, can be integrated with our proposed protection scheme to improve its 
scalability. Although the virtual clustering approach [143] and the home-zone strategy [144] were 
previously proposed, to the best of our knowledge, work in [129] and in this Section is the first to 
employ such concepts in a area different to routing protocols.
The basic idea of our scheme is to dynamically assign service repository functionality to certain 
nodes located in certain pre-defined network locations (i.e. home-zones) so that they become 
responsible for keeping information on a particular service or set of services. This strategy enables 
nodes providing a service Sq to update their details and those of the provided service -  address, 
location, service description, etc -  with those nodes that have been specifically selected to be 
service repositories for service Sq, regardless of the service provider’s location or degree of 
mobility. Also, any clients requiring service Sq can contact the same selected service repositories 
and get the details of those nodes providing service Sq. This strategy improves scalability in a 
number of ways. First, it minimises superfluous flooding, secondly it prevents control messages 
from traversing unnecessary parts of the network, and thirdly it minimises the latency involved in 
the service discovery process.
5.2.1 Clustering and Service Discovery
It has been shown that routing protocols that use approximate location information scale better 
than topology-based routing protocols [143]. This motivates us to use geographic location 
information in our service discovery mechanism for scalability reasons. Thus, our proposed 
approach assumes that a node is capable of acquiring its network location through either a GPS or 
a GPS-free positioning system, and that such a node advertises its position to its neighbours
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through periodical HELLO packets. This approach allows network nodes to know not only their 
own position but also the current position of its neighbours. When a source node desires to send a 
packet to a destination node it must first obtain the destination’s position. This could be done, for 
example, by broadcasting a location request (LREQ) to which the destination can respond with a 
location reply (LREP). However, our approach uses a more effective method to locate destination 
nodes which is also based on the concept of home-zones, which we introduce later. Once the 
source knows the destination’s location it appends it to the data packet to be sent, calculates which 
of its neighbours is the closest to the destination (since it knows its neighbours’ positions), and 
transmits the data packet to that neighbour. The node receiving the packet follows the same steps, 
i.e. finds the next closest hop to the destination and forwards the packet to it, and the process is 
repeated until the destination is reached. This is a conceptual illustration of how data forwarding 
is achieved in our network model.
Our approach also makes use of the virtual cluster principles proposed in [143]. The idea is that a 
geographical area is divided into equal regions of squared shape in a systematic way, so that each 
mobile node can determine the square it resides in if its location information is available. For this 
purpose we assume that i) each node has a clear picture of the network dimensions and its virtual 
clusters at the instant the network starts operating, ii) each virtual cluster has a unique identifier 
VCid, iii) nodes get their location information through either a GPS or GPS-free positioning 
system, iv) each network service has a unique service identifier Sm, and v) there exists a universal 
hash-function that maps every service to a specific virtual cluster based on its service identifier 
S/d- Nodes that have a service to offer (or service providers) are responsible to register their 
service with the corresponding virtual cluster and according to the network hash-function as 
explained later in this Section. Also, service providers may move about the network possibly 
changing virtual clusters on a constant basis, but the virtual cluster they are associated with 
remains the same. By contrast, nodes located in a particular virtual cluster act as service 
repositories for one or more services. However, when a service repository changes virtual 
clusters, it stops being repository for the set of services associated with its old virtual cluster, and 
becomes repository for a new set of services associated with its new virtual cluster. This means 
that the service repository functionality of a node varies depending on its location. For example, a 
node v, in virtual cluster VCa may work as service repository for the service Sq (regardless of the 
location of Sq and the virtual cluster SC] is in); while if it moves to virtual cluster VCb it may 
function as service repository for service Sr.
Figure 5-1 illustrates how the assumptions above work. All network nodes are aware of the 
network dimensions and the coordinates defining each virtual cluster. Consequently, if a node is 
capable of acquiring its position with a GPS or GPS-free mechanism, it is also able to work out in 
which virtual cluster it is physically located. Then when a service provider has a service to offer
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and wants to make it available to other network nodes, it uses the service identifier ( S id)  to 
calculate the virtual cluster ( VCID) in which it has to register and update its service. In Figure 5-1 
node V45 offers service S u  and it has calculated that VC 3 is the virtual cluster where this service 
m ust be registered/updated (we explain later how this calculation can be done). The figure also 
shows that nodes in VC3 (v ,^ V7, vn , vyj and vjg) are service repositories for service Su- Later when 
node v# wishes to use service Su  it can also calculate that virtual cluster VC3 is responsible for 
keeping information on this service by using the standard hash-function. Thus, node v# contacts a 
node in VC3 to obtain the location o f  a node providing service Su.
In our scheme each node has its own service repository. The service repository functionality for a 
given service Sjo is assigned to nodes located in a virtual cluster that has a unique identifier VCuj. 
Accordingly, every node residing in that virtual cluster is responsible for m aintaining the details 
o f service SID in its service repository. This means that each virtual cluster becomes a home-zone 
for a particular collection o f services. Since our mechanism requires all nodes to store service 
information about some other service providers, it can be classified as an all-for-som e approach, 
which can scale well [143].
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Figure 5-1 H om e-zone based service d iscovery approach
Our home-zone based service discovery strategy employs a hash-function to map a service 
identifier to a corresponding virtual cluster. The selected hash-function m ust ensure an equally
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distributed load on all virtual clusters; otherwise it may produce increased traffic in some virtual 
clusters and cause congestion. Equation 5-1 illustrates the hash-function concept.
hash-function( Sid )  = hf( Sid )  = VCid (5-1)
An example of a suitable hash-function is the modulo operation (a mod b), which finds the 
reminder of a division between two given numbers -  modulo is the hash-function used in the 
examples and simulations of this Chapter. Equation 5-2 shows an example where the modulo 
operation is used along with the service identifier (Sid) and the number of clusters in the network 
(VC#) to find the virtual cluster (V C id )  where the service S id  details should be registered and 
updated, i.e. the virtual cluster that is the home-zone of service S]D.
hf(S]D)  = ( S id  mod VC#) + 1 = VCJD (5-2)
In our approach each service provider first needs to identify the corresponding set of service 
repositories (i.e. virtual cluster) for each service it provides by applying the hash-function of 
Equation 5-1 to each service identifier (S id ), and then it registers and updates the service location 
with nodes in that cluster. In our scheme the service location update mechanism is mobility driven 
as well as time-driven. A static node sends, service updates in a periodic manner to its home-zone 
while a node on the move sends its updates depending on its speed -  the faster it moves the more 
often it updates its location. This mechanism aims at ensuring that the service location 
information maintained in service repositories is fresh and correct.
Another characteristic of our service discovery strategy is that service updates (which are used to 
register and update the location of a service) and service requests are unicast towards the centre of 
their corresponding virtual cluster. Service replies, on the other hand, are unicast towards the 
location of the node that sent the service request. This unicast approach prevents control messages 
from traversing unnecessary parts of the network. Once a service update reaches its intended 
home-zone it is not unicast anymore towards its centre, instead the first node receiving the service 
update stores the new information in its service repository and, through cluster-wide flooding, 
informs other nodes within the same cluster so that they can update their repositories.
Whenever a client node is interested in a particular service it makes use of the same hash function 
used by service providers to determine the home-zone associated with the needed service. Then it 
sends a service request towards the calculated virtual cluster in order to contact any o f its service 
repositories (i.e. nodes in the virtual cluster). In our scheme a service reply can be initiated by 
service repositories in the home-zone, the service provider itself (if the service request happens to 
pass through it) or any intermediate node as long as it contains “fresh” information about the 
service being requested. In the worst case, when a querying node has not received any response 
within a pre-specified period of time after having tried for a pre-specified number of times, it will 
start gradually flooding its service request in the network following an expanding search
117
A Collusion-Resistant Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation Approach
approach. This may happen, for example, due to the fact that a given service’s home-zone is 
currently empty.
Let us apply this algorithm to Figure 5-1. In the figure V45 is a service provider offering service Su  
(e.g. a colour printer). If we assume that Sjd = ID then we have that for service Su = 11. Also, for 
Figure 5-1 VC# = 9 since the network consists of 9 virtual clusters. Consequently, when node v45 
wants to advertise its service Su  it uses our example hash-function as follows:
h f(Sn )  = h f ( U ) = (11 m od9) + 1  = 2  + 1  =3 ->VC3
In this way node v45 determines that it must send its service update packets to virtual cluster VC3 
(it actually sends the updates to the geographical centre of VC3), which is the home-zone of 
service Su, as shown in Figure 5-1. It can also be seen that in VC3 the first node to receive the 
service update is vjg, which takes care of letting other cluster nodes know of the updated location 
of node v45. Also, in the figure node v«, which is a service client, needs to use service Su. 
Subsequently, it utilises the hash-function in exactly the same way the service provider V45 did, 
and it therefore finds that the home-zone of service Su  is virtual cluster VC3. Node then sends a 
service request to VC3 (directed to its geographical centre) which is promptly replied to by the 
first node in VC3 to receive the request, i.e. node vj2. The reply travels back towards node v$ 
containing a list of network nodes offering service Su. Finally, node v# chooses the closest service 
to itself, or optionally the decision can be left to the user counterpart for them to decide which 
service is more convenient, e.g. the printer closest to the exit as they are about to go out to a lunch 
meeting.
The process described above can be extended to be used in other scenarios besides service 
discovery. For example, in this Chapter we use the home-zone concept to assist our selected 
location-based routing protocol in finding a destination’s location, in the same way that is done in 
[143]. In this case every network node applies a hash-function to its own network ID  (e.g. IP 
address) to discover which virtual cluster is to become its home-zone. Consequently every virtual 
cluster is selected as the home-zone for a subset of network nodes in the same way that it happens 
for services, and the subset of network nodes a node is responsible for depends solely on which 
virtual cluster it is. In our approach network nodes must periodically send location updates to their 
corresponding home-zones to ensure that possible enquiring nodes can obtain their current 
location. On the other hand, source nodes wishing to find a destination apply the hash-function to 
the destination’s ID to work out the destination’s home-zone. Then, source nodes send a Location 
Request (LREQ) to the destination’s home-zone and obtain back a Location Response (LRES) 
with the destination’s location. After this, data packet forwarding occurs as described in the first 
paragraph of this Section (5.2.1).
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5.2.2 Evaluation Results and Analysis
We perform our simulations in the GloMoSim network simulator [48] [49]. For comparison 
purposes we have implemented a fully distributed service discovery mechanism that works in the 
same fashion as AODV. In this approach when a node needs a service it broadcasts a service 
request packet with a very low TTL (time to live) so that the packet can not travel more than a 
few hops. Nodes having a matching service may reply to the request -  provided they are willing 
to offer their services. If after a pre-defined time no service replies are received, the requesting 
node broadcasts a new request with a larger TTL in order to cover a greater area. In the absence of 
replies this process is repeated a couple of times (each time with a larger TTL) and as last resort 
the requesting node executes a network wide broadcast in an attempt to find the needed service. In 
our simulations we use TTL = 1,3 and 5 before attempting a network wide broadcast. The fully 
distributed approach described in this paragraph is evaluated with two different underlying 
routing protocols: AODV [59] [60] and home-zone based geo-casting (HZGC) [143]. Our reason 
to evaluate the fully distributed approach with HZGC as its routing protocol is that HZGC is the 
underlying routing protocol used by our home-zone based service discovery (HZSD) strategy, 
thus this decision brings fairness to our evaluation.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, our simulation parameters takes the following values: i) Nodes 
move according to the random waypoint mobility model with a constant speed chosen uniformly 
between 0 and 10 m/sec, this yields an average node speed of 5 m/sec and a standard deviation of 
2.89 m/sec, ii) the wireless transmission range of every node is 100 metres iii) the node density is 
5x1 O'4 nodes/m2, iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) the MAC layer protocol is IEEE 802.11 DCF, 
vi) the total simulation time for each scenario is 300 seconds, and vii) the hash-function utilised is 
that of Equation 5-2.. Additionally, at simulation start time nodes are selected as service providers 
with a 50% probability, thus about half the nodes offer services. A service provider randomly 
selects only one of the twelve possible services to offer, and all services have an equal chance of 
being selected by a service provider. All network nodes can become clients at some point during 
the simulation. Nodes remain inactive during a uniformly selected period of time between 10 and 
15 seconds. After this period they decide to make a service request with 70% probability. Then, 
regardless of whether they decide or not to request a service, they go inactive for another 
randomly selected period between 10 to 15 seconds. This process is repeated through the 
simulation time and provider nodes are not permitted to request the same service that they are 
offering.
The principal metrics of interest to evaluate our scheme are network control overhead and service 
discovery latency. Control overhead is defined here as the control traffic generated as part of the
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service discovery processes only, i.e. control overhead associated with the routing algorithms 
AODV and HZGC are not included.
The objective o f our first set o f  simulations is to assess the scalability o f  our service discovery 
approach in terms o f the increasing node-count. In order to properly see the effect o f  increasing 
the num ber o f  nodes on the simulated service discovery schemes, the terrain-area is also 
proportionally increased so that the average node density is kept constant. The num ber o f nodes 
for this simulation set is 20, 80, 180, 320, 500 and 720 for terrain-area sizes o f  200x200 n r ,  
400x400 m2, 600x600 m2, 800x800 m2, 1000x1000 m2 and 1200x1200 n r  respectively. Our 
simulation figures show the results for the fully distributed approach with AODV and HZGC 
routing, and for our home zone service discovery strategy.
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Figure 5-2 depicts the average control overhead incurred by the service discovery schem es as a 
function o f  increasing number o f  nodes in the network. It can be observed that the tw o fully 
distributed approaches performed similarly. However, the approach em ploying hom e-zone based 
geo-casting (HZGC) routing offers a slight improvement. The fully distributed approach does not 
benefit greatly from HZGC since its service discovery phase is based on broadcasting, which is 
the main source o f  control overhead. Additionally, the inherent w orking m echanism  o f  the 
underlying MAC layer protocol, i.e. IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF), 
exacerbates the problem. In IEEE 802.11 DCF when a collision occurs the nodes try to retransm it 
creating even more traffic which congests the network rapidly. As a result, the control overhead o f 
the fully distributed approaches display a sharp increase when the num ber o f  netw ork nodes
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increases beyond 100. On the other hand, our home-zone based service discovery mechanism 
offers a significant reduction in netw ork overhead when compared to the fully distributed 
strategy. As already stated, our home-zone service discovery mechanism em ploys HZGC routing 
and broadcasting is only used when strictly necessary, e.g. when a service cannot be found by 
querying the corresponding home-zone. For this reason, our proposed approach introduces very 
little control overhead in the network.
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Figure 5-3 A verage service discovery latency vs. num ber o f nodes in the netw ork
Figure 5-3 shows the average latency involved to successfully discovery and contact a service as a 
function o f  the increasing node count. The latency for our simulations is defined as the time 
elapsed between the instant a service client sends a service request up to the m om ent the service 
client receives an acknowledgement from a service provider confirming that it was successfully 
contacted. Additionally, we only display information for services that are successfully contacted. 
Any failures to contact a service, e.g. due to a lost service request or service reply, are not 
included in our calculations. In this respect, the figure does not represent the success rate o f  the 
service discovery strategies, but it indicates how long in average a service client takes to 
successfully contact a service provider. Figure 5-3 shows that our hom e-zone based service 
discovery approach outperforms the fully distributed strategy. However, a gradual increase is seen 
on our schem e’s curve when the number o f network nodes goes over 300. This behaviour can be 
linked to collisions, and their consequent retransmissions, o f  some service requests and replies 
due to increased network traffic, which delays the final acknowledgem ent from the service 
provider.
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The second set o f  results show how network control overhead and service discovery latency react 
to changes in the mean node speed. For these simulations we consider a network consisting o f  300 
nodes spread over an area o f 1000x1000 m2, which yields a node density o f  3x1 O'4 nodes/m 2. The 
mean node speed is then gradually increased from 0 m/sec up to 20 m/sec in steps o f  2 m/sec. 
This time the minimum and maximum speeds are set such that the standard deviation is always 
0.58 m/sec.
CD
>o
c 6
o
°  4
i_O
£  2
Fully Distributed - AODV 
Fully Distributed - HZGC 
Home-Zone Service Discovery
10 12 14 16 18 20
Mean Node Speed [meter/sec]
Figure 5-4 A verage netw ork control overhead vs. mean node speed  
(300 node netw ork)
1.8 
1.6 
1.4
1.2
1 4 ---------
o
CD 
10
>% o c
Si <0 _l 
CD 
0 5  
CO
S3 0.6 4 - - - -  
>
<
0.8
0.4
0.2
Fully Distributed - AODV 
Fully Distributed-HZGC 
Home-Zone Service Discovery
10 12 14 16 18 20
Mean Node Speed [meter/sec]
Figure 5-5 A verage service discovery latency vs. m ean node speed  
(300 node netw ork)
122
A Collusion-Resistant Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation Approach
Figure 5-4 shows that the network overhead is relatively unaffected by the nodes’ mean speed. 
Also, unlike Figure 5-2, the fully distributed approach using HZGC routing introduces much less 
control overhead in the network than its AODV routing counterpart. Because the fully distributed 
approach and AODV rely both on broadcasting there is a higher chance that they saturate the 
network quicker, which leads to increased collisions. In this situation, as already mentioned, the 
IEEE 802.11 DCF protocol reacts by trying to inject even more packets in the network, thus 
generating an abrupt increase in the network overhead. This same explanation applies to Figure 
5-5 since more collisions result in more service requests and replies being lost, subsequently 
delaying the communication between service clients and service providers.
Our final set o f  simulations aims at illustrating the effect that the population o f  service providers 
can have on network control overhead and service discovery latency. The sim ulated network 
consists o f  100 nodes confined to an area o f  600x600 n r  while the mean speed rem ains constant a 
5 m/sec with a standard deviation o f  2.89 m/sec. The percentage o f service providers is increased 
from 10% to 80% o f  the total num ber o f  network nodes.
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Figure 5-6 N etw ork control overhead vs. service providers percentage 
(100 node netw ork)
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 show that the only approach affected by the num ber o f  service providers in 
the network is the fully distributed approach em ploying AODV routing. Again the broadcasting 
nature o f  the fully distributed approach and AODV routing together generates enough traffic to 
rapidly saturate the network and lead it to a state where nodes constantly try to retransm it their 
packets unsuccessfully. This yields a lot o f  network control overhead and the subsequent 
collisions produce a large average latency since contact between service clients and service
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providers is delayed. The other two curves in both figures seem to be fairly independent from the 
num ber o f  service providers available in the network as only a tiny upwards trend can be 
observed. Finally, the figures dem onstrate that the lowest network control overhead and average 
latency is exhibited by our proposed home-zone service discovery strategy.
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This Section has demonstrated the advantages o f using the virtual clustering and hom e-zone based 
strategies to reduce network overhead and improve service discovery latency, especially when 
compared to approaches making use o f  AODV and other broadcast-based techniques to provide 
service discovery. Additionally, these results offer a general idea o f  the benefits that virtual 
clustering can bring to the protection scheme proposed in this thesis in term s o f  its scalability, 
while the home-zone based strategy can provide an effective and efficient way to keep track o f  the 
location o f manager nodes. Section 5.3.1 describes in detail how these concepts are integrated 
with the misbehaviour detection and node accusation algorithms.
5.3 Collusion and Liar Resistant Packet Forwarding 
Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation
This Section introduces two m odifications targeting two different aspects o f  the protection 
scheme described in Chapter 4. It is our view that these m odifications provide for a strong 
misbehaviour detection and accusation scheme that can cope with issues that have not been 
addressed in the previous chapters o f  this thesis. The first o f our m odifications (Section 5.3.1)
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seeks to improve the scalability of our approach by employing the position-based clustering 
algorithm presented in Section 5.2. We then extend this idea to propose an improved method to 
select cluster heads in the network and obtain a more efficient solution in comparison to the 
clustering approach described in Section 4.2.1. Additionally, by using the home-zone concept 
presented in Section 5.2 the network can keep track of all manager nodes in a well-organised 
manner. The second modification affects our misbehaviour detection algorithm. We introduce the 
concept of discrepancies which allows our scheme to prevent wrong accusations due to nodes that 
lie about their metrics (i.e. nodes that are liars, Section 5.3.2) and offers a predefined degree of 
resilience to colluding nodes (Section 5.3.3).
5.3.1 Improved Scalability: Clustering and Election of Cluster Heads
Adaptability is brought to our protection scheme by means of a hierarchical management plane 
that has cluster nodes (CNs) at its bottom tier, cluster heads (CHs) in its middle tier, and manager 
nodes (MNs) at its top tier. As stated in Section 4.2.2, in ubiquitous computing environments 
(UCEs) MNs and CHs can be statically assigned by a network administrator to satisfy network 
deployment issues. However, this is not always possible and the assignment of these roles can 
also be partially or completely dynamic. Our approach’s hierarchy has two main objectives: 
efficiently distribute and enforce network management policies defined at MNs, and accurately 
and effectively collect the behaviour metrics of nodes actively intervening in the communication 
process. Consequently, a well organised selection of MNs and CHs can result in a reduction of 
control overhead associated to our scheme and in a more effective manner to distribute policies 
and gather behaviour metrics. In our strategy we assume that there exists a small number of MNs 
(static or mobile) that have been assigned by a network administrator and are therefore trusted 
entities; this assumption remains as in Chapter 4. These MNs serve as network management 
policies definition points, which are used by a high level entity (i.e. an application or a network 
administrator) to define or modify policies to be applied to a UCE. The selection o f CHs, on the 
other hand, is left to our clustering algorithm.
The clustering algorithm introduced in Section 4.2.1 is not veiy efficient in terms of the potential 
number of nodes that may be elected CHs in the network. For example, if  we consider the 
network topology depicted in Figure 5-8, it can be observed that the number of CHs, which are 
the nodes belonging to the connected dominating set, can be considerably higher than the number 
of CNs. In the figure the relation of CHs to CNs is 3:1, i.e. 75% of the nodes have been selected 
as CHs even after applying the optimisation rules of Section 4.2.1. Additionally there are two 
subtle but important problems that can be highlighted by analysing Figure 5-8. The first is that 
due to their neighbourhood conditions, nodes in the figure do not have a chance to apply their 
capability function CF(Vj) in order to select the most capable nodes as CHs. This proves that the
125
A Collusion-Resistant Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation Approach
selection o f capable (“good enough”) CHs can be limited by neighbourhood conditions, as stated 
in the introduction o f this Chapter. The second problem is that 8 out o f  the 12 selected CHs do not 
have any CNs associated to them. This is very inefficient, especially if  a reactive routing protocol 
such as AODV is used. In this case, after collecting their local metrics all 12 nodes will need to 
broadcast a route request to find a MN to which report their collected metrics, and after all this 
effort there are 8 CHs that will only report metrics about them selves since they do not have any 
associated CNs, i.e. they did not collect any metrics apart from their own. A sim ilar situation 
occurs with the distribution o f  network managem ent policies. MNs distribute new policies to CHs 
to be enforced on themselves and their associated CNs. However, in Figure 5-8 half the nodes (i.e. 
the CHs without associated CNs) only have to enforce the policies on them selves, which is a clear 
indication that some o f  them could be CNs instead.
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Figure 5-8 C lustering -  Exam ple o f inefficient CHs selection
The problems exhibited by the example o f  Figure 5-8 have motivated us to look for alternative 
options. A more efficient clustering approach has been introduced in Section 5.2 as part o f  our 
work on service discovery mechanisms, and in this Section we illustrate how it can be m odified to 
account for the requirements o f our protection scheme. Additionally, its location-based routing 
protocol paired with our home-zone concept applied to the discovery o f  a destination’s location 
permits our approach to scale better than when using topology-based routing algorithm s such as 
AODV, which is used in the evaluation results o f  previous chapters.
The idea applied to our new clustering approach is similar to that o f  Section 5.2. We assum e that 
every network node has a clear picture o f the distribution and area covered by each virtual cluster 
in addition to the network dimensions. Each virtual cluster has a unique identifier VC/d and nodes 
get their location information through either a GPS or GPS-free positioning system. This last 
assumption is very reasonable since nowadays devices capable o f  calculating their geographic 
position are very common. For example, many mobile phones offer map services highlighting the 
user’s current position. Some o f  them use GPS systems and others do it by calculating their 
distance from near by Wi-Fi hotspots or cellular towers. Once a node has acquired its position it 
can work out in which virtual cluster it currently is physically located. Figure 5-9 illustrates a 
network that has been clustered em ploying the virtual clusters notion. However, unlike virtual 
clusters o f Section 5.2 (see Figure 5-1), in every virtual cluster o f Figure 5-9 a leader or cluster
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head (CH) has been elected: v8 in FCy, v4 in VC2, vI3 in VC3, vJ5 in VC4, v24 in VC5, v26 in F Q , v47 
in VC7, v37 in VC8 and v45 in VCg. CHs are then responsible for collecting m etrics and enforcing 
network management policies in CNs within their own virtual cluster.
Location
Update
Manager Node 
Cluster Head 
Cluster Node
The cluster head selection process is as follows: new nodes in a virtual cluster (because they just 
moved in or started up) query their neighbours for the ID and location o f  the current CH; if  they 
receive no reply they send a virtual cluster wide broadcast query. After a node sends these two 
queries there are two possible situations: i) it receives a reply with the ID and location o f  the CH, 
or ii) it receives no replies. In the first case the new node registers as a CN with the CH. In the 
second case the node triggers a cluster head election process by broadcasting within its virtual 
cluster a Cluster Election Packet (CEP). Nodes receiving a CEP calculate their capability function 
CF(vj and inform other virtual cluster nodes o f  its value. Then the node v, with the higher 
capability function CF(v,) is elected as CH while the rest become CNs and register as such with 
the CH. Nodes include in their registration packets their location and the value o f their capability 
function. In this way when a CH changes virtual cluster it can determ ine from its stored 
information the most capable node in its old virtual cluster. Next, it informs about the CH change 
to nodes in its old virtual cluster by sending them a Changeover Packet (COP). The COP packet is 
initially unicast towards the old virtual cluster and then broadcast within it, thus inform ing every 
node in the cluster o f the CH change. The new CH assumes its new responsibilities and the CNs
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associate with it. Meanwhile the old CH marks its own role as CN and starts the process that all 
new nodes follow when they arrive to a new cluster.
As implied above a node’s capability function CFfa) plays a major part in electing the most 
appropriate nodes to be CHs in their respective virtual clusters. Unlike the approach presented in 
Chapter 4, where the capability function has limited influence in the selection o f CHs because it is 
used as part of an optimisation rule, in our new clustering approach this function is the only 
driving force to elect cluster heads, which emphasises its importance. The capability function 
employed to elect appropriate cluster heads is presented in Equation 5-3 below.
y = w1PP(vi) + w2M EM (vi) + w3PVCC(vi) 
wAMR{vj) + w5AL{vi)
Equation 5-3 shows that our capability function depends on five node properties: processing 
power (PP(Vj)), memory capacity {MEM(vJ), mobility ratio (MR(Vj)), proximity to the virtual 
cluster centre (PVCC(Vj)), and accusation likelihood (AL(Vj)). Properties PP (vt)  and MEM(yi) were 
first introduced in Chapter 4 and their definition remains exactly as in Section 4.2.1. Property 
MR(Vf) was also introduced in the same section and it was associated with a node v;’s average 
frequency of link breaks with its neighbours. However, in this Section M R fa )  is associated instead 
with the average frequency with which node v, changes virtual clusters. As can be deduced from 
Equation 5-3 the more often a node changes virtual clusters the less ideal it is to become a CH. By 
contrast, a node that resides in a virtual cluster for a long time is a good cluster head choice since 
its election would result in fewer changeovers and CH elections, thus reducing network overhead 
and providing cluster stability.
Property PVCC(Vj) in the context of Equation 5-3 expresses the convenience that represents to 
have the elected node as close as possible to the virtual cluster centre so that it can be easily 
reached by all nodes in the cluster. While this property is not essential, we include it so that 
between two nodes of similar capabilities and characteristics the one closest to the virtual cluster 
centre is favoured to be elected as CH. The final property AL(vj) is closely related to the concept 
of discrepancies introduced later in Section 5.3.2. The basic idea is that the more discrepancies a 
node v, exhibits the higher its accusation likelihood is. High likelihoods of accusation are one of 
the characteristics of misbehaving nodes, which are targeted by our approach to isolate them from 
the network. Consequently, property AL(Vj) in Equation 5-3 expresses our approach’s 
unwillingness to accept a probably misbehaving node as a virtual cluster’s CH. After all, the node 
will soon be isolated from the network and a new cluster head election would be necessary.
Just as in Section 4.2.1 each variable in Equation 5-3 is normalised to a value range of (0, 1] by 
dividing them by their maximum values. Weights wj, W2, W3, w 4 and W5 are assigned values 
according to the importance of their pairing variables in the definition of the capability function
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CF(Vj). Nevertheless, the weight value assignment should be done such that the sum of w j, W2 and 
W3 is equal to 1, and the same applies for weights w 4 and W5.
In our approach metrics are reported in a periodic manner in a similar fashion to the one described 
in Chapter 4 (as explained later in Section 5.3.2). This implies that CHs contact MNs to report 
their local information and they must have a way to acquire the MNs’ location. We propose that 
MNs have a home-zone just a service does in Section 5.2. However, instead of applying a 
hash-function MNs can have one or more predefined and well-known home-zones. Thus, MNs 
can update their home-zones on their locations in the same fashion that services do in Section 5.2 
(i.e. time and mobility driven). This concept is illustrated in Figure 5-9 where node v?, which for 
simplicity is the only MN in the network, is updating its location with virtual cluster VC5, which 
in this network is the unique well-known home-zone for all manager nodes. On the other hand, 
CHs can contact those well-known home-zones to obtain the list of MNs in the network and their 
respective locations. Then, each CH chooses its closest MN and sends to it its local metrics report.
5.3.2 Dealing with liars: Discrepancy-based Detection and Accusation
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 misbehaviour detection was based on a modified version of the 
principle of conservation of flow (Equation 3-2). This approach gathers the metrics provided by 
the neighbourhood Uj of a node vj in order to evaluate its behaviour. However, node v4 does not 
have a say in its own behaviour. This can be a problem because a node vp which is a neighbour of 
Vj may be a liar, i.e. vp may be a node providing false metrics about node v4 in an attempt to get vy- 
accused and isolated from the network. For example, vp may claim to have transmitted x  packets 
to node y, for y, to forward, when in fact vp did not transmit any packets to y,. Consequently, node 
Vj may be persistently detected as a misbehaving node and eventually accused and isolated from 
the network without giving vy a chance to “tell its own side of the story”. In this Section we 
propose an approach that provides for a fairer detection and accusation system that also offers a 
predefined degree of resilience against colluding nodes.
We propose that all network nodes maintain a table with four metrics: T y , T t *, F};- and F j* . Metric 
T y  is the number of packets that node v; claims to have sent to node Vj for vj to forward. Metric T j  
is the number of packets that node vj claims that node v, has actually sent to it for it to forward. 
Metric is the number of packets that node v, claims that node vf has forwarded to it. Metric F j*  
is the number of packets that node v, claims that it has actually forwarded to node v,. In other 
words, Tjf and F j*  are the metrics reported by the node under evaluation, i.e. “its own side of the 
story”. Cluster nodes report these four metrics in a periodic manner to their CHs, which store this 
information, wait for all registered CNs to report their metrics, and forward it to the network 
MNs. A clear difference with our approach of Chapter 4 is that CHs and MNs do not aggregate
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any metrics; instead they have four matrices -  one for each type o f  metric -  in which they store 
individual values. In every m atrix rows and columns represent network nodes related to the values 
stored in each cell [row, column]. Rows represent claiming nodes and columns represent nodes 
involved in the claim. This concept is illustrated in Figure 5-11 that shows the m atrices that an 
MN would keep in its memory for the forwarding multihop network o f Figure 5-10 where node vy 
has sent 100 UDP packets to node v3, and it has also received 200 UDP packets sent by node v3.
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Figure 5-10 M ultihop packet transm ission between two netw ork nodes
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 100 200
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 200 0 0 0
5 0 100 200 0 0
b) Matrix T*
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 200 100
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 200 100 0 0 0
5 0 200 100 0 0
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 100 0
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3 0 0 0 0 200
4 0 100 0 0 0
5 0 200 0 0 0
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 200 0
2 0 0 0 100 200
3 0 0 0 0 100
4 0 200 0 0 0
5 0 100 0 0 0
c) Matrix F d) Matrix F*
Figure 5-11 M atrices corresponding to the m ultihop packet transm ission o f  Figure 5-10
From Figure 5-11 we see that in matrix T  the metric T42, which is stored in the cell [4, 2], is equal 
to 100 and it is read as follows: “node v4 claims to have sent 100 packets to node v2 for v2 to 
forward”. Likewise, in m atrix T* metric T42 , which is stored in the cell [2, 4], tell us that “node v2 
claims that v4 has sent to it 100 packets for it to forw ard” or alternatively “node v2 claim s to have 
received 100 packets from v4 for v2 to forward”. Similar analyses apply to metrics in m atrices F  
and F *.
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A characteristic of our model is that in an ideal network, such as that of Figure 5-10, the following 
equations hold (the superscriptT stands for the transpose of a matrix):
f  = f  and Fr = F*
Or alternatively:
(T*)t = T and (F*)r = F
However, in real environments packet losses occur in an unintentional manner and it is necessary 
to account for such losses. This notion is depicted by Equations 5-4 and 5-5:
(1  (^threshold) ^ ij — Tij — ( I  ~ ^threshold) T y (5-4)
(1  (^threshold) F ji ^ F jj 'A. (1  - CCthreshold) F jj (5-5)
It is the task of MNs at behaviour evaluation time to go through the metric matrices checking that 
Equations 5-4 and 5-5 hold. If any of the two equations does not hold the MN performing the 
behaviour check records a behaviour discrepancy between nodes v, and vj. A discrepancy indicates 
that two nodes differ in their claims with regard to the number of packets transmitted to forward 
and forwarded by each other. A discrepancy may be due to one or more of several factors: packet 
loss owing to reasons other than a node’s own fault (e.g. a problem in the communication channel, 
a node is overloaded, broken, compromised, etc), a node is misbehaving by intentionally dropping
packets, a node is lying in its reported metrics about another node’s behaviour which is also
perceived as misbehaviour, or a combination of these factors. Figures 5-12 and 5-13 illustrate how 
misbehaviour is perceived at a MN when a misbehaving node drops 50% of the packets and then 
lies in its reported metrics (i.e. the node is a liar) in an attempt to incriminate neighbouring nodes. 
In Figure 5-12 node v2 forwards only 50 packets towards V5 and 100 packets towards v4 (values 
shown in black colour), but it reports having forwarded 100 and 200 packets respectively (values 
shown in red colour). In Figure 5-13 discrepancies are highlighted with red and blue colours. Red 
corresponds to the lying node while blue correspond to its well-behaved neighbours. For this 
example, by following the process described below and assuming that athreshoid < 50%, a MN finds 
two discrepancies for node v2, one for v4 and another one for vj.
Discrepancies have a valid time which for simplicity we express in values multiple of the report 
period (Treport). Consequently, if behaviour checks are performed every 60 seconds 
( J rep0rt = 60sec) the discrepancy valid time can take values such as 60, 120, 180 and 240 seconds, 
or any other value multiple of Treport. Manager nodes maintain a discrepancies table where each 
entry consists of 3 parameters: first node involved in the discrepancy, second node involved in the 
discrepancy, and the discrepancy expiry time. Thus, the process of recording a new discrepancy 
between two nodes v, and y, requires a MN to create an entry in its discrepancies table including 
V/, Vj and the discrepancy expiry time, which is equal to the current time plus the discrepancy valid
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time. However, before creating a new entry a MN checks whether a discrepancy for the same pair 
o f nodes already exists. If  it does not, a new entry is created. If  it does, the expiry time o f  the 
already existing entry is updated. This ensures that discrepancies between a same pair o f  nodes 
are counted only once regardless o f  how many times the discrepancy is detected.
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Figure 5-12 M ultihop netw ork transm ission w ith a liar that drops packets
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Figure 5-13 M atrices at M Ns when there is a liar dropping packets in the netw ork
After removing any stale entries (i.e. entries that have expired) from its discrepancies table, a MN 
goes through the table counting the number o f behaviour discrepancies exhibited by every node. If  
a node exceeds the discrepancies limit (LdiSCrepancies) established for its network, it is accused o f  
misbehaviour and isolated from the network. This process is carried out in a sim ilar fashion to that 
described in Section 4.2.3, i.e. MNs inform CHs o f  the accusation and in turn CHs enforce the 
respective policies on them selves and their registered CNs. However, if  the accused node is a CH, 
then the MN sends a special accusation packet towards the C H ’s virtual cluster. C luster nodes 
within the target cluster receive the special accusation packet and broadcast it in a cluster-w ide
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manner. This leads to the effective isolation of the current CH and CNs have to trigger a new CH 
election process. Other virtual clusters are informed of the accused CH node through the 
conventional medium, i.e. CHs are informed first. Next, the MN removes entries from its 
discrepancies table that are associated to the accused node. In this way nodes that were previously 
recorded because of their discrepancies with misbehaving nodes get their discrepancy count 
reduced by one.
This new discrepancy-based accusation scheme gives rise to a special case. A node that 
misbehaves by dropping packets but does not lie about its behaviour in its reported metrics is not 
detected by Equations 5-4 and 5-5. The network corresponding to this particular case is also 
depicted by Figure 5-12. However, this time we assume that node V2 reports its real metrics. 
Figure 5-14 shows the matrices obtained at MNs after the metrics collection procedure is carried 
out. Metrics in blue correspond to metrics somehow related to the misbehaving node, and as it can 
be seen from the figure, Equations 5-4 and 5-5 hold even for athreshoid = 0. In fact, for this example 
Tt  = T* and Fr = F*, i.e. the network exhibits the characteristics of an ideal network. For this 
reason it is necessary to check for one more characteristic that identifies a well-behaved node: the 
number of packets that it forwards should be equal (within a factor of athreshoid) to the number of 
packets it has received to forward. Consequently, Equation 5-6 must hold (where V is the set of all 
network nodes, as defined in Section 3.2.1):
(5-6)
V /]v,eV  V/'IVj-eF
Matrices T* and F* in Figure 5-14 include the results for the sum of the values in every row in an 
extra column named “Total”. Values for well-behaved nodes are given in green while values for 
misbehaving nodes are given in red. It can be seen that misbehaving node V2 claims to have 
forwarded 150 packets out of the 300 packets it claims to have received to forward. Consequently, 
the evaluating MN records a discrepancy between node v2 and itself, i.e. a self-discrepancy. Self­
discrepancies require a different treatment to ordinary discrepancies. If a MN were to update the 
expiiy time of a node’s self-discrepancy every time Equation 5-6 does not hold for that node, then 
the node could misbehave for ever and its reward for being honest would be to have only one 
“well-updated” entry in the discrepancies table. For this reason, every time a self-discrepancy 
occurs a new entry is created in addition to updating all the existing self-discrepancy entries for 
the misbehaving node. Thus, nodes that are honest but misbehave will have their discrepancy 
count increase by one every time a behaviour check is performed.
Due to the manner in which our new protection scheme detects discrepancies Equation 4-3, which 
was introduced in Section 4.2.3, can not be used to calculate a node’s probability of accusation. 
Equation 4-3 assumes that there can only be a single detection per behaviour check on every
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network node. However, in our new scheme in a single behaviour check a node can potentially 
exhibit multiple discrepancies with different nodes. It all depends on how many nodes have come 
across and com m unicated with the evaluated node in the last Tcheck period, and how many 
discrepancies are detected on it. This useful characteristic o f our approach allows for the 
accusation o f  a m isbehaving node in a single behaviour check provided that its num ber o f 
discrepancies exceeds the discrepancies limit (Ldiscrepancies) established for the network. 
Nevertheless, for the specific case o f an honest m isbehaving node that exhibits self-discrepancies, 
Equation 4-3 still applies since such a node gets a single self-discrepancy (i.e. detection) in every 
behaviour check, i.e. it requires o f Ldiscrepancies discrepancies (equivalent to md  m isbehaviour 
detections) out o f  ch behaviour checks for it to be accused o f misbehaviour.
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 100 200 300
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 100 0 0 0 200
5 0 50 200 0 0 250
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 100 0
2 0 0 0 100 50
3 0 0 e 0 200
4 0 100 0 0 0
5 0 200 0 0 0
a) Matrix T b) Matrix T *
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 100 50 150
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 100 0 0 0 200
5 0 200 50 0 0 250
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 0 0 100 0
2 0 0 0 100 200
3 0 0 0 0 50
4 0 100 0 0 0
5 0 50 0 0 0
c) Matiix F cl) Matrix F*
Figure 5-14 M atrices at M Ns w hen there is a non-lying node 
dropping packets in the netw ork
5.3.3 Addressing Collusion
The previous section has demonstrated the capability o f  our approach to detect liars, m isbehaving 
liars, and honest but misbehaving nodes. This Section shows through a series o f  exam ples that this 
approach can also resist the coordinated attack o f  a predefined num ber o f  colluding nodes.
Figure 5-15 shows a network where four colluding nodes (y4, v5, and v7) launch an active attack 
against node V2 in an attempt to get it isolated from the network by the security m echanism  in
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place. In this attack each o f  the colluding nodes reports to have sent 100 UDP packets to node v2. 
Thus, for the network o f Figure 5-15 M Ns will detect 4 discrepancies for v2 and ju st 1 for nodes 
v4, v5, v6 and v7. No self-discrepancies are detected since the colluding nodes can simply claim that 
they are sources rather than intermediate nodes. As was explained in the previous section, i f  every 
behaviour check detects the same discrepancies, no new discrepancy entries are created in the 
discrepancies table; instead old discrepancies corresponding to the same pairs o f  nodes are 
updated. Therefore, the discrepancy count for node v2 remains 4. This is a clear indication that if  
we desire a network resilient to attacks o f up to 4 colluding nodes the limit o f  discrepancies 
I-discrepancies must be equal to 5. In general the number o f  colluding nodes k  that our network model 
can withstand is given by Equation 5-7.
k  L discrepancies 7 (5-7)
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Figure 5-15 C olluding nodes lying in their m etrics about node v2
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Figure 5-16 C olluding nodes in an attem pt to not be detected
A different type o f  collusion is depicted in Figure 5-16. In this case the colluding nodes v2, v3 and 
v4 want to fool the security measures in place by avoiding discrepancy detections. To this end, 
node v2 drops 60 packets out o f  the 100 it is supposed to forward and reports that it has actually 
forwarded the 100 packets. So that node v2 is not detected, vj receives the 40 packets and reports 
that it actually received 100 packets. Now the problem is for node v3 that has to justify  the 40 
packets it forwards instead o f  the 100 expected. In the figure node v4 helps node v3. These tw o 
nodes could agree on reporting 40 packets, but then a self-discrepancy would be detected at node
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v3 because it has already claimed to have received 100 packets. The other option (the one depicted 
in the figure) is to continue forwarding 40 packets and reporting 100. However, at some point a 
discrepancy will be found. For instance, in Figure 5-16 MNs detect a discrepancy for node v4 and 
another for V5. Thus the attempt made by the three colluding nodes to avoid discrepancy 
detections fails. They would only stand a chance to be undetected if node v5 (i.e. the destination) 
helped them to lie by reporting 100 received packets rather than the 40 packets actually received. 
But this situation would not make much sense because V5 would be the only network node 
affected since 60 packets destined for it get lost.
5.3.4 Network Nodes Authenticity and Metrics Integrity
As has been shown in the previous sections of this Chapter, our discrepancy-based protection 
scheme can deal with packet dropping misbehaviour, metric lying misbehaviour and colluding 
nodes up to a predefined number. However, for our protection scheme to work properly it is also 
important to ensure that: i) nodes cannot masquerade as CHs or MNs in order to falsely accuse 
other nodes of misbehaviour, ii) nodes cannot masquerade as other CNs so as to report false 
metrics on their behalf, and iii) reported metrics are not tampered with on their way towards the 
MNs. Although addressing these issues fall out of the scope of this thesis, in this Section we 
briefly explain how security techniques such as digital signatures and data encryption can help to 
provide nodes authenticity and data integrity in our scheme. The idea here presented is by no 
means the only possible solution and we make no assertions regarding its effectiveness. Our sole 
intention is to prove that with the appropriate security structure in place, the proposed protection 
scheme can offer a fairly strong resilience against nodes attempting to masquerade as other 
network nodes (whether MNs, CHs or CNs) and nodes that seek to modify metric packets.
To start with, we assume that all data transfers between network nodes are encrypted (using 
private keys, public keys or one-way hash chains). Thus data integrity is assured and packets 
modified while in transit can be identified by the destination. We also assume that MNs are well 
known entities in the network and that all network nodes are aware of their digital signatures. 
Consequently, network nodes can verify whether a packet has been truly sent by a MN. 
Additionally, MNs are the only Certification Authority for CHs. When a node is elected as a 
virtual cluster’s CH it contacts a MN to be certified. If the MN approves of the election (i.e. if the 
MN is not suspicious of the new CH) it sends back a packet certifying or accepting the new CH. 
The packet is received by the new CH and broadcast to all CNs in the cluster (which can verify 
the authenticity of the packet, as already mentioned) to inform them that it is now an accepted 
CH. Cluster nodes then register with the new CH and assume it is a trusted entity. The CH and its 
CNs can keep a copy of the certification packet in their memory to prove to new nodes in the 
cluster that the CH has been accepted by a MN. However, if a MN does not approve of a CH’s
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election, it sends a packet back to the CH’s virtual cluster for nodes to start a new election without 
including the currently elected CH. This process is repeated until a valid CH is elected. Finally, in 
a similar fashion to CHs, cluster nodes that register with a CH are assumed to be well-behaved 
trusted entities, and as such they are granted access to the network.
Both CNs and CHs can be removed from the lists of trusted entities and subsequently isolated 
from the network if they exhibit any type of misbehaviour, e.g. dropping packets, reporting false 
metrics or even failing to report their metrics in a periodic manner. Nevertheless, the type of 
penalisation associated to each type of misbehaviour depends on the policies defined at MNs by 
high level entities such as applications or network administrators. Penalisations can range from 
simple warnings to eviction from a cluster or total isolation from the network.
When cluster nodes report their metrics to their respective CHs, the CHs keep the signed packets 
in their memories until they have received metrics reports from all its registered CNs or until a 
maximum waiting time has elapsed. Next, CHs create a new packet including all received reports, 
send it to the closest MN (see Section 5.3.1) and wait for an acknowledgement before clearing 
their memories. If an acknowledgement is not received, the metrics are retransmitted until a 
maximum number of retransmissions are reached. MNs receiving a metrics report send back an 
acknowledgement, check the integrity of all packets and the authenticity of their senders, and 
proceed to evaluate the network behaviour as described in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.5 Evaluation Results and Analysis
As in our previous chapters, we perform our simulations using the GloMoSim simulation package
[48] [49]. The results presented for each value are the average of 20 simulation runs. The routing 
protocol home-zone based geo-casting (HZGC) [143], whose basic functionality was described in 
Section 5.2.1, is employed to do packet routing and node location discovery in all simulated 
networks. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, our simulation parameters takes the following 
values: i) nodes move according to the random waypoint mobility model with a constant speed 
chosen uniformly between 4 and 6 m/sec, this yields an average node speed of 5 m/sec and a 
standard deviation of 0.58 m/sec, ii) the wireless transmission range of every node is 100 metres 
iii) the node density is 5x1 O'4 nodes/m2, iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) the MAC layer 
protocol is IEEE 802.11 DCF, vi) the total simulation time for each scenario is 1800 seconds, and 
vii) 8 CBR connections are set up with ideal throughputs of 10240 bits/sec and transmitting 
packets of 256 bytes in size.
Additionally, clustering in the simulated networks is achieved using the virtual clustering 
approach of Section 5.2.1. Each virtual cluster has dimensions 200x200m2 and all networks are 
set up such that a whole number (i.e. without fractions) of virtual clusters fit in them. Each virtual
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cluster has a corresponding cluster head (CH) which is elected as described in Section 5.3.1 and 
using Equation 5-3. However, in our simulations we assume that all network nodes have the same 
processing power PP(Vj) and memory capacity MEM(Vj) and we omit the respective param eters in 
the equation. This means that CHs are elected according to their proximity to the virtual cluster 
centre PVCC(Vj), their mobility ratio MR(Vj) and their accusation likelihood AL(vt), w hich is 
directly proportional to the number o f discrepancies exhibited by node v,. On the other hand, the 
num ber o f m anager nodes (M Ns) in all simulations is 5, regardless o f  the num ber o f  netw ork 
nodes. The home-zone for MNs is always the first virtual cluster (VCID = 1) in the network, and 
all network nodes are aware o f this fact. Finally, in our simulations nodes are accused o f 
m isbehaviour and isolated from the network if  their discrepancy count reaches Ldiscrepancies = 6 .
Our first set o f  simulations aims at demonstrating the effectiveness o f our protection schem e in 
large environments. We simulated 500 node networks in areas o f  1000x1000m2 (i.e. the node 
density is 5x1 O'4 nodes/m 2). Two types o f networks are analysed: networks without m isbehaving 
nodes and network exhibiting misbehaviour. In the latter type o f  networks 40% o f nodes (i.e. 200 
nodes) misbehave by dropping 80% o f  the packets that they are suppose to forward. A dditionally, 
50% o f them (i.e. 100 nodes) lie on their reported metrics in an attempt to hide their 
misbehaviour. Figures 5-17, 5-18 and 5-19 show the results for the evaluated networks. D isplayed 
throughput values in Figure 5-17 correspond to the average network throughput o f  the previous 
180 seconds. Thus, the curves start 180 seconds when the first average network throughput is 
obtained.
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Figure 5-17 shows the average network throughput for three different networks: networks w ithout 
m isbehaving nodes (No M isbehaviour), networks w ith misbehaving nodes but w ithout protection 
(M isbehaviour Alone), and networks with m isbehaviour but protected by our proposed scheme 
(Detection & Accusation). As expected the best and worse cases correspond to the curves No 
M isbehaviour and M isbehaviour Alone respectively. The network im plem enting our approach 
exhibits a low throughput during most o f the first ha lf o f  the simulation, but im proves quickly as 
the simulation time crosses the 720 second mark. The results shown in the figure dem onstrate that 
our approach effectively detects and isolates m isbehaving and lying nodes alike in spite o f  their 
cheer amount. We believe that the slow improvement o f  the network throughput in the initial part 
o f the simulation is due to the large amount o f  m isbehaving nodes. Consequently, although our 
approach starts isolating nodes early in the simulation, as shown in Figure 5-19, enough 
m isbehaving nodes still remain in the network to keep its throughput low.
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Figure 5-18 Instant N etwork M isbehaviour vs. sim ulation tim e (500 node netw ork)
Figure 5-18 introduces a new important param eter to evaluate the effectiveness o f our approach, 
namely the instant network misbehaviour. We define the instant network m isbehaviour as the 
average m isbehaviour o f  all active network nodes (i.e. node that are actually transm itting, 
forwarding and receiving packets in the network) from the last behaviour check. In fact the instant 
network m isbehaviour represents the average num ber o f  packets dropped per active netw ork node, 
but expressed as a percentage o f the total num ber o f  packets that each o f  them is supposed to 
forward. As can be observed from Figure 5-18, networks with no m isbehaving nodes exhibit the 
lowest instant network m isbehaviour values, while networks with m isbehaving nodes but w ithout
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a protection scheme in place exhibit the highest values. On the other hand, networks 
im plem enting our protection scheme exhibit high instant network m isbehaviour values at the start 
o f  the simulation time, but as m isbehaving nodes are detected and isolated those values gradually 
decrease to about 5%. Also, Figure 5-18 confirms an important characteristic o f  our protection 
scheme that was first seen in the evaluation section o f  Chapter 4: a network w ith m isbehaving 
nodes that implements our proposed protection scheme initially behaves like a netw ork with 
m isbehaving nodes and no protection, but after most misbehaving nodes have been isolated from 
the network, the analysed network resembles one that exhibits no misbehaviour. Nevertheless, as 
can be seen from the figure, the instant network m isbehaviour for our analysed netw ork does not 
quite reach the values o f a network without misbehaviour, but this can be due to the significant 
change in the node density. After all, the network starts with 500 nodes and ends w ith ju st about 
300 nodes.
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The purpose o f  Figure 5-19 is to allow the reader to see in a direct m anner how the throughput 
and instant network misbehaviour react as our protection scheme accuses and isolates nodes from 
the network. The values shown the figure have been normalised and expressed in percentages. 
The num ber o f  accused nodes is normalised by dividing currently accused nodes by the total 
number o f m isbehaving nodes (i.e. 200 in the simulated network). Throughput values are 
normalised by dividing them by the ideal throughput (i.e. 10240 for our CBR connection 
parameters). The instant misbehaviour throughput is already expressed as a percentage o f  the total
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number of packets an active node is supposed to forward, as explained in the previous paragraph. 
It can be appreciated from the figure that the instant network misbehaviour starts descending as 
soon as our protection scheme has accused about 30% of misbehaving nodes. The throughput 
however show no signs of improvement until about 80% of the misbehaving nodes have been 
isolated from the network (at simulation time = 720 seconds). These results reinforce the analysis 
made for F igure 5-17.
Our second set of results aims at demonstrating the benefits of providing our protection scheme 
with adaptability through policies. For this set of results we simulated 320 node networks 
covering areas of 800x800m2 in order to maintain the node density at 5x1 O'4 nodes/m2. With the 
exception of networks without misbehaving nodes, all other networks had 40% of their nodes 
misbehaving (i.e. 128 misbehaving nodes). Misbehaving nodes are distributed over 4 groups, each 
containing 25% of misbehaving nodes (i.e. 32 nodes per group) and dropping 20%, 40%, 60% and 
80% of the packets they are supposed to forward respectively. Results are shown for networks 
using a non-adaptable protection scheme (Fixed Detection & Accusation) with misbehaviour 
threshold athreshoid -  70% and networks using an adaptable protection scheme (Adaptable 
Detection & Accusation). Networks with no misbehaving nodes (No Misbehaviour) and networks 
with misbehaving nodes but without protection scheme (Misbehaviour Alone) are also included 
for comparison purposes.
Our adaptable approach works as follows: the protection scheme starts by enforcing a 
misbehaviour threshold athreshoid = 70%, at simulation time t = 300 seconds a high-level policy is 
introduced that requires the system to drive the instant network misbehaviour to under 10%, this 
triggers an algorithm that lowers athreshoid by 20%, waits for 300 seconds, checks if the goal has 
been achieved and if it has not, repeats the process again. In our scenario we assume that policies 
have set a lower limit for athreshoid of 10% to prevent the wrong accusation of well-behaved nodes. 
Therefore, once athreshold reaches 10% at t = 900 seconds it remains the same until the end of the 
simulation. Figures 5-20, 5-21 and 5-22 show our simulation results.
Figure 5-20 demonstrates that our adaptable protection scheme offers better results in terms of the 
average network throughput. Whereas our adaptable approach manages to raise the throughput to 
about 8000 bits/sec, the non-adaptable protection scheme manages to raise it to just above 5000 
bits/sec. However, the improvement offered by the non-adaptable strategy is almost half that of 
the adaptable one even though we expect it to accuse only about 25% of the misbehaving nodes 
(i.e. those dropping 80% of packets). The reason for the somewhat unexpected improvement lies 
in the fact that the non-adaptable scheme isolates from the network those nodes that do most of 
the packet dropping.
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Figure 5-21 complements the results o f  Figure 5-20. In fact, not only does it confirm  that a 
reduction in the instant network m isbehaviour corresponds to an increase in the average network 
throughput, but also that the greater the reduction is the higher the increase is in the corresponding 
network throughput. Additionally, we can appreciate how similar networks im plem enting our 
protection scheme (whether adaptable or non-adaptable) are to networks w ithout protection at the
142
A Collusion-Resistant Misbehaviour Detection and Node Accusation Approach
start o f  the simulation and during its first minutes, when only a handful o f  nodes have been 
isolated from the network.
Figure 5-22 allows us to see the percentage o f  m isbehaving nodes that are accused in the network 
as the sim ulation time elapses. As expected up to t = 300 seconds both approaches behave in 
exactly the same way since their m isbehaviour threshold (^ threshold = 70%. However, 60 seconds 
later at t = 360 seconds a small difference can be observed due to the fact that the adaptable 
protection scheme has started to lower the m isbehaviour threshold in order to achieve the goal 
specified by high-level network managem ent policies (i.e. instant network m isbehaviour < 10%). 
The reaction o f  the adaptable protection scheme to each consecutive lowering o f  the m isbehaviour 
threshold can also be seen at t = 720 seconds and t = 990 seconds, right after a threshoid is changed.
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Our final set o f results illustrate how the selection o f  CHs is affected by the inclusion o f  our 
param eter accusation likelihood (.AL(v,)) in Equation 5-3. This set o f results considers networks o f 
80, 180, 320 and 500 nodes with areas o f  400x400m 2 (4 virtual clusters), 600x600m 2 (9 virtual 
clusters), 800x800m2 (16 virtual clusters) and 1000x1000m2 (25 virtual clusters) respectively. In 
Figures 5-23 and 5-24 is possible to appreciate the average time that nodes spend as CHs and the 
average num ber o f  times that they become CHs during a single simulation, as explained below.
Figure 5-23 shows the average time that network nodes spend as cluster heads. In the figure two 
networks are evaluated that use different strategies to select suitable cluster heads for each virtual 
cluster. The first network (Normal) employs parameters virtual cluster centre PVCC(vj) and
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mobility ratio M R (\)  (as already stated we assum e that all nodes have the same PP(Vj) and 
MEM(Vj)). The second network (Discrepancy Based) utilises the parameter accusation likelihood 
AL(Vj), which is directly proportional to the num ber o f discrepancies exhibited by a node, in 
addition to PVCC(Vj) and MR(v,). Figure 5-23 exhibits curves for both w ell-behaved nodes (Good) 
and m isbehaving nodes (Bad). As it can be appreciated from the figure, when a ‘N orm al’ strategy 
is used to select CHs, well-behaved nodes and m isbehaving nodes spend about the same tim e in 
CH role. On the contrary, when a ‘D iscrepancy Based’ capability function is employed, 
misbehaving nodes spend significantly less time as CHs while, in a parallel manner, well-behaved 
nodes see their average CH-role time increase to compensate for the lack o f  “good enough” 
nodes. This demonstrates that the accusation likelihood contributes towards a better selection o f 
nodes suitable to be CHs and helps to prevent m isbehaving nodes from staying long periods o f 
time as CHs. Additionally, electing as CH a node that is about to be isolated from the netw ork due 
to its m isbehaviour is pointless since sooner rather than later a new selection process has to be 
triggered. Finally, as can be observed in Figure 5-23, all nodes seem to be less likely to stay for 
long periods o f  time as CHs as the number o f  nodes in the network increases.
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Figure 5-24 illustrates how many times on average a node becomes CH during the course o f  a 
simulation. The figure shows different curves for well-behaved nodes (Good), m isbehaving nodes 
(Bad) and for networks using discrepancies (Discrepancy Based) and not using them (Normal). 
As in the previous figure, the curves corresponding to the ‘Discrepancy Based’ function clearly
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discrim inate between well-behaved nodes and misbehaving ones. This improves cluster stability 
and system reliability in addition to boost the trust o f nodes in cluster heads. Additionally, Figure 
5-24 shows that, unlike the average tim e that nodes spend as CHs, the average num ber o f  times 
that a node becomes cluster head is proportional to the number o f nodes in the network.
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Figure 5-24 A verage num ber o f  tim es that netw ork nodes becom e C H s vs. 
num ber o f netw ork nodes (node density = 5x1 O'4 nodes/m 2)
5.4 Summary
In this Chapter we have first presented a highly efficient network clustering algorithm which 
endows our adaptable protection scheme with the ability to scale well to large com puting 
environments. This is a desirable characteristic for solutions targeting ubiquitous com puting 
systems since they can typically consist o f hundreds o f  devices embedded in the users’ 
surroundings.
We have also introduced the concept o f discrepancies, which gives nodes under evaluation the 
chance to tell their “own side o f  the story” by reporting metrics on their own behaviour. Then 
through a series o f  proof-of-concept examples we demonstrated that the discrepancies concept 
renders our adaptable protection scheme capable o f dealing with lying nodes that report false 
metrics in order to hide their own m isbehaviour or in an attempt to get peer nodes accused o f 
misbehaviour. Also, we have shown through examples that our approach is resilient to attacks 
launch by colluding nodes, provided that the num ber o f colluding nodes is not greater than
L  discrepancies 1  •
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Finally, by analysing the results of simulated networks consisting of 80, 180, 320 and 500 nodes 
and exhibiting up to 200 misbehaving nodes, we have established the capacity of our approach to 
scale well to large MANET-like environments. The results have demonstrated that despite the 
sheer amount of misbehaving and lying nodes in the network our adaptable protection scheme 
virtually detects, accuses and isolates all of them. Additionally, we have also verified through 
simulations that by using discrepancies to determine a node’s aptness to be cluster head, the 
amount of misbehaving nodes that become cluster heads and the average time they spend in this 
role can be considerably reduced.
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Chapter 6
6 Summary, Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary
The need to protect the transmission capabilities of wireless multihop communications and more 
specifically of ubiquitous computing environments (UCEs) was the key motivation behind the 
research undertaken in this thesis. To this end, we have proposed a protection scheme that 
effectively detects, accuses and penalises nodes exhibiting packet forwarding misbehaviour that 
aims at disrupting the communication process in UCEs which rely on wireless multihop 
transmission. Below, we detail the contributions made to the different aspects of the proposed 
protection scheme:
a. Collection of information for behaviour evaluation
We have proposed to collect the packets transmitted to forward and forwarded by network nodes, 
i.e. the nodes’ behaviour metrics, in order to determine the number of packets that they do not 
forward. Two main strategies for behaviour metrics collection were proposed: a limited broadcast 
approach and a hierarchical and organisational role-based model. Our limited broadcast approach 
is tailored to small scale environments and seeks to collect an evaluated node’s behaviour metrics 
from its local neighbourhood. On the other hand, our organisational role-based model establishes 
a three tier hierarchy where nodes in the middle layer (cluster heads - CHs) collect metrics from 
their neighbourhood or cluster (cluster nodes - CNs) and send them to top-layer nodes (manager 
nodes - MNs) which are in charge of detecting and accusing misbehaving nodes. The scalability 
of our organisational model is closely related to the clustering algorithm employed in the network.
b. Accurate detection of misbehaving nodes
In this particular aspect we believe that we have moved a step forward with respect to most work 
found in the literature. First of all, the proposed protection scheme does not suffer from common 
problems such as ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions or nodes capable of controlling their 
transmission power because it does not use promiscuous listening to detect misbehaving nodes.
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Secondly, two methods have been proposed to assess a node’s possible misbehaviour: a 
detection-based method and a discrepancy-based method. The detection-based method employs 
metrics reported by an evaluated node’s neighbours to determine the fraction of packets it has 
failed to forward. If the fraction of packets dropped is higher than the network’s misbehaviour 
threshold, then a misbehaviour detection occurs. The discrepancy-based method, on the other 
hand, utilises an evaluated node’s own reported metrics in addition to those reported by its 
neighbours to determine whether a node is misbehaving. In this method a behaviour discrepancy 
occurs when two nodes disagree on their reported metrics by a fraction larger than the network’s 
misbehaviour threshold. In our proposed protection scheme the more misbehaviour detections or 
behaviour discrepancies a node exhibits, the more likely it is to be truly misbehaving. We have 
also proved through simulations that both these strategies allow our protection scheme to 
discriminate adequately between misbehaving and well-behaved nodes.
c. Accurate and effective accusation of misbehaving nodes
Accusation is another aspect of our protection scheme that is not available in many of the 
approaches found in the literature; where avoidance rather than penalisation seems to be the 
common trend. It is our view, as we have expressed it in this thesis, that nodes should not be 
awarded with less work for their misbehaviour and at the same time let them retain their network 
and service access privileges. For this reason, our protection scheme has been endowed with the 
ability to accuse and penalise misbehaving nodes. In this work, we have favoured node isolation 
as an adequate penalty for misbehaving nodes that discourages intentional misbehaviour.
Accuracy in our approach is achieved by examining a node’s behaviour over a period of time. 
Single detections or discrepancies are not enough to penalise misbehaving nodes since this 
approach could lead to the removal of useful well-behaved nodes from the network. Instead our 
protection scheme penalises only those nodes that are persistently misbehaving, i.e. exhibiting 
certain number of detections or discrepancies over a period of time. The effectiveness of this 
strategy has been tested in all chapters of this thesis with extensive sets of simulations and their 
corresponding results analysis.
d. Adaptability
We have proposed the use of policy based management (PBM) to make our protection scheme 
capable of adapting to the dynamic conditions of MANET-like UCEs. We have also presented 
how policies can be distributed to network nodes making use of the same organisational 
role-based model employed to collect behaviour metrics. Within this context, MNs have been 
selected as the interface between our scheme and network administrators, who define the 
high-level policies to be enforced in the network. CHs have been given the task of distributing the
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management policies to all CNs, which are network nodes without sophisticated management 
capabilities that receive and enforce in a local manner polices coming from CHs and MNs. We 
have also demonstrated through specific simulation scenarios the advantages that our policy-based 
adaptable protection scheme has over our non-adaptable approach.
e. Network Clustering
Two network clustering algorithms that allow for the selection of CHs have been studied and 
tested in this work. The first algorithm [127] is a well-known method that creates and maintains a 
connected dominating set (CDS) in a fully distributed and decentralised manner. Although this 
algorithm has several known drawbacks, we have used it to prove the feasibility and correctness 
of our proposed approach. The second studied algorithm [143] is an efficient network clustering 
method based on the geographical location of network nodes. In addition to allowing for a better 
selection of CHs, this algorithm provides our protection scheme with the scalability properties 
required so that it can be deployed in UCEs, which typically consist of large numbers of devices 
and sensors. Our simulation results and their analysis demonstrated the suitability an efficiency of 
each method in the creation of a hypercluster (overlay) of CHs to collect behaviour metrics and 
distribute network management policies.
f. Resilience to lying nodes
It was shown in Chapter 5 that in our protection scheme misbehaving nodes can report false 
metrics as a means to launch an attack that seeks to isolate well-behaved nodes from the network. 
We have addressed this problem by allowing evaluated nodes to report metrics about their own 
behaviour and then detecting discrepancies between reported metrics. Our simulation results have 
shown that the discrepancy-based protection scheme effectively accuses misbehaving and lying 
nodes alike, while maintaining a low probability of wrongly accusing well-behaved nodes.
g. Resilience to colluding nodes
In this thesis we have identified collusion as one of the principal and most difficult problems to be 
tackled by protection mechanisms. In this work we have made an effort towards tackling 
colluding nodes that work in a cooperative manner to frame a well-behaved node for 
misbehaviour. Our proposed solution makes use of the discrepancies concept with a slight 
modification so that successive discrepancies between a same pair of nodes are counted only once 
towards the accusation of the nodes. We demonstrated the effectiveness of our solution through a 
proof-of-concept example where 4 colluding nodes attempt to remove from the network a 
well-behaved node.
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6.2 Conclusions
This Section offers a few concluding remarks and observations within the context of the work
undertaken in this thesis:
o The self-regulating nature of UCEs requires that they be able to monitor the behaviour of their 
devices. UCEs’ heterogeneity supposes the presence of devices with limited resources, which 
is an incentive for nodes to misbehave by failing to forward packets in an attempt to preserve 
their scarce resources (e.g. selfish nodes saving battery power). Additionally, UCEs’ ad hoc 
nature, which allows users to join and leave the network at their will, creates the potential risk 
of admitting malicious users that seek to disrupt the communication process by lunching 
black-hole and grey-hole attacks. Also, it is possible that nodes misbehave for other reasons.
o Although this work has been developed in the context of wireless networks the principle 
employed is general enough to be applied to other types of networks. However, we make no 
attempt to state or predict the efficiency, effectiveness or modifications that our approach may 
require to work properly in such systems.
o Our proposed protection scheme does not require high density networks in which many nodes 
can promiscuously listen (overhear) to each others’ received and transmitted packets. Instead, 
it uses metrics accumulated by nodes that are actively intervening in the communication 
process by sending, receiving and forwarding data packets.
o In general, the fewer packets a misbehaving node drops the more its behaviour resembles that 
of a well-behave node, as it can be appreciated from our simulation result figures. Thus, a 
misbehaving node could potentially avoid being detected and accused of misbehaviour by 
dropping a small fraction of packets. However, it would also mean that our proposed scheme 
would have managed to enforce a minimum level of good behaviour (or a maximum level of 
misbehaviour) on the misbehaving node. The simulation results indicate that misbehaving 
nodes should not drop more than 8% of packets above the network average to have a chance of 
not being detected (there is also the chance that they will be detected anyway).
o Making use of policies at the management plane to control our protection scheme gives 
networks administrators a powerful tool to adjust the system to a UCE’s particular needs. For 
example, network administrators could apply different types of penalty or trigger different 
actions when nodes are accused of misbehaviour. If the accused node is a well-known base 
station, the best course of action could be to send a notification to an administrator or try 
restarting the base station. Isolating the misbehaving base station would most likely exacerbate 
the packet dropping problem detected in the UCE.
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o  Tackling colluding nodes is a complex task that is not always possible to accomplish. In this 
work we have managed to design a strategy to provide UCEs with resilience against nodes that 
collude to hide their misbehaviour or to frame well-behaved nodes for misbehaviour. 
However, our strategy has an upper limit for the number of colluding nodes it can resist that is 
directly proportional to the number of discrepancies required to accuse a node of 
misbehaviour. Thus, modifying the number of colluding nodes our protection scheme can 
handle changes the probability of nodes being accused of misbehaviour too.
6.3 Future Work and Open Issues
In this work we have addressed the specific problem of how to tackle packet forwarding 
misbehaviour in ubiquitous computing environments. However, there are issues that have been 
left unaddressed or are susceptible of improvement. Below, we propose some future research 
directions that we consider interesting to complement and extend work presented in this thesis.
o  In Section 3 . 3 . 2  and Section 5 . 3 . 4  we showed how security services such as authenticity and 
data integrity can help to prevent the misuse of our proposed protection scheme, increase 
nodes’ trust in the correctness of reported metrics, and provide confidence in the veracity of 
detection alert and accusation packets. However, although providing our protection scheme 
with the basic security services (authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data 
integrity, non-repudiation and service availability) is important to make its deployment 
possible in real environments, this field is complex and deserves its own piece o f research. For 
this reason we propose it as an interesting area of research to further extend this thesis work.
o  Our research efforts have been focused on examining the forwarding behaviour of network 
nodes. Nevertheless, metrics can be collected to evaluate nodes’ behaviour in other areas. For 
instance, network nodes could maintain and report metrics on the route request packets 
generated by other nodes so as to identify denial of service (DoS) attacks or on the number of 
data packets originating at each node to detect greedy behaviour. We consider that identifying 
other types of misbehaviour through collection of behaviour information is a possible path for 
future research seeking to enhance the scope of the undertaken work.
o  In this thesis policies have been used as a means to provide our protection scheme with 
adaptability to the dynamic conditions of UCEs. Policies express the high-level goals of a 
managing entity and are interpreted into low-level policies that dynamically control the 
operation of our protection scheme. However, there are two important areas with the context of 
policy based management (PBM) that we have not addressed in this work: policy conflicts and 
policy refinement. Policy conflicts can occur in our scheme when multiple policies and the 
network dynamic conditions affect simultaneously the values of the same managed object
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parameters. On the other hand, policy refinement deals with the appropriate translation of 
high-level policies (e.g. setting the detection rigidness of our approach) and variables (e.g. the 
probability of wrong accusation) to low-level algorithm configuration (e.g. the value of the 
misbehaviour threshold a threshoid.)• We propose that these two open issues be addressed through 
future research.
o Currently it is possible to find in the literature a number of approaches that seek to protect 
network communication protocols against a wide variety of attacks. In particular, in Chapter 2 
of this thesis we presented some strategies aiming at protecting the route discovery 
functionality of mobile ad hoc routing protocols. We believe that an interesting research work 
would be to study the suitability of such approaches to be integrated with our protection 
scheme, which protects the data forwarding functionality of wireless routing protocols, in 
order to provide a holistic protection solution for wireless multihop routing protocols.
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